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Article
Constructing the Substantive Constitution
James E. Fleming*
I.

Introduction

A.

The Flightsfrom Substance in ConstitutionalTheory

A specter is haunting constitutional theory-the specter of Lochner v.
New York.' In the Lochner era, the Supreme Court gave heightened judicial protection to substantive economic liberties through the Due Process
Clauses. 2 In 1937, during the constitutional revolution wrought by the

* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. A.B. 1977, University of Missouri; J.D.
1985, Harvard University; Ph.D. 1988, Princeton University.
Iam grateful to John Ely and John Rawls for providing helpful comments concerning this Article
and to Cass Sunstein for writing a thoughtful response to it. Special thanks go to Linda McClain for
her patient and constructive readings of numerous drafts. Akhil Amar, Sot Barber, Debby Denno,
Chris Eisgruber, Martin Flaherty, Ned Foley, Samuel Freeman, Will Harris, Tracy Higgins, Bob
Kaczorowski, Greg Keating, Sandy Levinson, Steve Macedo, Frank Miehelman, Walter Murphy, Larry
Sager, Bill Treanor, and Mark Tushnet gave valuable suggestions. I also would like to thank my
research assistants Steven Shaw, Sabrena Silver, and Larry McCabe. Fordham University School of
Law provided generous research support. I presented an earlier version of this Article at a work-inprogress seminar at the AALS Conference on Constitutional Law, the Fordham University School of
Law Faculty Work-in-Progress Colloquium, and the New York University School of Law Colloquium
on Constitutional Theory, and I benefitted from the discussions at these sessions.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. Rv. 873, 873
(1987) (characterizing Lochner as an infamous "defining case" in constitutional law, and a "spectre"
that "has loomed over most important constitutional decisions"); cf. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH
ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848), reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER
469, 473 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) ("A spectre is haunting Europe-the spectre of
Communism.").
2. See, e.g., Atkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a federal minimum
wage law for women and minors as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment);
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3 officially repudiated the Lochner
New Deal, West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
era, marking the first death of substantive due process.4 Nevertheless, the
ghost of Lochner has perturbed constitutional theory ever since, manifesting
itself in charges that judges are "Lochnering" by imposing their own substantive fundamental values in the guise of interpreting the Constitution
The cries of "Lochnering" have been most unrelenting with respect to
Roe v. Wade,6 which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a realm of substantive personal liberty or privacy
broad enough to encompass the right of women to decide whether or not
to terminate a pregnancy. In a well-known critique, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, John Hart Ely attacked the Court for

engaging in Lochnering, arguing that to avoid doing so it must confine
itself to perfecting the processes of representative democracy,7 as intimated
in Justice Stone's famous footnote four of UnitedStates v. CaroleneProd8
ucts Co.
Despite these cries, Planned Parenthood v. Casey9 officially reaffirmed the "central holding" of Roe instead of marking the second death
of substantive due process by overruling it.1" In an apoplectic dissent,

Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61 (invalidating, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
a state maximum hours law that the Court described as "mere meddlesome interference[] with the
rights of the individual" to liberty of contract).
3. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage law and signaling the demise of the
Lochner era by overruling Atkins).
4. For accounts of the official demise of Lochner, see, for example, LAURIENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 8-6 to 8-7 (2d ed. 1988); Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due
Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34, 36-38;
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 873-83. For attempts to resurrect stringent judicial protection of eeonomic
liberties, see, for example, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980).
5. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); John H. Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf-A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). Ely apparently coined the term
"Lochnering" or "to Lochner." Id. at 944.
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. Ely, supra note 5, at 933-45.
8. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
9. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
10. Id. at 2804 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).Justices Stevens and
Blackmun, who would have reaffirmed Roe in its entirety, joined Parts I, II, I1, V-A, V-C, and VI of
the joint opinion, supplying the fourth and fifth votes necessary to make those parts the opinion of the
Court, thus reaffirming Roe. See id. at 2838 (Stevens, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id.at 2843 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part). The remaining four Justices would have overruled Roe. See id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring inthe judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by White, Scalia & Thomas, JJ.);
id.
at 2873 (Scalia, J., concurring in thejudgment in part and'dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
White & Thomas, JJ.).
For different views concerning whether the joint opinion in Casey in fact reaffirmed the central
holding of Roe, contrast Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
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Justice Scalia blasted the Court for continuing to engage in Lochnering,
protesting that the Court must limit itself to giving effect to the original
understanding of the Constitution, narrowly conceived."
Ely's and Scalia's critiques illustrate the two responses to the specter
of Lochner that have dominated constitutional theory since West Coast
Hotel. Both strategies have been widely criticized for taking "pointless
flights from substance": the flights to process and original understanding,
respectively.12 The substance that these dominant responses are said to flee
is not only substantive liberties like privacy or autonomy, but also
substantive political theory in interpreting the Constitution. These flights
are said to be pointless because perfecting processes and enforcing original
understanding inevitably require the very sort of substantive constitutional
choices that these strategies are at pains to avoid.
After Casey, President Clinton's election, and the appointment of Justice Ginsburg to replace Justice White, the long-anticipated second death
of substantive due process is unlikely to come anytime soon."3 What is

HARV. L. Rv. 24, 27-34 (1992) (arguing that Casey preserves Roe) with Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2860
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that "Roe
continues to exist, but only in the way a storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to give
the illusion of reality") and id., 112 S. Ct. at 2881 (Scalia, J., concurring inthe judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (contending that certain "portions of Roe have not been saved"). Prior to the
decision in Casey, some scholars believed that the Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), was evidence of "the second death of substantive due process." See Daniel 0. Conkle,
The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215 (1987).
11. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2883 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (analogizing Roe and Casey to Lochner and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (@57
see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862-65 (1989).
12. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) [hereinafter Tribe, Puzzling Persistence],reprintedin LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 9 (1985) [hereinafter TRIBE, CHOICES] (retitled The Pointless
Flight from Substance) (arguing that Ely's theory takes a pointless flight from making substantive
constitutional choices to perfecting processes); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 469, 470 (1981) (originally entitled The Flightfrom Substance, see Commentary, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 525, 539 n.* (1981)) [hereinafter Dworkin, Forum], reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33, 34 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE] (arguing that the flights from
substance to process and original understanding "end in failure" because "[jludges cannot decide what
the pertinent intention of the Framers was, or which political process is really fair or democratic, unless
they make substantive political decisions of just the sort the proponents of intention or process think
judges should not make"). It may well be that some of Ely's and Scalia's supporters embrace their
theories precisely because they believe that doing so will enable them to flee substance in constitutional
interpretation.
13. President Clinton has indicated that he plans to appoint to the Supreme Court persons who
believe that the Constitution protects the right to privacy, including the right to choose abortion. See
Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Expected to Pick Moderatefor High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
1993, at A9. Justice White and then-Justice Rehnquist dissented in Roe's companion case, Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White & Rehnquist, 11., dissenting), and Justice White joined Chief
Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Scalia's dissents from Casey's refusal to overrule Roe. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2873
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needed is a theory of constructing the substantive Constitution that would

beware of the specter of Lochner, yet also resist the "temptations" to flee
from substance to process or original understanding.14 This Article outlines

a Constitution-perfecting theory: a theory that reinforces not only the
procedural liberties, but also the substantive liberties embodied in our
Constitution. 5 This theory constructs the substantive Constitution by
securing both the preconditions for deliberative democracy and the preconditions for deliberative autonomy in our constitutional democracy.
B.

Between Process and Substance
In 1980, Ely published Democracy and Distrust,the pinnacle of the

Carolene Products tradition, elaborating the theory that courts should

perfect the processes of representative democracy rather than impose substantive fundamental values.

6

His theory has two elegant, comprehensive

(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg believes that
the Constitution protects the right of a woman to choose abortion, although she contends that sex
equality arguments for such a right are better than autonomy or privacy arguments. See Ruth B.
Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1198-1200 (1992); Ruth B.
Ginsburg, Some 7wughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv.
375, 379-83 (1985).
14. This Article focuses primarily on the flight from substance to process. In Casey, the joint
opinion resisted the temptations, in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
to take a flight from substantive liberties to procedural liberties or to original understanding. See
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804-06 (acknowledging that it was tempting to abdicate the responsibility of
exercising reasoned judgment). The joint opinion discussed the infamous era of Lochner, id. at 2812,
but it reiterated that the Due Process Clause protects substantive liberties, "a realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter." Id. at 2805. Justice Scalia angrily replied that the Court's
"temptation" is not to abdicate responsibility but rather "in the quite opposite and more natural
direction-towards systematically eliminating checks upon its own power; and it succumbs." Id. at
2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). For similar notions of
"temptation" and "seduction," see BOR.K, supra note 5, passim; Robert H. Bork, Again, a Strugglefor
the Soul of the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1992, at A19.
15. I mean "perfecting" in the sense of interpreting the Constitution with integrity so as to render
it a coherent whole, not in Monagban's caricatured sense of "Our Perfect Constitution" as a perfect
liberal utopia or an "ideal object" of political morality. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 356 (1981); cf. Frank I. Michelman, Constancy t an Ideal
Object, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 406, 407 (1981) (distinguishing "weak-sense perfectionism" or
"constitutional rationalism" from "strong-sense perfectionism"). For the notion of law as integrity,
see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-224 (1986).
16. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-77 (1980) (characterizing his own theory as
filling in the outlines of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)); see
Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 131 (1981) (stating that Ely's book "culminates" the CaroleneProductstradition); Richard D. Parker, The Past of ConstitutionalTheory-And
Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 223 (1981) (claiming that Ely's book "perfect[s]" the tradition).
There have been many valuahle discussions of CarokneProducts. See, e.g., LOuIS LusKY, BY WHAT
RIGHT? 108-12 (1975); ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 512-17
(1956); J.L. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 275 (1989); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of
JudicialActivism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982); Louis Lusky, Footnote
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themes: first, keeping the processes of political communication and participation open, and second, keeping those processes free of prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities, in order to assure equal concern and respect
for everyone alike.17
Although numerous critics have charged Ely with taking a pointless
flight from substance to process, his book has 'set the terms that have
framed the central debates in constitutional theory for over a decade.18 An
important reason for the persistence of process-perfecting theories such as
Ely's, 9 notwithstanding the resistance to them,' is that no one has done
for "substance" what Ely has done for "process." That is, no one has
developed a Constitution-perfecting theory with the elegance and power of
Ely's process-perfecting theory.2'

Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1982); Lewis F. Powell,
Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982).
17. ELY, supra note 16, at 75-88. By "elegant," 1 mean to suggest the notion of elegance in the
construction of scientific theories. An important reason for the attractiveness of Ely's theory is its
elegance. For assessments of Ely's book that stress this aspect, see, for example, Harry H. Wellington,
The Importance of Being Elegant, 42 OHIO ST. LJ. 427 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, Equality,
Democracy, and Constitution: We the People in Court, 28 ALBERTA L. REV. 324, 328 (1990).
18. See Symposium, Democracy and Distrust. Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. REV. 631 (1991).
19. See Tribe, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 12, at 1063 (expressing puzzlement at the
"persistence of process-based constitutional theories").
20. See Miebael J. Kiarman, The Puzzling Resistance to PoliticalProcess Theory, 77 VA. L. REV.
747, 772-82 (1991) (providing a partial defense of Ely's theory against various critiques).
21. Nevertheless, there has been a great deal of sophisticated work about the need for substantive
political theory or substantive constitutional choices in interpreting the Constitution. See, e.g., I
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); SOTI.Ios A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984) [hereinafter BARBER, CONSTITUTION]; SOTIPIOS A. BARBER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1993) [hereinafter BARBER, JUDICIAL POWER]; PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONALFATE (1982); PHILIP BOBBIrr, CONsTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, RIGHTS]; DWORKIN, supra note
15; EPSTEIN, supra note 4; WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION (1993);
STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES (1990); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIElCE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1993)
[hereinafter RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE]; DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONSOF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1989) [hereinafter RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS]; DAVID AJ. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1986) [hereinafter RICHARDS, TOLERATION]; SiEGAN, supra note 4; ROGERS M.
SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1985); TIBE, CHOICES, supra note 12;
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991); Dworkin,

Forum, supra note 12; Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the Constitutional
Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43 DUKE L.J. 1 (1993); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces]; Frank I.
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman, Law's Republic];
Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 3 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993);

Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering ofConsdiuional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 703 (1980) [hereinafter
Murphy, Ordering]; Lawrence G. Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 417 (1981) [hereinafter Sager, Skepticism]; LawrenceG. Sager, The IncorrigibleConstitution,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893 (1990); Tribe, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 12.
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In an important new book, The Partial Constitution,

Cass R.

Sunstein advances a rich, synthetic theory that might appear to be such a
Constitution-perfecting theory. He claims to avoid Ely's putative flight

from substance by clearly grounding his own constitutional theory in a
substantive political theory of liberal republicanism or deliberative
democracy.'
Sunstein's theory seems at once more liberal and more
republican than Ely's: that is, to stem froi both a more robust vision of
"liberal" substantive liberties and a richer vision of "republican" political
processes.2' Furthermore, he makes the bold and imaginative claim that

what was wrong with Lochner had nothing to do with protecting substantive fundamental values; rather, it was the Court's use of "status quo
neutrality" and existing distributions as the baseline from which to

distinguish unconstitutionally partisan political decisions from impartial
ones.'

Deliberative democracy, to the contrary, reflects a commitment to

an impartial Constitution, understanding impartiality as requiring the
government to provide public-regarding reasons for its decisions.
Nevertheless, those who thought that Ely's theory was the grandest

process-perfecting theory of them all, or that it had sounded the Hegelian
death knell for such theories,27 may be in for a surprise. For Sunstein's
liberal republicanism leads to a theory of judicial review whereby courts
principally should secure the preconditions for deliberative democracy, and
the structure of his theory parallels that of Ely's Carolene Products

22. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). Sunstein's book, which is likely to
be regarded by some as the most important book in constitutional theory since Ely's Democracy and
Distrust,judiciously weaves together strands of liberalism, republicanism, pragmatism, and feminism,
drawing significantly upon the work of John Rawls, John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, and Catharine A.
MacKinnon.
23. See id. at 104-05, 142-45.
24. Thus, Sunstein's liberal republicanism might seem to satisfy two lines of criticism of Ely's
theory: one, that the latter is not liberal enough, or that it stems from too frail a vision of substantive
rights, see, e.g., Dworkin, Forum, supra note 12, at 513-16; Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: 7he Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV.L. REV. 1, 9-10, 16-17 (1979); Tribe, Puzzling Persistence, supranote 12, at 1064,
1076 & n.66; and two, that it is not republican enough, or that it reflects an impoverished vision of
political processes, see, e.g., Parker, supra note 16, at 239-57.
25. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 45-62, 259-61; Sunstein, supra note 1, at 874-75, 882-83.
26. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 10, 24-25.
27. The allusion is to G.W.F. HEEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 13 (T.M. Knox trans., 1942)
("When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey
in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with
the falling of the dusk."). The idea of the Hegelian death knell is that Ely, by giving the Carolene
Products paradigm its fullest development, or its most expansive elaboration, has shown processperfecting tradition's ultimate incompleteness, if not rendered it anachronistic. Many scholars have
suggested that Ely has perfected the CaroleneProducts tradition. See Brest, supra note 16, at 131-32;
Parker, supra note 16, at 223, 240-45; see also Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98
HARv. L. REv. 713, 716-17 & 716 n.6 (1985) (noting Ely's contribution to the Carolene Products
framework, but advocating moving beyond it).
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theory.' Moreover, his theory gives remarkably little attention to substantive liberties such as privacy and autonomy, affording them constitutional
protection, if at all, largely on the basis of equality rather than liberty. For
example, Sunstein specifically eschews a substantive due process approach
in favor of an equal protection approach in defending Roe and Casey and
criticizing Bowers v. Hardwick. 9 In fact, he all but cedes the Due Process
Clause to Justice Scalia, practically accepting Scalia's narrow conception
of it as embracing procedural due process and only those substantive
liberties historically and traditionally protected, a conception pointedly
rejected in Casey.' In that sense, Sunstein's theory, like Ely's, represents
a flight from protecting substantive liberties.
C. Toward a ConstitutionalConstructivism
To move beyond Ely's and Sunstein's process-perfecting theories to
a Constitution-perfecting theory, I outline a constitutional constructivism.
I mean constitutional constructivism in both a methodological sense-as a
method of interpreting the Constitution-and a substantive sense-as the
substantive political theory that best fits and justifies our constitutional
document and our underlying constitutional order. I develop such a theory
by analogy to John Rawls's political constructivism,31 a theory developed
in his significant new book, PoliticalLiberalism. 2

28. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 144, 142-44 (arguing that none of the criticisms of Ely's
theory "fundamentally damages the view that interpretive principles should be based first and foremost
on considerations of democracy" and acknowledging parallels between the two themes of Ely's theory
ofjudicial review and his own theory).
29. See id. at 35, 259-61, 270-85 (defending Roe and Casey and rejecting a privacy or autonomy
justification in favor of an equal protection justification for the right of a woman to decide whether to
have an abortion); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1163, 1174-75
(1988); SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 131-32, 154, 156-57, 402-03 n.17 (both criticizing Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and arguing that the Due Process Clause is backward-looking,
safeguarding traditional practices against short-run departures, while the Equal Protection Clause is
forward-looking and is critical of existing practices that deny equality, however long-standing and
deeply rooted).
30. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992) (joint opinion) (rejecting as
"inconsistent with our law" Justice Scalia's conception of due process, put forth in Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
31. Rawls's political constructivism seeks to construct principles ofjustice that provide fair terms
of social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and trust among free and equal citizens in a morally
pluralistic constitutional democracy such as our own, rather than to discover principles of justice that
are true for all times and all places. The latter project is that of theories of moral realism or natural
law. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 90-99 (1993). For elaboration of the two senses of
constitutional constructivism, see infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying
notes 353-57.

32. In PoliticalLiberalism, Rawls significantly reformulates his well-known theory of justice as
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). In his new book, Rawls addresses "the
problem of political liberalism": "How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just
fairness.
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Constitutional constructivism is, however, a theory of constructing our

substantive Constitution, as distinguished from a theory of constructing the
just constitution (unmoored by the constraints of our constitutional text,
history, and structure).

It entails a theory of judicial review with two

elegant, comprehensive themes: first, securing the preconditions for deliberative democracy, to enable citizens to apply their capacity for a conception of justice to deliberating about the justice of basic institutions and

social policies, and second, securing the preconditions for deliberative
autonomy, to enable citizens to apply their capacity for a conception of the
good to deliberating about how to live their own lives, in order to afford
everyone the common and guaranteed status of free and equal citizenship

in our morally pluralistic constitutional democracy.'

It neither flees

substantive political theory nor flees protecting substantive liberties.
Constitutional constructivism is a Constitution-perfecting theory in the
sense that it gives meaningful effect to the substantive liberties along with
the procedural liberties embodied in our Constitution.

society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious,
philosophical, and moral doctrines?" RAWLS, supranote31, at xviii. Put anotherway, he asks: "How
is it possible that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all
affirm the political conception [of justice] of a constitutional regime?" Id. The major change from A
Theory of Justiee is that the earlier work had treated his conception of justice as fairness not as a
political conception of justice, but as a comprehensive philosophical doctrine that all citizens would
endorse in a well-ordered society. See id. at xv-xvii.
Much work in constitutional theory has been inspired by Rawls's A Theory of Justice, most
notably that of David A.J. Richards and that of Frank 1. Michelman. See, e.g., RICHARDS,
CONSCIENCE, supranote 21; RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS, supranote 21; RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra
note 21; Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protectingthe PoorThrough the FourteenthAmendment,
83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969); Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuitof ConstitutionalWelfare Rights: One
View of Rawis' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); Frank 1. Michelman, Welfare Rights
in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659 [hereinafter Michelman, Welfare Rights].
For applications of Rawls's articles since A Theory of Justice to constitutional theory, see, for example,
Samuel Freeman, ConstitutionalDemocracy and the Legitimacy of JudicialReview, 9 LAW & PHIL.
327 (1990-91) [hereinafter Freeman, ConstitutionalDemocracy];Samuel Freeman, OriginalMeaning,
DemocraticInterpretation,andthe Constitution, 21 PHIL. & PUB. APF. 3 (1992) [hereinafter Freeman,
DemocraticInterpretation];Stephen M. Griffin, ReconstructingRawis's Theory ofJustice:Developing
a Public Values Philosophy ofthe Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 715 (1987); Symposium, Rawlsian
Theory of Justice: Recent Developments, 99 ETHICS 695 (1989).
33. Throughout this Article, my use of such terms as "our" Constitution, or "our" constitutional
document and "our" underlying constitutional order, should not be read as ignoring the tension between
such inclusive references and the historical exclusion of categories of persons from "We the People"
as well as from "free and equal citizenship." See Angela P. Harris, Race andEssentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 582-83 (1992) (observing that the voice of "We the People" in
the Preamble of the Constitution "does not speak for everyone," nor does "men" or "people" in the
Declaration of Independence include everyone) (citing JAMES B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR
MEANING 232 (1984)); Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2 (1987) (observing that the "We the People" who ratified the
original Constitution did not include African-Americans or women); see also RAWLS, supra note 31,
at xxix, 238-39 (stating that the principle of equality underlying the Deelaration of Independence and
the Constitution condemns slavery of African-Americans and oppression of women).
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In Part II, I reconsider Ely's theory, assessing the common charges
that it takes a flight from substance: that it flees substantive political theory
in interpreting the Constitution and that it flees giving effect to certain
substantive constitutional provisions. I argue that his theory does not take
the first flight: it is not a process-basedtheory at all, but rather a processperfectingtheory that perfects processes in virtue of its substantive basis in
a political theory of representative democracy (a qualified utilitarianism
rooted in equal concern and respect). Ely's theory, however, does take the
second flight: his two process-perfecting themes do not account for, and
thus leave out, certain substantive liberties that are manifested in our
constitutional document and implicit in our underlying constitutional order.
Still, his interpretive method shows the need for a Constitution-perfecting
theory, such as a constitutional constructivism.
In Part III, I consider Sunstein's theory, examining the extent to which
it moves beyond perfecting processes to perfecting the Constitution substantively as well. Sunstein repeatedly states that his theory of deliberative
democracy is entirely compatible with the theories of constitutional democracy put forward by John Stuart Mill and Rawls.' But his theory lacks a
principal theme of securing the preconditions for deliberative autonomy,
and it recasts certain substantive liberties such as privacy, autonomy, and
liberty of conscience as preconditions for deliberative democracy or, worse
yet, leaves them out entirely. From the standpoint of constitutional constructivism, Sunstein's theory proves, contrary to his intention, to be a
theory of "the partial Constitution." His theory is partial, not whole,
because it would not fully secure the preconditions for deliberative autonomy. Furthermore, it is partial,not impartial,for it consequently would
not adequately protect citizens' pursuit of their divergent conceptions of the
good from coercive political power.
Finally, in Part IV, I outline a constitutional constructivism, a Constitution-perfecting theory. It is a theory of constitutional democracy and
trustworthiness, an alternative to Ely's theory of representative democracy
and distrust and to Sunstein's theory of deliberative democracy and impartiality.35 To be trustworthy, a constitutional democracy must secure and

34. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 141, 175, 186; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1566-71 (1988) (outlining a theory of liberal republicanism
and noting affinitites between it and Rawls's theory).
35. To fix ideas, I shall use the term "constitutional democracy" to refer to a Rawlsian theory of
our underlying constitutional order, "representative democracy" to refer to Ely's theory, and
"deliberative democracy" to refer to Sunstein's. These terms are for the most part consistent with
Rawls's, Ely's, and Sunstein's usages. On occasion, however, Sunstein refers to his own theory of
deliberative democracy as a theory of constitutional democracy. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 22,
at 14, 193.
There is a long-standing conflict between the political and constitutional theories of
constitutionalism and democracy. In their purest forms, constitutionalism is concerned with limited
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respect not only the procedural preconditions for deliberative democracy
but also the substantive preconditions for deliberative autonomy. 6 Ely's
and Sunstein's process-perfecting theories secure only the former type of

precondition for trust or impartiality.

Constitutional constructivism

provides a framework to guide the exercise of reasoned judgment in con-

structing the substantive Constitution so as to give both substance and
process their due. 7
H. Beyond Ely's Theory of Reinforcing Representative Democracy
In Democracy and Distrust,Ely argues that courts should perfect the
processes of representative democracy rather than impose substantive fundamental values. As such, his theory is widely thought-by critics and

supporters alike-to represent a flight from substance to process. 38 In The

government and democracy with unfettered majority rule. See WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E.
FLmAING & WILLIAM F. HARRis I1,AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTEPPRETATION 23-46 (1986)
[hereinafter MURPHY, FLEMING & HARRIS]. The political system of the United States is a complex
hybrid of constitutionalism and democracy, or a constitutional democracy, rather than a representative
democracy. See id.A constitutional democracy is a system in which a constitution imposes limits on
the content of legislation: To be valid, a law must be consistent with fundamental rights and liberties
embodied in the constitution. A representative democracy, by contrast, is a system in which there are
no constitutional limits on the content of legislation: Whatever a majority enacts is law, provided the
appropriateprocedural preconditions are met. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Brief Restatement
§ 43 (1992) (unpublishedmanuscript, on file with the author). Constitutional constructivism is a theory
of constitutional democracy, whereas Ely's theory, with certain qualifications, see infra text
accompanying note 77, is a theory of representative democracy. Sunstein claims to resolve "the muchvaunted opposition between constitutionalism and democracy" through his theory of deliberative
democracy.
SUNSrEIN, supra note 22, at 142; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutions and
Democracies:AnEpilogue, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRAcY 327 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad
eds., 1988) (exploring the relationship between different conceptions of democracy and different
approaches to constitutionalism). I argue that the model of constitutional democracy better fits and
justifies our constitutional document and underlying constitutional order than does Ely's model of
representative democracy or Sunstein's model of deliberative democracy.
36. For Rawls's reference to trustworthiness, see RAWLS, supra note 31, at 319; infra text
accompanying note 429.
37. For the idea of a "guiding framework," see RAWLS, supra note 31, at 368 (describing a
"guiding framework" for deliberation). For the notion of "reasoned judgment" in the specific context
of substantive due process, see the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2806 (1992) ("The inescapablefact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon
the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts
always have exercised: reasonedjudgment."). Thejoint opinion was echoing Justice, Harlan's famous
conception of judgment, not as a formula or bright-line rule, but as a "rational process." See Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. kAWLS, supra note 31, at 222 ("[W]e
may over the course of life come freely to accept, as the outcome of reflective thought and reasoned
judgment, the ideals, principles, and standards that specify our basic rights and liberties, and effectively
guide and moderate the political power to which we are subject." (emphasis added)). As for the notion
of giving both substance and process their due, contrast Monaghan, supra note 15, at 355 (referring,
disparagingly, to "the 'due substance clauses': substantive due process and substantive equal
protection").
38. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Wages of Crying Wolf, Ely ariticizes Roe by telling a fable of the theorists
who cried "Lochner" too often. 9 In assessing Ely's theory, I tell a
parallel fable of the theorist who cried "substance" too indiscriminately,
the wages of which are that he is fated to suffer reiterations of the mistaken
charge that his theory of the Constitution flees substantive political theory.
This Article interprets Ely's project as a quest for a process-perfecting
"ultimate interpretivism" that is based on a substantive political theory of
representative democracy, a qualified utilitarianism rooted in equal concern
and respect.' From that standpoint, I argue that Ely's own interpretive
method shows the need for a Constitution-perfecting theory, such as a constitutional constructivism, that would give meaningful effect to the substantive liberties embodied in our Constitution along with the procedural
liberties. Such a theory would move beyond process to substance.
A.

An Outline of Ely's Questfor the Ultimate Interpretivism

I.
The False Dichotomy Between Interpretivism and Noninterpretivism.-At the outset, I sketch the terrain of constitutional theory as Ely
sees it and indeed has defined it for over a decade.41 Constitutional theory,
on his view, is dominated by a false dichotomy between two theories of
judicial review.42 "Clause-bound interpretivists" (or "originalists") believe
that "judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to
enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written

39. Ely, supra note 5, at 943-45.
40. See ELY, supra note 16, at 82, 88; James E. Fleming, A Critique of John Hart Ely's Quest
for the Ultimate ConstitutionalInterpretivism of RepresentativeDemocracy, 80 MICH. L. Rev. 634
(1982).
41. See Symposium, supra note 18.
42. ELY, supra note 16, at vii. Some constitutional theorists who popularized the terms
"interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism," have repudiated that dichotomy. CompareThomas C. Grey,
Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 714-18 (1975) (proposing a
"noninterpretive" theory as an alternative to the "pure interpretive model") with Thomas C. Grey, The
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1, 1 (1984) (recanting the dichotomy, stating that "[wie
are all interpretivists; the real arguments are not over whether judges should stick to interpreting, but
over what they should interpret and what interpretive attitudes they should adopt"). Others have
criticized the distinction between interpretivism and noninterpretivsim. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note
21, at 127-28 (arguing that the distinction hinders real insight into constitutional interpretation); Michael
S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S.CAL. L. Rnv. 107, 110-14 (1989) (rejecting
the distinction). Dworkin rejected the dichotomy from the beginning, Dworkin, supra note 12, at 47176, along with the dichotomy betwecn originalism and nonoriginalism, id. at 471 n.7. Similarly, he
rejects the distinction between enumerated and unenumerated rights. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated
Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 381, 381-91 (1992).
The dichotomy between originalism and nonoriginalism is similar to that between interpretivism
and noninterpretivism. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The MisconceivedQuestfor the OriginalUnderstanding,
60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 204 n.1 (1980). If there is a difference between interpretivism and originalism,
it seems to be that the former places greater emphasis on constitutional text (or language) and the latter
upon intention of the framers and ratifiers (or history).

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 72:211

Constitution. "' Advocates of this theory include Justice Black and Judge
Bork, not to mention Justice Scalia."
"Noninterpretivists" (or
"nonoriginalists") contend, on the contrary, that "courts should go beyond
that set of references and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within
the four corners of the document."4 5 Representatives of this theory
include the majority of the Supreme Court that decided Roe,' along with
proponents of protecting substantive fundamental values. 7
Put another way, clause-bound interpretivists have claimed a monopoly
on the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review, put forward in
The FederalistNo. 78 and Marbury v. Madison: Courts are obligated to
interpret the higher law of the Constitution and to preserve it against
encroachments by the ordinary law of legislation." They have accused

other theorists of engaging in Lochnering, or attempting to impose their
own visions of political utopia upon the polity in the name of the Constitution. Moreover, they have insisted that the only way to avoid Lochnering
is to flee making substantive constitutional choices in favor of giving effect
to the original understanding of the Constitution, narrowly conceived. 9

By contrast, fundamental values theorists typically have rejected or
reconstructed the classical justification, arguing that courts should elaborate
the substantive fundamental values embodied in the higher law of the

43. ELY, supra note 16, at 1.
44. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2873 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-27 (1965)
(Black, J.,
dissenting); Huoo L. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONALFAITH (1969); BORK, supranote 5; Hugo
L. Black, The Bill ofRights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960); Scalia, supra note 11. Needless to say,
there are great variations among the advocates of this type of theory.
45. ELY, supra note 16, at 1.
46. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (holding that the right of privacy, although
"not explicitly mention[ed] in the Constitution," encompasses a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy).
47. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LFAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); DWORKIN,
RIGHTS, supra note 21; DWORKIN, supra note 15; RONALD DWORKIN, LinE's DOMINION (1993);
TRIBE, CHOICES, supra note 12; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990);
TRIBE & DORF, supra note 21; Dworkin, Forum, supra note 12; Tribe, Puzzling Persistence, supra
note 12. There are, of course, considerable differences among the proponents of this type of theory.
Dworkin rejects the terms "noninterpretivism" and "nonoriginalism" for such theories. See supra note
42.
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467, 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). Numerous scholars, however, have
disputed the clause-bound interpretivists' (or originalists') pretension to a monopoly on the classical
justification. See, e.g., 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 60-61, 72; BARBER, JUDICIAL POWER, supra
note 21, at 157-58; DWORIN, RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 131-49; Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork's
GrandInquisition, 99 YALE LJ.1419, at 1425-27 (1990) (reviewing BORK, supra note 5); Sotirios A.
Barber, JudicialReviewandThe Federalist, 55 U. CHI.L. REv. 836, 836-39 (1988); Ronald Dworkin,
Bork's Jurisprudence,57 U. CHI. L. REv. 657, 661-65 (1990) (reviewing BORK, supra note 5).
49. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 5, at 143-60; Scalia, supra note 11, at 862-64.
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Constitution and protect them against deprivations by the ordinary law of
legislation. They have been at pains to distinguish their theories from
Lochnering, and to justify protecting certain substantive fundamental values

rather than others.'

Furthermore, they have charged clause-bound inter-

pretivists with abdicating responsibility for making substantive constitu-

tional choices by resorting to formalist, authoritarian pretexts to
interpretive neutrality like original understanding.5 1
The genius of Ely's approach is that it leads to a middle ground, a
"third theory" that aims to break out of this false dichotomy.52 First, Ely
argues that clause-bound interpretivism, notwithstanding its allure, is
impossible.53 Its allure is its evident rule-of-law virtues and democratic
virtues: It supposedly fits our usual conceptions of what the Constitution
is and how it should be interpreted, and it claims to dissolve what Bickel
conceived as the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" posed by judicial review
through invoking the classical justification.' Its impossibility is that it
dispositively fails on its own terms: "For the constitutional document itself,
the interpretivist's Bible, contains several provisions whose invitation to
look beyond their four corners-whose invitation, if you will, to become

at least to that extent a noninterpretivist-cannot be construed away."55
The three open-ended provisions that Ely stresses are the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment (but not the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
50. See, e.g., DWORKIN, MIGaus, supra note 21, at 278 (arguing that it is not inconsistent to
recognize fundamental rights grounded in equal concern and respect while criticizing Lochner for
protecting a right that is not so grounded); TRIBE, supra note 4, § 11-1, at 769-72 (contending that
Lochner gave a "perverse content" to fundamental values); TRIBE & DoaF, supra note 21, at 65-66
(arguing that the Constitution protects certain individual rights but not laissez-faire capitalism).
51. See, e.g., Dworkin, Forum, supra note 12, at 469-500, 516 (arguing that the flight from
substance to original intention-or from making substantive choices to enforcing choices made long ago
by the framers and ratifiers-fails because judges cannot decide what the pertinent original intention
was without making substantive political decisions of the sort that the proponents of original intention
are at pains to insist judges must avoid); Dworkin, supra note 48, at 674, 674-76 ("Bork seems to
forget, moreover, that on his own account the method of original understanding also requires judges
to make controversial moral choices in applying abstract constitutional principles."). Sunstein argues
that Bork's originalism is "formalist" in the sense that it insists that "the meaning of texts is usually
or always a simple matter of fact"-"the neutral, apolitical invocation of the original understanding of
the founders" and "authoritarian" in the sense that it "ultimately traces legal legitimacy to an exercise
of power, to the view that might makes right." SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 94-95, 94-104, 107-10.
52. ELY, supra note 16, at vii.
53. See id. at 1-9, 11-41; John H. Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism:Its Allure and Impossibility,
53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978).
54. See ELY, supra note 16, at 3-5. For the "counter-majoritarian difficulty," see BICKEL, supra
note 47, at 16. Of course, Ely's approach to "our usual conceptions" of the Constitution is not
necessarily the only way of framing the issue. See, e.g., MURPHY, FLEmING & HARRIS, supra note
35 (structuring constitutional interprctation on the basis of three interrogatives: (1) What is the
Constitution?, (2) Who may authoritatively interpret it?, and (3) How ought it to be interpreted?).
55. ELY, supra note 16, at 13.
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Fourteenth Amendments).56 His argument is basically that the clausebound interpretivists, in their zeal to flee substance and avoid Lochnering,
engage in their own brand of Lochnering by trying to read these openended clauses out of the Constitution. In doing so, they forfeit their claim

to a monopoly on the classical, interpretive justification of judicial
review.57
Second, Ely contends that theories of protecting substantive funda-

mental values, despite their appeal, are illegitimate. For such theories,
which he claims fill in the open-ended provisions with values drawn from
"external" sources beyond the Constitution like natural law, tradition, or
consensus, are frighteningly indeterminate and irredeemably undemocratic."8 Therefore, they lack both the supposed rule-of-law virtues and

democratic virtues of clause-bound interpretivism and, accordingly, aggravate rather than resolve the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Worse yet, Ely
maintains, these theories prove to be straightforward invitations to engage
in Lochnering.
2. Ely's Third Theory of Reinforcing Representative Democracy.Thus, Ely declines to embrace either a clause-bound interpretivism or a
substance-unbound fundamental values theory. Instead, he puts forward a
third theory of representative democracy and distrust, whose outlines were
prefigured in the famous footnote four of CaroleneProducts:Courts should
enforce the specific provisions of the Constitution and should reinforce the
processes of representative democracy by setting aside decisions of legislatures and executive officials when those processes are systematically

malfunctioning and thus producing untrustworthy outcomes.59

56. Id. at 14-38. Ely rejects the common view that the Due Process Clauses are similarly openended and justify recognition of "unenumerated" substantive rights, arguing that "'substantive due
process' is a contradiction" and, by the same token, "'procedural due process' is redundant." Id. at
18 & n.*.
57. See id. at 38-41. The most transparent attempt to read such clauses out of the Constitution
is Robert Bork's. Bork has advanced an "ink blot" thesis with regard to both the Ninth Amendment
and the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See BOPK, supra note 5, at 166 (likening the Privilege or
Immunitites Clause to a provision that has been "obliterated past deciphering by an ink blot");
Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 249 (1987) (testimony of
Judge Robert H. Bork) [hereinafter Nomination Hearings](analogizing the Ninth Amendment to a text
whose meaning cannot be known because it is covered by an "ink blot"). For a powerful rejoinder to
Bork, much like Ely's critique of Justice Black, see Ackerman, supra note 48, at 1430-34.
58. ELY, supra note 16, at 3-5, 43-72.
59. Id. at 73-77, 103. In footnote four of Carotene Products, Justice Stone suggested three
situations in which representative democracy is not to be trusted and which therefore justify judicial
scrutiny more intensive than ordinary deference to the political process:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
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Ely also suggests that his third theory represents the ultimate interpretivism, because it derives content for the open-ended provisions of the
Constitution "from the general themes of the entire constitutional document
and not from some source entirely beyond its four corners."' That is,
it fills in the Constitution's open texture by deriving whatever rights are
implicit in the constitutional document and underlying constitutional order

of representative democracy.61
Ely argues that his third theory avoids the pitfalls and incorporates the
strengths of the first two theories. By questing for the ultimate inter-

pretivism rather than searching for an "external" source of substantive
fundamental values in the nether world beyond the CaroleneProductsparadigm, the theory can lay claim to the supposed rule-of-law virtues as well

as the democratic virtues of the classical, interpretive justification of
judicial review.6' By reinforcing the processes of representative democra-

cy when their outcomes are unworthy of trust, the theory is consistent with
and supportive of the underlying system, thereby minimizing the countermajoritarian difficulty.' In both ways, he maintains, his theory avoids
Lochnering.
Much of the enormous critical literature responding to Ely's provoca-

tive theory has focused upon his supposed eschewal of substance for
process, to the relative neglect of his claim to be the ultimate interpretivist. 6 Moreover, scholars who have addressed that claim typically have
done little more than belittle it.' This Article instead takes Ely's claim

such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held
to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now wbether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation....
Nor need we enquirewhether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious or national or racial minorities: whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more scarching judicial inquiry.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (citations omitted).
60. ELY, supra note 16, at 88.
61. See id. at 73-101.
62. See id. at 12.
63. See id. at 88, 101-02.
64. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 16, at 137; Dworkin, Forum, supra note 12, at 470; Tribe,
Puzzling Persistence,supra note 12, at 1064; Mark V. Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The
Contributions ofJohn Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045-57 (1980).
65. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1047-48
(1984). But see Fleming, supra note 40, at 638-46 (critiquing Ely's project as a failed quest for an
ultimate interpretivism); Douglas Laycock, Taking ConstitutionsSeriously:A Theory ofJudicialReview,
59 TEX. L. REV. 343,360 (1981) (taking Ely's claim seriously but concludingthat Ely is not ultimately
an interpretivist).
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seriously, interpreting his project as a quest for a process-perfecting
ultimate interpretivism that is based on a substantive political theory of
representative democracy.
My interpretation suggests neglected affinities between Ely's theory
and the method and content of Dworkin's theory of constitutional interpretation.' These affinities are significant for two reasons. First, they show
that the common charge that Ely's theory takes a flight from substantive
political theory to feigning interpretive neutrality is mistaken. Second, they
indicate that although the other familiar charge-that his theory takes a
flight from protecting certain substantive constitutional provisions to
perfecting processes-is basically sound, Ely's theory itself shows the need
for a Constitution-perfecting theory.
B.

Ely Does Not Flee Substantive PoliticalTheory: The FlightNot Taken

1. Ely's Substantive Political Theory: Ely as Hercules.-The suggestion that Ely's theory bears affinities to Dworkin's may seem surprising,
if not paradoxical, for Dworkin's theory may appear to epitomize the substantive fundamental values theories that Ely rejects as illegitimate. By
creating a mythical philosopher-judge Hercules, who constructs a substantive political theory underlying the constitutional document and constitutional order to decide hard cases,67 Dworkin boldly invites critical
invocation of Judge Learned Hand's or Judge Bork's objections to rule by
Platonic philosopher-judges in a democracy. 8
Indeed, Dworkin's
Hercules may seem to be the very incarnation of the Lochnering judge.
Nonetheless, Ely's quest for the ultimate interpretivism leads him, like
Hercules, to attempt to construct the substantive political theory that best
fits and justifies the Constitution as a whole, as it was originally framed
and has developed. 9 First, like Hercules, Ely works back and forth

66. Some scholars, however, have noted similarities between Ely's and Dworkin's theories. See,
e.g., James O'Fallon, Book Review, 68 CAL. L. REv. 1070, 1091 (1980) (reviewing ELY, supra note
16) (observing that Ely identifies Dworkin's notion of the right to equal concern and respect as "central
to the project of giving content to the open-ended clauses of the Constitution"); Sager, Skepticism,
supra note 21, at 426 (stating that "Ely in fact comes to depend rather heavily on premises closely akin
to those advanced by Dworkin," for example, the rigbt to equal concern and respect).
67. See DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 238-75, 379-402; DWORKIrN, RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 10530.
68. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (1958) (stating that rule by "Platonic
Guardians" would deny citizens the satisfaction of participation in a common venture); BORK, supra
note 5, at 355, 210-14, 252-54, 351-55 (criticizing constitutional theorists who "would remake our
constitution out of moral philosophy" for engaging in political judging and for succumbing to the
"temptations of utopia").
69. For Dworkin's formulations of the two dimensions of best interpretation, fit and justification,
see DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 239; RONALD DWORKIN, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard
Cases?, in DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 119, 143-45; DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 21,
at 107.
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between the constitutional document and an underlying political theory of
the constitutional order, striving toward reflective equilibrium between
them.' Thus, Ely's interpretive method resembles Dworkin's constructivist method of constitutional interpretation.7 1
Second, the affinities between Ely's and Dworkin's theories extend beyond their interpretive methods to the content of their substantive political
theories. Ely argues that the substantive political theory that best fits and
justifies our constitutional document and underlying constitutional order is
a theory of representative democracy that is rooted in Dworkin's constitutive principle of equal concern and respect.' As Ely puts it, our system
combines "actual representation" of majorities' interests and "virtual
representation" of minorities' interests,' and "preclude[s] a refusal to
represent [minorities], the denial to [them] of what Professor Dworkin has

called 'equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the
political institutions that govern [majorities and minorities alike].'"
Ely also characterizes his substantive political theory of representative
democracy as an "applied utilitarianism" that is designed to realize Jeremy
Bentham's utilitarian principle of the equal weighting of preferences,

namely, "each to count for one and none for more than one."76 He adds,

70. See ELY, supra note 16, at 75-101; see also Commentary, supra note 12, at 527-28 (statement
of Ely) (characterizing interpretation as "striving for 'reflective equilibrium'"); John H. Ely,
Democracy and the Right to Be Different, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 397, 398 n.4 (1981) (describing
interpretation as a quest for reflective equilibrium). But see ELY, supra note 16, at 56, 56-60
(criticizing reliance upon "reason" or "the method of reason familiar to the discourse of moral
philosophy" as a souree of substantive fundamental values (quoting BICKEL, supra note 47, at 87)).
71. Dworkin initially put forth a constructivist method of legal interpretation by analogy to Rawls's
conception of justification in political philosophy as a quest for reflective equilibrium between our
considered judgments and underlying principles ofjustice. See DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 21, at
159-68. Dworkin argues, by analogy, that legal interpretation proceeds back and forth between extant
legal materials and underlying principles toward reflective equilibrium between them. Below, I
distinguish between constructivism in Dworkin's general methodological sense and constructivism in
Rawls's specific substantive sense. See infra text accompanying notes 353-57. For another
development of a constructivism in a general methodological sense, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189 (1987).
72. See ELY, supra note 16, at 82-87, 219 n.119; see also Dworkin, Forum, supra note 12, at 512
& n. 101 (arguing that Dworkin's theory is "the theory on which Ely himself actually relies (in spite
of much that [Ely] says)").
73. ELY,supra note 16, at 101.
74. Id.at 86, 82-87.
75. Id. at 82 (quoting DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 180) (emphasis in original).
76. Id. at 237 n.54; John H. Ely, Democracy and JudicialReview, 17 STAN. LAW. 3, 8 (1982)
[hereinafter Ely, JudicialReview]. For an analysis of Bentham's utilitarian equal-weighting principle,
as well as Mill's use of it, see H.L.A. HART, NaturalRights: Bentham andJohn Stuart Mill, in ESSAYS
ON BENTHAM 79 (1982). Ely states
the substantive basis for his theory of representative democracy
in qualified utilitarianism most clearly in Ely, supra note 53, at 405-08. Ely omitted this discussion
from Democracy andDistrust,see ELY, supra note 16, at 187 n. 14, but his continued adherenceto this
5
view isapparent from both the book, see id. at 187 n.14, 237 n. 4, and from three more recent
See Ely, supra note 70, at 401-04; Ely, Judicial Review, supra, at 6-9; Jobn H. Ely,
articles.
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though, that his theory is a qualified utilitarianism: paragraphs one and two
of the Carolene Products framework, concerned with enforcing specific
prohibitions of the Constitution and keeping political processes open,
impose rights or "side constraints" upon the utilitarian processes' pursuit
of the general welfare, while paragraph three mandates "distributional

corrections" where those processes are corrupted by prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities.' His theory, however, does not embrace
substantive fundamental rights or values that lie beyond the Carolene
Productsframework.
To be sure, Ely's substantive political theory rooted in equal concern
and respect or qualified utilitarianism is synthetic and eclectic rather than
programmatic or doctrinaire. Thus, he presents it as compatible with both

republicanism and qualified interest-group pluralism, not to mention utilitarianism and liberalism. For example, he states that his theory attempts
to secure "the republican ideal of government in the interest of the whole

people," and that it does not endorse a pure interest-group pluralist vision
of government in the interests of majority coalitions, "winner-take-all."" 8
But his claim that his substantive political theory synthesizes or is compatible with several traditions of political thought does not make it any less

substantive.
Ely's substantive political theory of representative democracy entails

the process-perfecting theory of judicial review outlined above: first,
keeping the processes of political communication and participation open,
and second, keeping those processes free of prejudice against discrete and

insular minorities, in order to assure equal concern and respect for everyone alike.
My interpretation of Ely's theory shows two things.

Clearly, Ely

seeks to avoid Lochnering by condemning judicial enforcement of substan-

Professor Dworkin's External/Personal Preference Distinction, 1983 DuKE L.J. 959, 979-80
[hereinafter Ely, ExternallPersonal];see also Commentary, supranote 12, at 540-41 (statements of Ely
and Dworkin) (discussing a utilitarian conception of democracy). For analyses of Ely's theory as
utilitarian, see, for example, Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential
Contradictionsof Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1102-04 (1981); Robin
L. West, In the Interest of the Governed: A UtilitarianJustificationfor Substantive JudicialReview,
18 GA. L. REV. 469, 473-79 (1984).
Despite similarities between their substantive political theories, Ely's theory is more utilitarian
than Dworkin's. Indeed, Dworkin is well known for his critiques of utilitarianism, though he has
engaged in internal critiques concerning the rights that utilitarianism itself presupposes if it is to honor
its egalitarian promise that "each is to count for one and no one for more than one." See DWORnKN,
RGHTS, supra note 21, at 275-77; RONALD DWORKIN, Do We Have a Right to Pornography?,in
DwoRKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 335, 359-72 [hereinafter DwoRKiN, A Right to Pornography].
77. See Ely, supra note 53, at 406 & n.29.
78. ELY, supra note 16, at 79, 82; see also John H. Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional
Theory and Practicein a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REv.
833, 840 n.15 (1991) (explaining that his theory is intended to be as compatible with a "republican"
model as with a "pluralist" model).
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tive fundamental values that lie beyond his Carolene Productsframework.
Equally clearly, however, he does not shy away from constructing the substantive political theory that he believes best fits and justifies our
constitutional document and underlying constitutional order. Whether Ely's
political theory actually provides the best interpretation of our Constitution
is, of course, another question.7 9

2. The Mistaken Charge That Ely Flees Substantive Political
Theory.-Nevertheless, many constitutional theorists have charged that Ely
flees substance for process-that he denies the need for substantive political
theory or substantive constitutional choices in constitutional interpretation
and feigns interpretive neutrality through perfecting processes. For
example, Tribe immediately responded to Ely's Democracy and Distrust
by expressing his puzzlement at the persistence of "process-based" constitutional theories, calling instead for a substance-based theory.'
He
argued that process-based theories are radically indeterminate and fundamentally incomplete, because they necessarily perfect processes by virtue
of a basis in a "full theory of substantive rights and values-the very sort
of theory the process-perfecters are at such pains to avoid.""1 Yet, Tribe
contended, Ely seeks to eschew making substantive constitutional choices
in favor of being "neutral on matters of substantive value."2 Notwithstanding Ely's use of certain aspects of Dworkin's theory, Dworkin himself
made a similar critique of Ely's theory.'
In The PartialConstitution, Sunstein reiterates this type of critique,
charging Ely with claiming that it is possible to interpret the Constitution
without making substantive arguments and, thereby, to attain interpretive
neutrality." Sunstein argues, however, that constitutional interpretation
inevitably requires reliance on substantive principles, which must be justified in terms of moral or political theory, through substantive arguments.
He contends that Ely fails to make such substantive arguments to defend
his conception of representative democracy.'
79. In Part IV, I suggest that constitutional constructivism's theory of constitutional democracy
is superior to Ely's theory of representative democracy in this respect. For a fuller consideration of
this question, see James E. Fleming, Constitutional Constructivism (1988) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Princeton University, on file with the Texas Law Review).
80. Tribe, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 12, at 1063.
81. Id. at 1064. Tribe makes this argument with respect to both themes of Ely's Carolene
Productstheory. Id. at 1067-79.

82. Id. at 1068.
83. See Dworkin, Forum, supra note 12, at 470, 500-16. But see id. at 512& n.101 (arguing that
Dworkin's theory is "the theory on which Ely himself actually relies (in spite of much that [Ely]

says)").
84. SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 104-05 & 369 n. 17 (acknowledging that Dworkin and Tribe have
made similar arguments).
85. Id. at 104-05, 143-44.
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My interpretation of Ely's theory, by emphasizing its affinities to the
method and content of Dworkin's theory, shows that these common critiques are mistaken. Ely's theory of democracy and distrust, contrary to
Tribe's puzzled suggestion, is not a process-basedtheory at all; rather, it
is a process-perfecting theory that perfects processes in virtue of its
substantive basis in a political theory of representative democracy, a
qualified utilitarianism rooted in equal concern and respect. And so it will
not suffice even to meet, let alone to better, Ely's theory to belittle it as
taking a pointless flight from substance to process, or to pontificate about
the necessity of making substantive constitutional choices in constitutional
interpretation. Instead, the battle with Ely has to be at the level of substantive political theory.
Some critics have argued that Ely's theory is not liberal enough
because it stems from too frail a vision of "liberal" substantive liberties
like privacy and autonomy.86 Others have argued that his theory is not
republican enough because it reflects an impoverished vision of political
processes as utilitarian and pluralist." But what they miss is that to argue
for a more liberal theory or a more republican theory is to engage with
Ely's substantive political theory rather than to deny that he has such a
theory.
Thus, as it turns out, Sunstein does battle with Ely at the level of
substantive political theory, arguing for the superiority of his liberal
republican theory of deliberative democracy over Ely's qualified pluralist
theory of representative democracy." Constitutional constructivism also
engages in that battle with Ely and Sunstein, maintaining the superiority of
a theory of constitutional democracy over their theories.89
All of this, however, poses a puzzle: Why have constitutional theorists
persisted in mistakenly charging that Ely eschews substantive political
theory in constitutional interpretation in favor of feigning interpretive
neutrality? To try to account for this puzzle, I shall construct a fable of the
theorist who cried "substance" too indiscriminately in his critique of
substantive fundamental values theories.
3. The Wages of Crying "Substance."
a. The fable of the theorists who cried "Lochner" too often.-In
The Wages of Crying Wolf, Ely advances a well-known critique of Roe by

86. See, e.g., Dworkin, Forum, supra note 12, at 513-16; Fiss, supra note 24, at 9-10, 16-17;
Tribe, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 12, at 1064, 1076.
87. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 16, at 239-57.
88. See SUNSTIN, supra note 22, at 143-44.
89. For my usage of the terms "representative democracy," "deliberative democracy," and
.constitutional democracy," see supra note 35.
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analogy to the fable of the boy who cried "wolf" too often.' The wolf,
of course, is Lochner. Ely's fable of the theorists who cried "Lochner" too
often, as I iuterpret it, goes something like this:
Since West Coast Hotel officially repudiated Lochner's special judicial protection for substantive economic liberties, every time the
Supreme Court has given heightened judicial protection to any constitutional value in any decision, judges and commentators alike have
cried "Lochner." They have done so frequently and indiscriminately, regardless of whether the decisions in question could be justified,
on the basis of inferences from the text, history, or structure of the
Constitution, as being within the CaroleneProductsparadigm and its
underlying theory of representative democracy. Therefore, when a
real ease of Lochnering came along, in the form of Roe, judges and
commentators did not believe the cry of "Lochner." Instead, they
said that they had heard that cry too often.
The point of Ely's fable is that judges and commentators should have
reserved the cry of "Lochner" for cases that could not be justified within
the CaroleneProductsparadigm and its underlying theory of representative
democracy. On his view, what the Supreme Court did in Lochner that was
so dreadful was to enforce substantive fundamental values drawn from the
nether world beyond a Carolene Products jurisprudence. That, too, Ely
argues, is what is wrong with Roe.91 Thus, for him, the specter of Lochner is incarnate in Roe and any other decision that rests upon such substantive fundamental values, not in substance or fundamental values as such.
To fix ideas, we should distinguish Ely's narrow sense of the
substance or Lochnering (beyond a Carolene Productsjurisprudence) that
is out-of-bounds from a generic sense of the substance that is not forbidden. Contrary to common misinterpretations, Ely does not argue that
it is out-of-bounds and illegitimate for judges to enforce substance or
fundamental values as such, in a generic sense of making substantive constitutional choices and thus not being neutral in deciding which values the
Constitution especially protects.
b. The fable of the theorist who cried "substance" too indiscriminately.-In Democracy and Distrust, Ely puts forward a famous critique
of "noninterpretivist" (or "nonoriginalist") theories of discovering substantive fundamental values.' There he runs "the gamut of fundamentalvalue methodologies" that was "the odyssey of Alexander Bickel."' He

90.
91.
92.
93.

Ely, supra note 5,at 943-45.
Id.at 933-45.
See ELY, supra note 16, at 43-72.
Id. at 71.
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rejects, on skeptical and democratic grounds, the following "external"
sources of substantive fundamental values that such theorists have proffered: the judge's own values, natural law, neutral principles, reason,
tradition, consensus, and the predicted values of the future.'
Ely's explosive critique is an indiscriminate rout of all of these sources
of values as such, irrespective of the content of the values derived from
these sources and of whether that content is plausibly manifested in our
constitutional document or implicit in our underlying constitutional order.
His no-holds-barred attack seems to have misled some readers into thinking
that he was rejecting, as out-of-bounds and illegitimate, judicial enforcement of substance in a generic sense rather than in the narrower sense of
substance or Lochnering just distinguished. These readers may have
rejected his theory for that reason.
To suggest how this result may have occurred, I shall construct a fable
of the theorist who cried "substance" too indiscriminately. It goes something like this:
There once was a theorist who warned judges and commentators
against crying "Lochner" too often. When what he viewed as a real
case of Lochnering came along, in the form of Roe, he himself cried
"Lochner." But the judges and commentators, who had heard that
cry too often from others, did not heed his cry. Then the theorist
ran the gamut of sources of substantive fundamental values, crying
"substance" indiscriminately with respect to all of them, regardless
of their content. When he finished, the judges and commentators
said that they had heard the cry of "substance" too often. Next, the
theorist elaborated a CaroleneProducts theory of judicial review and
tried to explain that he really had meant to cry "substance" only with
respect to judicial imposition of substantive fundamental values lying
in the nether world beyond his CaroleneProductsjurisprudence. But
he had cried "substance" so indiscriminately that the judges and commentators did not listen. Worse still, they chanted back "substance"
at the theorist's own theory, and proclaimed that they were not afraid
of substance. Finally, they criticized him for pointlessly trying to
flee substance for process.
The wages of Ely's crying "substance" too indiscriminately are that
he is doomed to endure reiterations of the mistaken charge that his theory
flees substance for process in the sense of denying the need for substantive
political theory or substantive constitutional choices in interpreting the
Constitution.

94. Id. at 43-72.
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C. Ely Does Flee Substantive ConstitutionalProvisions:The FlightTaken
1. Ely's Interpretive Method Calls for a Constitution-Perfecting
Theory.-Ely's theory, however, does take a different flight from substance
to process: It flees certain substantive provisions of the Constitution in the
sense that his two process-perfecting themes do not account for them and
thus do not give meaningful effect to them. Some constitutional theorists
have argned that Ely ignores or seeks to deny the Constitution's openly
substantive provisions by construing those provisions so as to reduce them
to procedural protections or, worse yet, to read them out of the Constitution. For example, Tribe points to the Constitution's protection of religious freedom and private property, as well as its prohibition of slavery,
as evincing substantive commitments that cannot be reduced to procedural
protections.95 Dworkin and Ackerman make similar arguments, as does
Sunstein.' These theorists, as it were, argue that Ely flees the whole,
substantive Constitution for a partial, procedural Constitution. This
criticism is basically sound, but misplaced.
My tack concerning Ely's flight from substantive constitutional provisions is different, for I seize the opportunity to criticize his theory on its
own terms.' I shall take seriously Ely's quest for the ultimate interpretivism, interpreting it as a commitment to a constructivist method of constitutional interpretation. My argument is that Ely's interpretive method
shows the need for a Constitution-perfecting theory, not merely a processperfecting theory, to give meaningful effect to both the substantive liberties
and the procedural liberties embodied in our Constitution.
Ely's argument for his theory of judicial review from "the nature of
the United States Constitution" is that his political theory of representative
democracy better fits and justifies the constitutional document and underlying constitutional order than do substantive fundamental values theories.9"
He takes a "brisk tour" of the Constitution, arguing that it is "principally"
concerned with establishing a procedural framework and protecting procedural liberties rather than securing substantive liberties."
Yet Ely
admits that there are numerous manifestations of substantive values, as

95. Tribe, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 12, at 1065-67.
96. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 104; Ackerman, supra note 65, at 1047-48; Dworkin, supra
note 17, at 328, 343-44.
97. Cy.Fleming, supranote 40, at 638-46 (critiquing Ely's project as a failed quest for an ultimate
interpretivism); Laycock, supra note 65, at 360 (taking Ely's claim seriously but concluding that Ely
is not ultimately an interpretivist).
98. See ELY, supra note 16, at 88, 87-101. Butsee id. at 101 (concedingthat "the argumentfrom
the general contours of the Constitution is necessarily a qualified one"). Ely also makes two other
arguments for his theory. See infra note 126 and text accompanying notes 434-37.
99. ELY, supra note 16, at 87, 92.
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distinguished from procedural values, on the face of the Constitution that
are not accounted for in his two process-perfecting themes. Indeed, on the
evidence of his brisk tour, one might doubt whether he-supposedly the
process theorist par excellence-is a process theorist in any strong sense.
For example, Ely acknowledges manifestations of substantive values,
in addition to procedural values, in the First Amendment. 1"
These
values include religious liberty, liberty of conscience, freedom of association, and autonomy. He also concedes an admixture of substantive and
procedural values in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, such as
privacy, repose, and independence." 1 His analysis of the Thirteenth
Amendment is more complicated, but the upshot basically seems to be an
admission that it is concerned with securing the substantive value of
independence or autonomy."w
Furthermore, Ely grants that the syntax of the open-ended Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ninth Amendment "is most naturally that of substantive entitlement."" He also states
that these provisions "seem to have been included in a 'we must have
missed something here, so let's trust our successors to add what we
missed' spirit.""' Hence, his ejusdem generis analysis of these openended provisions as substantive would seem to entail construing them to
justify protecting implicit substantive entitlements as well as implicit
procedural entitlements. 5
If one were questing for the ultimate interpretivism, and thus striving
for reflective equilibrium between the constitutional document and the
underlying political theory of the constitutional order, one should be
disconcerted by the presence of so many disequilibrating substantive value
"anomalies" or "mistakes" in the document that even Ely concedes are not
reflected in the process-perfecting theory that he has constructed." ° Such
manifestations of substantive values on the face of the Constitution, in
Ely's words, "call for more,"" 7 that is, for further movement back and

100. Id. at 93-94.
101. Id. at 95-97.
102. See id. at 98-100.
103. Ely, supra note 70, at 400; see ELY, supra note 16, at 193 n.45.
104. ELY, supra note 16, at 87.
105. But see Ely, supra note 70, at 400 (responding to Fleming, supra note 40, and maintaining
that "it does no violence to these provisions to read them as I believe they ultimately must be read, as
protecting rights of participation in the processes and outputs of representative government").
106. In speaking of "anomalies," I mean to echo THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 52-53 (enlarged 2d ed. 1970) (defining "anomalies" as violations of
"paradigm-induced expectationsthat govern normal science"). On "mistakes," see DWORKIN,RIGHTS,
supra note 21, at 118-23 (conceiving "mistakes" as legal materials that are inconsistent with the theory
that provides the best scheme of justification for a body of law and therefore lack generative force).
107. ELY, supra note 16, at 76.
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forth between document and theory toward reflective equilibrium between
them, and thus for a more acceptable fit and a better justification.0 8
To attain the ultimate interpretivism and reflective equilibrium, one
would need to elaborate a theory that would construe these provisions of

the document to vindicate their substantive values as well as their procedural values. Instead of moving beyond perfecting procedural liberties
to securing substantive liberties, Ely basically lops off the document's

substantive members in order to fit it into the narrow bed of his processperfecting theory. If Ely achieves a close fit between the admittedly
substantive and procedural Constitution and his merely process-perfecting

theory, it is a fit in the manner of Procrustes, not Hercules.
And so Ely takes a flight from perfecting the whole Constitution to

merely perfecting its processes. But his own interpretive method calls for
more, a Constitution-perfecting theory that would protect both the
substantive liberties and the procedural liberties embodied in our Consti-

tution. In Part IV, I outline such a theory in the form of a constitutional
constructivism.
2. The NinthAmendment: The ConstitutionalJester.-Elyrefers to the
Ninth Amendment"

9

as "that old constitutional jester" and observes that

"[i]n sophisticated legal circles mentioning [it] is a surefire way to get a
laugh.""' Nonetheless, he takes it seriously, arguing that "the conclusion that the Ninth Amendment was intended to signal the existence of

federal constitutional rights beyond those specifically enumerated in the
Constitution is the only conclusion its language seems comfortably able to

support."..

In his quest for the ultimate interpretivism, Ely uses the

open-ended Ninth Amendment to show that clause-bound interpretivism is

108. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing two dimensions of best interpretation,
fit and justification).
109. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
110. ELY, supra note 16, at 33, 34. As in: "What are you planning to rely on to support that
argument, Lester, the Ninth Amendment?" Id. at 34. The joke supposedlywas that a litigant who had
no plausible constitutional arguments to support a claim might as a last resort invoke the
"unenumerated" constitutional rights contemplated by the Ninth Amendment. In years past, similar
jokes could have been based on Justice Holmes's view of the Equal Protection Clause. See Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (referring disparagingly to equal protection arguments
as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments"). Needless to say, the status of the Equal
Protection Clause in constitutional law has changed considerably since Holmes wrote.
111. ELY, supranote 16, at 38; see also CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW
43, 43-44 (1981) (suggesting that Ely and he had moved and seconded that "the Ninth Amendment...
at long last be adopted"); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46
WASH. L. REv. 3, 44 (1970) ("The stone the builders rejected may yet be the cornerstone of the
temple.").
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impossible."'
Ironically, his analysis likewise shows that his own
process-perfecting interpretivism is incomplete.
Ely's interpretive method, understood as a constructivist method, leads
to a conception of the Ninth Amendment as a rule of construction for the
Constitution as a whole. As Tribe puts it, "[T]he Ninth Amendment is a
uniquely central text in any attempt to take seriously the process of
construing the Constitution."113 Indeed, it has come to play a supporting
role, if not a leading one, in the work of courts and scholars in construct-

ing the Constitution to protect rights not specifically enumerated, such as
the right to privacy or autonomy."' The Ninth Amendment not only textually authorizes, but indeed calls for, deriving "unenumerated" constitutional rights that are implicit in the particular provisions of the constitutional document, the general themes of the Constitution as a whole,

112. See ELY, supra note 16, at 34-41; supra text accompanying notes 55-57. For critical
responses, see BORK, supra note 5, at 166, 183-85; Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of
the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223, 259-64 (1983); Thomas B. McAffee, The Original
Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. RV. 1215, 1220-22 (1990). Bork has tried to read
the Ninth Amendment (along with the Privileges or Immunities Clause) out of the Constitution with his
"ink blot" thesis. See supra note 57.
113. Laurence H. Tribe, Contrasting ConstitutionalVisions: OfReal and UnrealDifferences, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 100 (1987); see also TRIBE & DORF, supra note 21, at 54-55, 110-11
(treating the Ninth Amendment as a rule of interpretation that expresses a presumption in favor of
generalizing from specific, enumerated rights to others retained by the people).
114. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 484-85 (1965) (citing the Ninth
Amendment in discussing the "zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees"); id. at 486-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasizing the role of the Ninth Amendment
in supporting the Court's protection of fundamental personal rights not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (citing the Ninth Amendment in support of the
right of a woman to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 579 n.15 (1980) (citing the Ninth Amendment in upholding the right of the public to attend
criminal trials); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 201-03 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(objecting to the Court's holding that the right of privacy did not extend to protect homosexual intimate
association and the Court's refusal to consider whether Georgia's sodomy law ran afoul of the Ninth
Amendment); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992) (joint opinion) (citing the
Ninth Amendment to support its
rejection of the views that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects only those rights specifically enumerated in the first eight amendments or "only
those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected... by other rules of law when
[it] was ratified"). But see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 520 (Black, J.,dissenting) (protesting that "[u]se
of any such broad, unhoundedjudicial authority [asthe Ninth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment
as construed by Justice Douglas's opinion of the Court and Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion]
would make of this Court's members a day-to-day constitutional convention"); Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2884, 2884-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (claiming angrily
that the joint opinion treats the Ninth Amendment as "a literally boundless source of additional,
unnamed, unhinted-at 'rights'").
Recently, entire scholarly symposia and books have been devoted to interpreting the Ninth
Amendment. See, e.g., I THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE (Randy Barnett ed., 1989); 2 THE
RIGHTs RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE (Randy Barnett ed., 1993); Symposium, The Bill of Rights and the
Unwritten Constitution, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267 (1992); Symposium, Interpretingthe NinthAmendment,
64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. I (1988). For critical responses, see supra note 112.
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and the underlying constitutional order."' Because the Constitution as
a whole includes manifestations of substantive liberties such as liberty of
conscience, privacy, and autonomy as well as procedural liberties, a constructivist conception of the Ninth Amendment would seem to call for deriving implicit substantive liberties along with implicit procedural liberties.
As stated above, Ely acknowledges numerous manifestations of substantive liberties in the Constitution."' Yet he argues that the Constitution as a whole embodies a political theory of representative democracy,
which entails a process-perfecting theory of judicial review that does not
account for, and so leaves out, those substantive liberties. Thus, he
attempts to limit the Ninth Amendment to justify recognizing only implied
procedural liberties. But again, the Ninth Amendment requires that responsible constitutional interpretation derive not only the procedural liberties
but also the substantive liberties that are implicit in the constitutional
document and the underlying constitutional order.
This constructivist conception of the Ninth Amendment accords with
Justice Goldberg's interpretation of it in his concurring opinion in Griswold
v. Connecticut."' Goldberg argued that to fail to protect a substantive
fundamental right, such as privacy-which is implicit in "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions" and is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental"-simply because "that right is
not guaranteed in so many words" by the Constitution is "to ignore the
Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever." 1 Failing to do
so, he contended, would violate Marbury v. Madison's interpretive principle that "[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is
intended to be without effect." 9 If, to recall Chief Justice Marshall's
hermeneutic principles in McCulloch v. Maryland-we must seek a "fair
construction of the whole instrument" and "we must never forget, that it
to exis a constitution we are expounding" 1 -we must never forget
121
effect.
meaningful
it
give
to
as
so
Amendment
Ninth
the
pound
Ironically, the Ninth Amendment indeed may play the role of the constitutional jester, but in the sense of the jester as a truth-teller in

115. For reservations about the distinction between enumerated and unenumerated rights, see, for
example, Dworkin, supra note 42, at 381-91.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
117. See Griswold,381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment
is a rule of construction for the Constitution as a whole, not an independent source of constitutional
rights).
118. Id. at 491 (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 490-91 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803)).
120. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
121. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490 n.6 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing BENNETT B.
PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955)).
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Shakespearean drama. Like the jester in King Lear, who is free to speak

the truth notwithstanding the King's authority," the Ninth Amendment
scoffs at any presumption of the sovereign's omnipotence and omniscience
in enumerating specific constitutional rights. It mocks the pretensions of
all theories of constitutional interpretation that try to reduce constitutional
rights to a closed, enumerated list (as .clause-bound interpretivism or
originalism does"z). But it also scoffs at the presumptuousness of theories that attempt to prune constitutional provisions of their substantive
character by recasting them as procedural protections (as Ely's theory
does). Thus, the Ninth Amendment shows that the Constitution itself calls
for moving beyond a process-perfecting theory to a Constitution-perfecting
theory that would give meaningful effect to both the substantive liberties

and the procedural liberties embodied in the Constitution. The constitutional constructivism that I propose in Part IV is such a theory.
D. Ely's Process-PerfectingInterpretivism:Its Allure and Incompleteness
Ely concluded his critique of Justice Black's clause-bound interpre-

tivism by saying that "[tihe point of all this is this": One cannot be a
clause-bound interpretivist because several open-ended provisions of the
Constitution show that the theory dispositively fails on its own terms."2
Likewise, to conclude my parallel critique of Ely's theory, the point of all
this is this: One cannot be an ultimate interpretivist and at the same time
remain a Carolene Products process-perfecting representative democrat

because certain substantive provisions of the Constitution call for going
beyond CaroleneProductsto a Constitution-perfecting theory. In the end,

Ely abandons his quest for the ultimate interpretivism, choosing instead a
process-perfecting theory and therewith only the penultimate interpre-

tivism.1"

122. See WILLAM SHAKESPEARE,THE TRAGEDY OF KING LEAR act 1, sc. 4.
123. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 519, 518-20 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Ninth
Amendment does not give the Court authority to invalidate laws that it thinks violate "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice" (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring)));
BORuK, supra note 5, at 166, 183-85 (outlining the "ink blot" thesis of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and the Ninth Amendment); Nomination Hearings, supra note 57, at 249 (affirming Bork's ink
blot theory as applied to the Ninth Amendment); Monaghan, supra note 15, at 365-67 (describing the
Ninth Amendmentas "entirely empty" and the "schedule of rigbts" in the Constitution as "a list closed
as of 1791"); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2884-85 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (construing the Ninth Amendment in terms
of a closed list plus narrowly conceived traditions).
124. Ely, supra note 53, at 445. By implication, Ely's analysis also applies to Bork's originalism.
Bork certainly treats Ely's critique of clause-bound interpretivism as being aimed at theories like his
own. See BORK,supra note 5, at 178-85, 194-99.
125. For an analysis suggesting parallels between Justice Black's and Ely's predicaments and their
responses to them, see Fleming, supra note 40, at 646-48.
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That abandonment, not a failure to do substantive political theory in
the first place, is Ely's flight from substance to process. In a sense, he
builds a flight from substantive liberties such as liberty of conscience,
privacy, and autonomy into the very substance of his process-oriented
political theory of representative democracy, which does not include such
liberties. In trying to avoid the specter of Lochner, Ely's theory flees
substance for process by recasting certain substantive liberties of the
Constitution as procedural protections of his theory or, worse yet,
repealing their substantive aspects by construction."
In conclusion, Ely's process-perfecting interpretivism, notwithstanding
its allure, is incomplete. Ely's theory falls short of a Constitutionperfecting theory because it fails to give both substance and process their
due. To move beyond the sphere between process and substance, we need
a Constitution-perfecting theory.

E. Interlude:A Thayerfor Our Time?
In Democracy and Distrust, Ely sought to justify the Warren Court's
constitutional revolution on the basis of a Carolene Products jurisprudence." z Beyond the two process-perfecting themes of his framework,

126. See ELY, supra note 16, at 100 (stating that the right of individuals to bear arms and liberty
of contract have been "'repealed' by judicial construction"). In another sense, Ely flees substance for
process when he shifts from his first two, interpretive arguments for his process-perfecting theory to
his third, institutional argument for it. See id. at 87-103. His first two arguments stem from bis
analysis of the nature of the Constitution as a whole, and the type of theory that would be consistent
with and supportive of the underlying system, as being principally concerned with process rather than
substance. His third argument is based on his assessment that because of the differences in institutional
positions or perspectives between courts and legislatures, courts should perfect processes and
legislatures should pursue substantive fundamental values. Thus, his distinction between process and
substance turns from being a principle about what the Constitution, properly interpreted, means to a
principle about who should interpret what it means. (For an analysis of constitutional interpretation
on the basis of these interrogatives, along with the interrogative how ought the Constitution to be
interpreted, see MURPHY, FLEMING & HARRIS, supra note 35.) His distinction becomes a principle
of role differentiation between courts and legislatures.
When Ely turns from bis two interpretive arguments to his institutional argument, he shifts, as
it were, from theory of the Constitudon to theory of judicial review. (For the distinction between
theory of the Constitution and theory of judicial review, see BARBER, CONSTITUTION, supra note 2 1,
at 196-99; StephenM. Griffin, What Is ConstitutionalTheory? The Newer Theory andthe Decline of
the Learned Tradition, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 493, 529-35 (1989).) He then basically names as "the
Constitution" those values that are judicially enforceable, that is, procedural values, rather than arguing
for a conception of the Constitution outside the courts that would include substantive values along with
procedural values. By contrast, Sunstein and constitutional constructivism distinguish between the
partial, judicially enforceable Constitution and the whole Constitution that is binding outside the courts
on legislatures, executive officials, and citizens generally. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 240;
SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at v-vi, 9-10, 138-40, 145-61, 350.
127. ELY, supra note 16, at 73-75 (arguing that the "deep structure" of the Warren Court's
jurisprudence was that of footnote four of Carolene Products, not discovering substantive fundamental
values).
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Ely's argument becomes reminiscent of James Bradley Thayer's classic
argument for judicial deference to the representative process. 121 Thayer's
argument, along with Justice Holmes's dissent in Lochner,29 served as

a rallying cry for progressives during the conservative era of Lochner."
Recently, in a symposium assessing his book, Ely published Another Such
Victory: ConstitutionalTheory and Practicein a World Where Courts Are
No Different From Legislatures.1 31 His article implies that those who
have argued that courts should impose substantive fundamental values
rather than merely perfect processes have won the battle, but at too great
a cost: namely, that courts are now in theory and practice no different from
legislatures.1 31 Indeed, Ely's article reads like a veiled plea to be the

Thayer for the next generation, the proponent of a theory of judicial review
for progressive voices crying in the wilderness during the conservative era
of the Rehnquist Court. 133 Ely himself is making a principled argument,
but there may also be strategic arguments for joining him. In 1993, the
centennial of the publication of Thayer's classic argument, Sunstein has
I now
made his own plea to be the Thayer for the next generation."

turn to Sunstein's theory.

128. See James B. Thayer, The Originand Scope of the American Doctrineof ConstitutionalLaw,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893) (arguing for judicial deference to the Congress and President, absent a
clear mistake, on the ground that politically elected officials are the primary makers of policy as well
as the primary interpreters of the Constitution in our scheme of government). It is important to bear
in mind, however, that footnote four of Carolene Products, which Ely elaborates in Democracy and
Distrust, defines itself in opposition to Thayer's doctrine of the clear mistake by setting forth three
exceptions to the general presumption of constitutionality and deferential scrutiny of legislative (and
executive) actions.
Justice Frankfurter regarded Thayer's classic article as "the most important single essay" in
constitutional law. FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 301 (Harlan B. Phillips ed., 1960). During
1993, the centennial of the publication of his essay, Thayer enjoyed a revival. A symposium was held
at Northwestern University School of Law to mark the centennial. See One Hundred Years of Jndicial
Review: The Thayer CentennialSymposium, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1993). None other than Ely gave
the keynote address. See id. at vi.
129. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
130. See G. Edward White, Revisiting James Bradley 71ayer, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 48, 48-49
(1993).
131. Ely, supra note 78.
5
132. Ely's article, however, does not constitute a "surrender." Id. at 854 n. 7; see also JOHN H.
ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 54 (1993) (applying the theory of Democraey and Distrnstto justify
judicial review as a corrective for Congress's evasion of its constitutional responsibilities in deciding
what wars we should and should not fight).
133. Ely calls for a revival of the strand of the Legal Process tradition that emphasizes that
because courts are different from legislatures in that judges (at least federal judges) do not stand for
election, courta should perfect processes rather than discover society's substantive fundamental values.
Ely, supra note 78, at 833-54.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 158-62.
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III. Beyond Sunstein's Theory of Securing Deliberative Democracy
In The Partial Constitution, Sunstein might seem to provide a
Constitution-perfecting theory that moves beyond Ely's process-perfecting
theory. He promises both to beware of the legacy of Lochner and to resist
taking a flight from substance. In his introduction, he proclaims that the
Warren Court's constitutional revolution is over. The most important contemporary disputes about the meaning of the Constitution, he argues, reflect disagreement about the meaning of the requirement that government
be impartial or neutral: status quo neutrality versus deliberative democ1 35
racy.
Sunstein contends that what was wrong with Lochner was not, as Ely
thought, that the Court gave heightened judicial protection to substantive
fundamental values. Rather, it was the Court's use of status quo neutrality
and existing distributions as the baseline from which to distinguish unconstitutionally partisan political decisions from impartial ones. t 36
Ironically, the implication of this interpretation is that the contemporary
Justices, such as Scalia, who
protest most against Lochnering in fact
1 37
engage most actively in it.
Furthermore, Sunstein claims to avoid Ely's putative flight from substance by clearly grounding his own constitutional theory in a substantive
13
political theory of liberal republicanism or deliberative democracy. 1
His theory appears at once more liberal and more republican than Ely's;
that is, it appears to stem from both a more robust vision of "liberal"
substantive liberties and a richer vision of "republican" political pro39
1

cesses.

Yet the structure of Sunstein's theory parallels that of Ely's Carolene
Products theory, and his liberal republicanism leads to a theory of judicial
review whereby courts principally should secure the preconditions for
deliberative democracy."t
Although Sunstein moves somewhat beyond

135. SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 1-2, 6.

136. See id. at 45-62,259-61; Sunstein, supra note 1, at 874-75, 882-83. Sunstein also states that
"[t]he basic view of the Lochner period that issetout here isstrongly endorsed by the important
leading opinion" in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, which accordingly rejected the view, elaborated in
Justice Scalia's opinion, that "the problem with the Lochner era rested solely in the aggressive use of
the due process clause." SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 363 n.40 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)). For an historical account of the Lochner era as responding to the collapse
of "vested rights-retroactivity"jurisprudencerather than as inaugurating the protection of unenumerated
substantive fundamental rights, see James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving
ConstitutionalProtectionfor Propertyand Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 87, 123-42 (1993).
137. See SUNSTMN, supra note 22, at 68-92, 130-31; Sunstein, supra note 1, at 874-75, 883-902.
138. See SUNSrEIN, supra note 22, at 104-05, 142-44.
139. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
140. See SUNSTMN, supra note 22, at 142-44. Sunstein does not claim that the general
commitment to deliberative democracy isthe exclusive source of interpretive principles. Rather, he
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Ely's theory of reinforcing representative democracy, he falls short of
offering a full Constitution-perfecting theory.
In this Part, first, I outline Sunstein's theory along with his interpretation of what was wrong with Lochner. Second, I argue that Sunstein's
liberal republicanism represents a flight from substance to process in the
sense that it emphasizes "republican" deliberative democracy to the neglect
of "liberal" deliberative autonomy (and such substantive liberties as liberty
of conscience, privacy, and autonomy). Third, I illustrate this argument
by criticizing Sunstein's analysis of Bowers v. Hardwick,"1 showing that
Sunstein's theory, somewhat like Ely's, flees substantive due process and
the preconditions for deliberative autonomy in favor of equal protection and
the preconditions for deliberative democracy. Finally, I suggest that, to the
extent that Sunstein's theory lacks a theme of securing the preconditions for
deliberative autonomy, it is indeed, contrary to his hope, a theory of
securing the partialConstitution.142
A.

An Outline of Sunstein's Theory of DeliberativeDemocracy

1. Sunstein's PoliticalTheory of DeliberativeDemocracy.-Sunstein
argues that the substantive political theory that best fits and justifies the
Constitution is a theory of deliberative democracy or liberal republicanism."13 This theory reflects a commitment to the "impartiality principle,"
which requires government to provide public-regarding reasons concerning
the common good for its actions and forbids government from acting solely
on the basis of the self-interest or "naked preferences" of private groups
or individuals. In this sense, the Constitution is an impartial constitution,
to be distinguished from a partial constitution of pure interest-group
says that it is the principal source, the "first and foremost" type of consideration, or "a promising
source." See id. at 123, 144, 162.
141. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
142. In Part IV, I contend that constitutional constructivism entails a fuller theory of perfecting
the whole, impartial Constitution.
143. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 17-39, 123-61 (setting out the core commitments of
deliberative democracy and arguing that this substantive political theory better fits and justifies the text,
history, and structure of the Constitution than do alternative theories such as status quo neutrality and
interest-group pluralism); CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 24152 (1993) (outlining the conception of deliberative democracy, especially with reference to the political
functions of free speech).
In effect, Sunstein and Ackerman are in competition to be the new Madison. See 1 ACKERMAN,
supra note 21, at 165-99 (advancing a theory of neo-federalism that is said to rediscover the dualism
of Publius, or Madison). Both Sunstein's theory of deliberative democracy and Ackerman's theory of
dualist democracy aim to synthesize the traditions of liberalism and republicanism in theories of liberal
republicanism. Compare SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 133-45 with 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at
25-33. Sunstein acknowledges a debt to Ackerman, but resists the latter's complex apparatus of higher
lawmaking and structural amendments to the Constitution outside the formal procedures of Article V.
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 357 n.3, 370 n.21, 372 n.17; Cass R. Sunstein, New Deals, NEW
REPUBLIC, Jan. 20, 1992, at 32 (reviewing 1 ACKEIMAN, supra note 21).
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pluralism. It establishes "a republic of reasons," not a political market of
naked preferences. Sunstein argues that this commitment to deliberative
democracy, central to the founding, has been deepened by the Civil War
Amendments and the New Deal. 144
Deliberative democracy has four core commitments."
First, and
most important, is a belief in political deliberation. 46 Political decisions
should not simply reflect aggregations of the self-interested preferences of
well-organized private groups or individuals. Nor should they consist
merely of protections of status quo neutrality, or "prepolitical" private
rights. 7 Instead, political decisions should be produced by an extended
process of deliberation and discussion concerning the common good, in
which new information and new perspectives are brought to bear, and the
decisions should reflect public-regarding reasons. Moreover, politics
should not simply implement existing preferences, as a market might; it
should reflect upon and sometimes transform such preferences in light of
aspirations. Sunstein rejects any close analogy between consumers in a
market and citizens in a polity, or between "consumer sovereignty" and the
political sovereignty of We the People. 4 '
Second, the belief in political deliberation entails a commitment to
citizenship and to widespread political participation by the citizenry." 9
It also requires that people have a large degree of security and independence from the will of others and from the state."5 For example, the
commitment to citizenship implies a sphere of autonomy into which the
state may not enter, such as that protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. It further implies both
property rights and social programs that attack poverty, such as the New
Deal's "second Bill of Rights."'
The Civil War Amendments deepened
the original commitment to citizenship by abolishing involuntary servitude
and casting doubt on "all efforts at political exclusion of identifiable groups

144. SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 51-62, 123, 133-34.
145. Id. at 133-41. Sunstein emphasizes that these four commitments "draw on diverse starting
points; this is no sectarian creed." Id. at 141; cf. RAWLS, supra note 31, at 15, 133-72 (arguing that
a society's political conceptionofjustice draws support from an overlapping consensus among opposing
moral, philosophical, and religious conceptions of the good). For example, Sunstein claims that his
theory of deliberative democracy is compatible with the liberal theories of Mill and Rawls, the
liberalism (or pragmatism) of Dewey, certain forms of utilitarianism, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at
141, and certain forms of feminism, see id. at 257-90.
146. SUNSTMN, supra note 22, at 133-34.
147. See id. at 3-7, 40-67, 68-92, 134.
148. See id. at 164, 134-35, 162-94.
149. See id. at 135-36.
150. Id. at 136.
151. Id. at 139; see also id. at 60.

244
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on the basis of morally irrelevant characteristics," for example, race, sex,
and sexual orientation. 152
Third, deliberative democracy is committed to agreement as a regula-

tive ideal for politics. 53 It seeks to reach agreement among equal citizens through deliberation concerning public-regarding reasons and the
common good, not simply to register the different tastes or the different
perspectives of disagreeable people.154
The final commitment is to political equality, which forbids not only
disenfranchisement but also large disparities inpolitical influence held by

different social groups. 55 It also presupposes freedom of speech and
access to a good education. Political equality does not require economic
equality, but it does entail: (1) freedom from desperate conditions; (2)
opposition to caste systems (e.g., racism, sexism, and heterosexism); and

(3) rough equality
of opportunity, including roughly equal educational
56
opportunity.
2.

Sunstein's Theory of JudicialReview as Securing Deliberative

Democracy.-This political theory of deliberative democracy, Sunstein
argues, entails a theory of judicial review under which courts principally
should secure the preconditions for deliberative democracy. 57

But he

stresses that the judicially enforceable Constitution is not coterminous with
the Constitution that is binding outside the courts on legislatures, executive
officials, and citizens generally (unless and until they amend it). 5
Constitutional theory is broader than theory of judicial review. 59
152. See id. at 136, 259-61, 402 n.17.
153. Id. at 137.
154. Cf.Christopher L. Eisgruber, DisagreeablePeople, 43 STAN. L. REV. 275, 297-98 (1990)
(reviewing ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989)) (contending that American culture inevitably will breed disagreement over
the meaning of constitutional principles).
155. SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 137.
156. Id. at 137-40, 402 n.17.
157. Id. at 142-44.
158. See id. at v-vi, 9-10, 138-40, 145-61, 350; see also Paul Brest, The Conscientious
Legislator's Guide to ConstitutionalInterpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 586 (1975) (arguing that
legislators have a duty to interpret the Constitution conscientiously and that the deferential rationality
standards applied by courts, for example, to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses do not
comprehend all that is demanded of legislators who fulfill that duty); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of UnderenforcedConstitutionalNorms, 91 HA~v. L. Rv. 1212, 1213
(1978) [hereinafter Sager, FairMeasure]; Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes:Reflections on
the Thinness of ConstitutionalLaw, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 419 (1993) [hereinafter Sager, Thinness]
(both disputing the modem view that confines constitutional norms to the scope of federal judicial
enforcement); cf William M. Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Ovemling andthe Revival of
'UnconstitutionalI Satutes, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 1902, 1936, 1946-47 (1993) (rejecting the view that
the judiciary alone has the power to determine what the Constitution means in favor of the notion of
constitutional dialogue among the branches of government).
159. See supra note 126.
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Accordingly, Sunstein sensibly and sensitively elaborates certain
institutional limits on the role of courts in social reform. 1" For example,
he argues that although deliberative democracy entails freedom from
desperate conditions and imposes obligations upon government to provide
a social minimum of goods and services to meet people's basic needs for
subsistence, such obligations are not judicially enforceable in the absence
of legislative or executive action.161
Beyond securing judicially
enforceable preconditions for deliberative democracy, Sunstein's argument
becomes somewhat reminiscent of Thayer's plea for judicial deference to
political decisions on the ground that easy resort to judicial review deadens
the citizenry's sense of political responsibility. 62
Nonetheless, Sunstein argues for an aggressive role for courts in two
categories of cases. The first involves "rights that are central to the
democratic process and whose abridgement is therefore unlikely to call up
a political remedy."" 6 The second involves "groups or interests that are
unlikely to receive a fair hearing in the legislative process."161 The first
category calls for active judicial protection of the preconditions for political
deliberation, political equality, and citizenship. The second category leads
to active judicial vindication of an anticaste principle of equal citizenship.
Sunstein acknowledges that these two categories of cases parallel the
two themes of Ely's Carolene Products theory.16 Furthermore, he observes that both his and Ely's theories of judicial review secure preconditions for democracy. But Sunstein argues that his conception of democracy-liberal republicanism-better fits and justifies the American system
than does Ely's conception, which he characterizes as interest-group pluralism." He overstates this contrast. As shown above, Ely's theory is one
of qualified pluralism, and it is concerned also with securing the "republican ideal of government in the interest of the whole people." 67 There
160.
161.
162.
'Mayer,

See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 145-53.
See id. at 138-40, 148-49.
See Thayer, supra note 128; supra text accompanying notes 128-34; see also James B.

John Marshall, in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, AND FELIX
FRANKFURTERON JOHN MARSHALL 1, 86 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1967) ("The tendency of a common

and easy resort to [judicial review] . . . is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden
its sense of moral responsibility."). Indeed, Sunstein and Ely may be the principal contenders to be
the Thayer for the next generation. Whereas Sunstein differentiates the roles of courts and legislatures
on the basis of the institutional limits of courts, Ely basically uses his distinction between process and
substance as a principle of role differentiation. In effect, Ely names as "the Constitution" those
procedural values that are judicially enforceable, rather than distinguishing between the partial
Constitution that is judicially enforceable and the whole Constitution that is binding outside the courts.
See supra note 126.
163. See SUNSTIN, supra note 22, at 142.
164. Id. at 143.
165. See id. at 143-44.
166. Id.
167. ELY, supra note 16, at 82; see supra text accompanying note 78.
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is no question, however, that Sunstein's theory is a richer republican theory
than Ely's.
3. The Legacy of Lochner: Status Quo Neutrality Versus Unenumerated Substantive FundamentalRights.-The best illustrations of the
differences between Sunstein's and Ely's theories with respect to the two
categories of cases calling for an aggressive role for courts are their
approaches to Buckley v. Valeo'68 and Roe v. Wade. 1" I contrast their
analyses of these cases in light of their different understandings of what
was wrong with Lochner: status quo neutrality and unenumerated substantive fundamental rights, respectively.
In Buckley, the Court struck down certain campaign finance regulations imposing limitations on expenditures on the ground that "the concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment." 1" For Sunstein, Buckley is an incarnation of LochThe Court treated the
ner because it evinces status quo neutrality.'
existing distribution of wealth and political power as a prepolitical state of
nature and therefore held that interfering with it was an impermissible,
partisan objective.
Moreover, for Sunstein, Buckley stems from a flawed conception of
democracy as a veritable marketplace of preferences rather than a republic
of reasons. He draws upon Rawls's analysis of Buckley and analogy between Buckley and Lochner." As Rawls puts it:
The First Amendment no more enjoins a system of representation
according to influence effectively exerted in free political rivalry
between unequals than the Fourteenth Amendment enjoins a system
of liberty of contract and free competition between unequals in the
economy, as the Court thought in the Lochner era. 3
Thus, according to Sunstein and Rawls, what is wrong with Buckley is that
the Court fails to see that such campaign finance regulations can be justified on the basis of a liberal republican commitment to securing political

168. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
169. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
170. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
171. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 84-85, 223-24; SUNSTEIN, supra note 143, at 94-101;
Sunstein, supra note 34, at 1576-78; Sunstein, supra note 1, at 883-84.
172. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 387 n.45 (quoting John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and
Their Priority, in 3 THE TANNER LECrURES ON AUMAN VALUES 1, 76 (Sterling M. MeMurrin ed.,
6
1982), reprinted in RAWLS, supra note 31, at 289, 360-61); Sunstein, supra note 34, at 1577 n.20
(also quoting Rawls, supra).
173. RAWLS, supra note 31, at 362.
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equality 74 or the fair value of the equal political liberties."7 Cases like
Reynolds v. Sims 76 and Wesbeny v. Sanders,"7 in affirming the principle of one-person, one-vote, presuppose that the Constitution as a whole
a full and
guarantees "a political procedure which secures for all citizens
"
equally effective voice in a fair scheme of representation. 1

For Ely, by contrast, Buckley is unrelated to Lochner because it does
not involve unenumerated substantive fundamental rights. Unlike Sunstein
and Rawls, Ely conceives our system as being "programmed, at least
roughly, to register the intensities of preference that utilitarianism makes
crucial. " 1 79 On his view, what is "questionable" about Buckley is that

it allows money to distort the reflection of such intensities of preference
and thus may thwart realization of Bentham's utilitarian principle of the
equal weighting of preferences, namely, "each is to count for one, and

none for more than one. ""

This principle itself is a principle of

impartiality, Ely's alternative to status quo neutrality."
For Ely, Roe is an incarnation of Lochner because it involves judicial
protection of a substantive fundamental right drawn from the nether world
beyond his Carolene Productsjurisprudence." Ely emphatically rejects
174. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 137-40, 223-24 (setting forth the commitment to political
equality).
175. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 5-6, 356-63 (explaining the guarantee of the fair value of the
equal political liberties and distinguishing it from formal equality); see also infra note 393.
176. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
177. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
178. RAWLS, supra note 31, at 361, 360-63.
179. Ely, JudicialReview, supra note 76, at 7. For the contrast between Ely's utilitarian view
and the views of Sunstein and Rawls, see id.; SUNSrEIN, supra note 22, at 162-63; RAWLS, supranote
31, at 190, 327-28,361-62; RAWLS, supra note 32, at 361.
180. Ely, Judicial Review, supra note 76, at 7, 8 (quoting Mill's analysis of Bentham). For
discussion of Ely's qualified utilitarianism, see supra note 76 and text accompanying notes 76-77.
Ely's only reference to Buckley in Democracy andDistrust is different from the discussion quoted in
the text. There he criticized the Court for adopting "a balancing test-albeit an exacting one demanding
a 'compelling' state interest-not an approach that absolutely protects all expression that does not fall
within some unprotected category." ELY, supra note 16, at 234 n.27.
181. See ELY, supra note 16, at 82-87 (explaining the commitment to equal concern and respect
in the design and administration of the political institutions that govern majorities and minorities alike).
As H.L.A. Hart has pointed out, Bentham's utilitarian principle of the equal weighting of preferences
is "no respecter of persons." HART, supra note 76, at 97, 97-99 (citation omitted). That apparent
egalitarianism and impartiality is a principal source of the appeal that utilitarianism has had. See id.
at 97-98; DwoRKIN, RIcHTs, supra note 21, at 275; DWORgMN,A Right to Pornography,supra note
76, at 360. But, Hart continues, utilitarianism is "'no respecter of persons' in a sinister as well as a
benign sense of that expression." HART, supra note 76, at 99, That is, for utilitarianism, "separate
individuals are of no intrinsic importance but only important as the points at which fragments of what
is important, i.e., the total aggregate of pleasure or happiness, are located." H.L.A. HART, Between
Utility and Rights, in ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 198, 200 (1983). Hence arises
Rawls's famous argumentthat "[u]tilitarianism does not take seriously the distinctionbetweenpersons."
RAwLS, supra note 32, at 27.
182. See Ely, supra note 5, at 933-45. For an account of critiques (such as Ely's) of the right to
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substantive due process arguments for a right to abortion, whether framed
in terms of liberty, privacy, or autonomy. But he also rejects the argument
that women constitute a discrete and insular minority, and therefore does

not make an argument for a right to abortion based on equal protection or
an anticaste principle.1"
For Sunstein, by contrast, Roe is unrelated to Lochner because it does

not evince status quo neutrality."' Sunstein, like Ely, rejects substantive
due process arguments for a right to abortion, whether rooted in privacy,
decisional autonomy, or bodily integrity."
But Sunstein, unlike Ely,
argues for a right to abortion grounded in equal protection and an anticaste

principle, contending that abortion restrictions turn a morally irrelevant
characteristic, sex (like race), into a systemic source of social disadvantage.
On his view, restrictive abortion laws are invalid because they are "an
impermissibly selective co-optation of women's bodies," and they "turn
women's reproductive capacities into something for the use and control of
others."" 6 Sunstein defends Roe and Casey as necessary to secure equal

citizenship for women, indeed as tantamount to a Brown v. Board of
Education"8' for women, not analogous to Lochner or, worse yet, Dred

Scott v. Sandford. 8

privacy and abortion that emphasizes the ghost of Lochner, see Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and
JudicialReview: Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293 (1986).
183. See id. at 933-35; see also ELY, supra note 16, at 164-70, 247-49 n.52 (arguing that women
are not insular, nor are they a minority).
184. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 259-61.
185. See id. at 259-61, 270-85. Decisional autonomy and bodily integrity are the two doctrinal
strands upon which the joint opinion in Casey relied in officially reaffirming the central holding of Roe.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806-08, 2810-11 (1992). The joint opinion
notably does not use the word "privacy" to refer to the substantive liberty that is protected by the Due
Process Clause, though it does speak of precedents that have "respected the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter." Id. at 2807; see Linda C. McClain, The Poverty ofPrivacy?, 3 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 119, 127-33 (1992) (discussing the virtual disappearance of privacy in the joint
opinion in Casey).
186. SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 259, 272. Sunstein rightly notes that the joint opinion in Cascy
emphasized issues of sexual equality. Id. at 284. And he correctly stresses that Justices Blackmun and
Stevens in their separate opinions also emphasized equality. Id. His quotation from Justice Stevens,
however, omits the crucial passage that shows that Stevens regards liberty and equality as intertwined.
Stevens writes: "Roe is an integral part of a correct understanding of both the concept of liberty
and
the basic equality of men and women." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added). Sunstein omits the italicized passage. See infra note 215 and
accompanying text. Sunstein's equality approach to Roe and Casey is not without problems, but I
cannot pursue them here.
187. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
188. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Compare SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 260-61 (analogizing
Roe and Casey to Brown), with Casy, 112 S. Ct. at 2882, 2882-85 (Sealia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that the joint opinion's "description of the place of
Roe in the social history of the United States is unrecognizable" and drawing analogies between Roe,
on the one hand, and Lochner and Dred Scott, on the other).
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Thus, Sunstein's liberal republicanism cogently satisfies one line of
criticism of Ely's theory by providing a more republican theory. I shall
argue, however, that it does not sufficiently satisfy another line of
criticism, for it does not offer a significantly more liberal theory than
Ely's. I shall also preview constitutional constructivism, a theory that
answers both lines of criticism of Ely's theory and is more liberal than
Sunstein's theory.
B.

Sunstein's Liberal Republicanism:A Flightfrom Substance?

1. Beyond the False Antithesis of Liberalism and Republicanism.There is a long-standing conflict in political and constitutional theory
between the traditions of republicanism and liberalism. This conflict is
encapsulated in Benjamin Constant's famous contrast between, respectively,
the tradition associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which gives primacy
to the libertiesof the ancients, such as the equal political liberties and the
values of public life, and the tradition associated with John Locke, which
gives greater weight to the liberties of the modems, such as liberty of conscience, certain basic rights of the person and of property, and the rule of
law.189 Despite arguments that liberalism triumphed over republicanism

at the founding,1"' the conflict has resurfaced periodically in various
guises throughout our constitutional history through attempts to recover the

communitarian aspirations of the republican tradition and to critique the
individualist presuppositions of the liberal tradition.191
Yet some political philosophers, including Rawls, and some constitutional theorists, most prominently Sunstein and Frank Michelman, have
sought to break the stranglehold of this false antithesis." 9 Sunstein
189. RAWLS, supra note 3 1, at 4-5, 299 (referring to Benjamin Constant, Liberty of the Ancients
Compared with That of the Modems, Address Before the Athdnde Royal in Paris (1819), reprintedin
BENJAMIN CONSTANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS 307 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans., 1988)); see
RAWLS, supra note 32, at 201; John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515,
519 (1980); see also STEPHEN HOLMES, BENJAMIN CONSTANT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
LIBERALISM 31-52 (1984) (recounting Constant's distinction between liberties in different social and
historical contexts). Locke's most significant work in this respect is JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed. 1698), and Rousseau's is JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Roger D. Masters ed. & Judith R. Masters trans., 1978) (1762).
190. See, e.g., Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955); HERBERT J.
STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERAUSTS WERE FOR (1981).
191. See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988).
192. Roberto Unger has described this confiict, encapsulated in Constant's famous contrast, as "the
stranglehold of a false antithesis." ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
41(1986). For Rawls's attempt to move beyond this impasse, see RAWLS, supra note 3 1, at 5; Rawls,
supra note 189, at 519; infra text accompanying notes 208-09, 349-50. For Michelman's efforts, see
Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 21, at 1524-32; Michelman, Traces, supra note 21, at 36-47.
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proposes to move beyond the recent revival of classical republicanism, and
beyond the clash between certain versions of liberalism and republicanism,
to a synthesis, liberal republicanism." He also claims that his synthesis
would resolve other familiar tensions in political and constitutional theory,
for example, between constitutionalism and democracy and between understandings of liberty and equality. 1"
I shall consider whether Sunstein's liberal republicanism represents an
adequate synthesis of these traditions and liberties or instead takes a flight
from substance to process-namely, from the substantive liberties of the
moderns to the procedural liberties of the ancients.1Y 5 First, I shall defend Sunstein's synthesis against Richard A. Epstein's critique arising from
the standpoint of classical liberalism.Y Second, I shall critique his synthesis from the standpoint of Rawls's own resolution; political constructivism.
2. Epstein's Antithesis: Status Quo Neutrality over Deliberative
Democracy.-Epstein argues that Sunstein's liberal republicanism represents an indefensible flight from substance. He contends that "[n]o political theory can concentrate on process and deliberation to the exclusion of
substantive concerns," yet Sunstein's theory tries to do precisely that."9
At first glance, Epstein's critique of Sunstein looks like Tribe's,
Dworkin's, and Sunstein's critiques of Ely. On careful examination, however, it proves to be quite different, amounting to nothing more than an
emphatic argument that the antithesis between liberalism and republicanism
is real, and that in this clash classical liberalism should totally vanquish
republicanism. In Sunstein's terms, Epstein basically argues that status quo
neutrality should prevail over and constrain deliberative democracy.
What is Sunstein's supposed flight from substance? Epstein contends
that Sunstein flees both the substance of republicanism and the substance
of liberalism. First, he argues that Sunstein embraces the procedural and

193. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 373 n.18, 133-41 (stating that "it appears that the oftendrawn opposition between liberalism and republicanism is, in the American tradition, a large mistake"
and outlining the principles of a synthesis, liberal republicanism or deliberative democracy); Sunstein,
supra note 34, at 1567, 1566-71 (critiizing scholars who have posited an "opposition between liberal
and republican thought" as stemming from a "caricature' of the liberal tradition).
194. SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 142; see supra note 35.
195. Cf.Michael Walzer, Flightfrom Philosophy, N.Y. RB.. BOOKS, Feb. 2, 1989, at 42-43
(reviewing BENjAMIN BARBER, THE CONQUEST OF POLITICS: LIBERAL PHILOSOPHY IN DEMOCRtATIC

TIMES (1989), a book by a prominent civic republican and proponent of "strong democracy")
(critiquing Barber's argument that politics should be free of philosophy). But see Michael Walzer,
Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379 (1981) (criticizing invocation of philosophy in
constitutional theory).
196. See Richard A. Epstein, ModernRepublicanism-Orthe Flightfrom Substance, 97 YALE L.J.
1633 (1988) (critiquing both Sunstein, supra note 34, and Michelman, Law's Republic, supranote 21).
197. Epstein, supra note 196, at 1633.
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deliberative elements of classical republicanism while fleeing its substantive
components, for example, by disavowing its militarist, elitist, sexist, racist,
and religious sentiments. 198 As a result, he suggests, Sunstein's theory
is selective, seductive, and incoherent. 99 But traditions of political and
constitutional theory are not all-or-nothing packages of ideas that one must
accept or reject as a unit, and there is hardly anything more commonplace
in the history of ideas than attempting to synthesize elements of more than
one tradition while rejecting other elements.'
Sunstein's flight from
objectionable substantive components of classical republicanism does not
render his project incoherent or doomed to fail.
Second, Epstein contends that Sunstein flees the substantive concerns
of classical liberalism and thereby fails to respond to the major challenge
of modem constitutional law: "the development of a substantive theory
which demarcates the zone of collective legislative control from the zone
of entrenched individual rights."" ° Epstein himself answers this challenge with a putatively Lockean theory of limited governmental powers and
entrenched individual rights.'
That is, he defends a strong version of
precisely the sort of liberalism that is said fundamentally to oppose republicanism.'
Epstein would flee from the deliberation and process of Sunstein's liberal republicanism to the substance of classical liberalism.'
He would constrain deliberative democracy with a "natural" or "prepolitical" conception of status quo neutrality of the very sort that Sunstein
is at pains to throw off.
Thus, unlike Rawls and Sunstein, who perceive the clash between liberalism and republicanism as a false opposition to be transcended through
a synthesis, Epstein perceives that clash as a real opposition to be resolved
through a total victory of classical liberalism over republicanism. But to
charge, as Epstein does, that Sunstein's liberal republicanism flees from
certain substantive concerns of classical liberalism is to comprehend that

198. Id. at 1634-36.
199. Id. at 1636.
200. See, e.g., I ACKERMAN, supra note2l, at 303, 302-03 (stating that the "Founders' genius"
resided in the way that they artfully recombined received ideas and practices into new constitutional
patterns); THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 48, at 81-84 (James Madison) (reworking
Montesquieu's theory of republics); id. No. 14, at 104, 102-04 (James Madison) (defending the
"experiment of an extended republic"); SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND
INNOVATION INWESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1960). Ely has attempted to formulate a theory that
is eompatible with several traditions of political thought. See supra text accompanying note 78.
201. Epstein, supra note 196, at 1634.
202. Id. at 1635, 1649-50; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 11-18 (advancing a Lockean theory
in the context of the Takings Clause).
203. Sunstein would reject this antithesis. See supra note 193.
204. C. I ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 11 (criticizing Epstein as a conservative "rights
foundationalist").
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Sunstein rejects substantive political theories such as Epstein's and aims to
synthesize liberalism and republicanism in the aftermath of the New Deal
and the rise of the welfare state. That charge does not derail Sunstein's
project.
There is nothing objectionable in Sunstein's rejection of Epstein's
substantive political theory.'
We should flee the substance of Epstein's
theory, with its scheme of limited governmental powers over the economy
and its zone of entrenched economic liberties, for it would unduly constrain
deliberative democracy. Sunstein's theory gives adequate protection to
property and liberty of contract; there is no justification for heightened
judicial protection of such economic liberties at the present time.'
Epstein's theory is the very incarnation of status quo neutrality; indeed, it
is Lochner's revenge on constitutional theory since West Coast Hotel and
the New Deal.'
3. A Rawlsian Synthesis: Deliberative Autonomy Along with
Deliberative Democracy.-Nonetheless, Sunstein's liberal republicanism
does take a different, objectionable flight from substance-namely, a flight
from judicial protection of such substantive liberties as liberty of conscience, freedom of association, privacy, and autonomy, which I shall
unify around a theme of securing deliberative autonomy. Rawls's resolution of the conflict between liberalism and republicanism through political
constructivism would not take a flight from process to substance that would
unduly constrict the procedural liberties of the ancients (as Epstein does).
Nor would it take a flight from substance to process that would not fully
account for the substantive liberties of the modems (as Sunstein does).
Like Sunstein's theory, Rawls's theory addresses the impasse thrown
up by the conflict between the traditions of the liberties of the ancients and
of the liberties of the moderns and between understandings of equality and
liberty. 8 Rawls tries to dispel that conflict and to reconcile equality and
liberty by combining the liberties of both traditions in one coherent scheme

205. In this Article, I cannot undertake a full critique of Epstein's theory. (I have mentioned it
mainly becauseEpstein has sounded the chargathat Sunstein's theory represents a flight from substance
to process.) Suffice it to say that I agree with Sunstein's critique of Epstein's theory. See SUNSTEIN,
supra note 22, at 296-98. In a general way, much of Sunstein's critique of status quo neutrality applies
to Epstein's theory. For additional critiques of Epstein, see Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian
Constitution, 41 U. MIMi L. REv. 21 (1986); Jeremy Paul, Searchingforthe Status Quo, 7 CAPDOZO
L. REV. 743 (1986) (reviewing EPSTEIN, supra note 4). See generallySymposium, RichardEpstein's
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 41 U. MiMi L. REV. 1 (1986).
206. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 143.
207. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 306-30 (arguing that much of the New Deal and the modem
welfare state is unconstitutional); supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
208. See supra notes 189, 192.
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of equal basic liberties that is grounded on a conception of citizens as free
and equal persons.) 9
In Part IV, I outline a constitutional constructivism by analogy to

Rawls's political constructivism. For now, the main idea to note is that
constitutional constructivism has two fundamental themes, which correspond roughly to the liberties of the ancients and the liberties of the

moderns, respectively. First, a republican theme secures the preconditions
for deliberative democracy, to enable citizens to apply their capacity for a

conception of justice to deliberating about the justice of basic institutions
and social policies. Second, a liberal theme secures the preconditions for

deliberative autonomy, to enable citizens to apply their capacity for a
conception of the good to deliberating about how to live their own lives.

Together, these two themes afford everyone the common and guaranteed
status of free and equal citizenship in our constitutional democracy.210
To put the idea schematically, in the synthesis of republicanism and

liberalism, each tradition has a principal theme. Furthermore, both themes
correspond to aspects of self-government: political self-government and

personal self-government (or self-determination). While this formulation
may seem overly schematic or dichotomous, and may appear to deny that

democracy and autonomy are complementary aspects of one unified vision,
209. See infratext accompanying note 382. Rawls contends that his political liberalism or political
constructivism is compatible with "classical republicanism" or "civic republicanism." See RAWLS,
supra note 31, at 205-06. He maintains, however, that it is not compatible with "civic humanism" as
a form of Aristotelianism that sees taking part in democratic politics "as the privileged locus of the
good life." Id. at 206. Such a strong form of republicanism gives primacy to the liberties of the
ancients rather than resolving the impasse between those liberties and the liberties of the modems. See
id. at 5, 206.
210. For a fuller statement of these two themes, see infra section IV(A)(4). I refer to the first
theme as that of securing the preconditions for deliberative democracy, to emphasize its similarity to
Sunstein's principal theme. Sunstein has done an excellent job of elaborating that theme. But he does
not develop a counterpart to the second theme of seeuring the preconditions for deliberative autonomy.
See infra section M(B)(4). Rawls also speaks of "deliberative democracy" as an aspect of constitutional
democracy. See Rawls, supra note 35, § 43; see also RAWLS, supra note 31, at 214 n.3 (speaking of
"deliberative democracy" as an aspect of political liberalism).
I refer to the second theme as that of securing the preconditions for deliberative autonomy for
three reasons: first, Rawls refers to the second moral power, the capacity for a conception of the good,
as the power of deliberative reason, see infra text accompanying note 395; second, Justice Stevens
refers to "decisional autonomy" in terms of "deliberations" about important decisions concerning how
to live one's life, see infratext accompanying notes 212-15; and third, this theme relates to deliberation
concerning fundamental decisions affecting one's identity and destiny, not merely the pursuit of
gratification of preferences or desires. Deliberative autonomy is not a conception of liberty as license.
See infra text accompanying note 334. This second theme is concerned with securing the preconditions
for the development and exercise of persons' capacity for a conception of the good. It reflects a
general assumption about this capacity, and it does not call for or require an inquiry into the actual
deliberations, responsibility, and judgment of specific individuals in their particular exercises of this
capacity. See MACEDO, supra note 21, at 32-33. For an analysis of charges that such rights license
irresponsibility, see Linda C. McClain, Rights andIrresponsibility, 43 DUKE LJ. (forthcoming Mar.
1994).
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it has the virtue of emphasizing that an adequate unified account requires
two themes.211

Constitutional constructivism's first theme, securing deliberative
democracy, protects such basic rights as the equal political liberties and
freedom of thought. Its second theme, securing deliberative autonomy,
protects such basic rights as liberty of conscience and freedom of association, including decisional autonomy and freedom of intimate association.
Familiar understandings of deliberative autonomy are illustrated by
Justice Stevens's and Justice Blackmun's dissents in Bowers. For example,

Justice Stevens writes that the Court's "privacy" decisions have been
animated by fundamental concerns for "the individual's right to make certain unusually important decisions that will affect his own, or his family's,

destiny" and "the abiding interest in individual liberty that makes certain
state intrusions on the citizen's right to decide how he will live his own life

intolerable." 212 Similarly, Justice Blackmun characterizes this liberty in
terms of "freedom of intimate association" and a right to "decisional privacy" along with "spatial privacy."213

Similar conceptions of deliberative autonomy are present in Casey, not
only in the opinions of Justices Stevens and Blackmun but also in the joint
opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. As Stevens puts it,

"Decisional autonomy must limit the State's power to inject into a woman's
most personal deliberations its own views of what is best because a
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is nothing less than a matter
of conscience. "2'4 He emphasizes liberty of conscience and decisional

211. By putting these two themes so schematically, I do not mean to imply that the realms of
political self-government and personal self-government (or self-determination) are entirely distinct. To
the contrary, for active, responsible citizens, deliberation concerning the common good in the political
realm may be an important aspect of their pursuit of their conception of the good or of how to lead
their own lives. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 206. More fundamentally, as Frank Michelman has
cogently emphasized, democracy and autonomy are complementary aspects of one unified vision that
coexist in a dialectical relation of mutuality, reciprocity, and entailment. See Michelman, Law's
Republic, supra note 21, at 1524-37; Frank Michelman, P#Aa; Personalbut Not Split: Radin Versus
Rorty, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1783, 1790 (1990).
212. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fitzgerald
v. Porter Mem. Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975) (Steven, J.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916
(1976)). Justice Stevens's dissent also illustrates how evolving notions of "ordered liberty" offer a
standpoint for criticism of historical practices, and how principles of equality guide us in concluding
that minorities should not be deprived of such liberty. Id. at 218-19.
213. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2840 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (empbasis added); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261,340-45 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that choices about death are a matter of individual
conscience). Despite Justice Stevens's broad view of liberty of conscience, hejoined in Justice Scalia's
opinion of the Court in Employment Division, Department of Human Resourees v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990) (rejecting the argument that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required an
exemption from a general criminal prohibition on the use of peyote to allow ceremonial use of peyote
by members of the Native American Church).
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autonomy as well as equal dignity and respect for women and men.21
Likewise, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Casey emphasizes that cases

protecting the fundamental right of privacy embody "the principle that
personal decisions that profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and
destiny should be largely beyond the reach of government."216 He, too,
stresses self-determination along with gender equality.217 Similarly, the

joint opinion in Casey speaks of a woman's liberty at stake in the decision
whether to have an abortion as
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy ....
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of
218
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.

Like the opinions of Stevens and Blackmun, the joint opinion illustrates a
complex intertwining of liberty and equality in its justification of the right
to decide whether to have an abortion. 9

Constructivism's second theme of securing deliberative autonomy
articulates and unifies such concerns for liberty of conscience, decisional
autonomy, privacy, and freedom of intimate association. Furthermore, that
theme fits well with the substantive due process cases that reflect an
antitotalitarian principle of liberty, to be discussed below.'
Finally, it

embodies intertwined concerns for liberty and equality in one coherent
scheme.

215. In his opinion in Casey, Justice Stevens intertwines liberty arguments and equality arguments.
For example, he writes that "Roe is an integral part of a correct understanding of both the concept of
liberty and the basic equality of men and women," Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), and that "[p]art of the constitutional liberty to choose is the equal dignity
to which each of us is entitled." Id. at 2842. He also empbasizes the notion of "equal respect." Id.;
see supra note 186. For an analysis of Stevens's idea of decisional autonomy in terms of "deliberative
autonomy," see Jane M. Cohen, A Jurisprudenceof Doubt: DeliberativeAutonomy and Abortion, 3
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 175 (1992).
Rawls only briefly discusses abortion, mentioning it in a footnote. See RAWLS, supra note 31,
at 243 n.32. There he identifies three important political values at issue in the question of abortion:
the equality of women as equal citizens, the ordered reproduction of political society over time, and
due respect for human life. He states that he believes that "any reasonablebalance of these three values
will give a woman a duly qualified right to decide whether or not to end her pregnancy during the first
trimester." Id. He acknowledges that a reasonable balance may allow a woman such a right beyond
this, but does not discuss the question in general. Id.
216. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2846 (Blacknun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
217. Id. at 2846-47.
218. Id. at 2807 (joint opinion); cf. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992) (affirming
that the First Amendment protects freedom of conscience).
219. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809, 2812, 2831 (joint opinion).
220. See infra text accompanying notes 229-37.
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4. Sunstein's Synthesis: Deliberative Democracy to the Neglect of
Deliberative Autonomy.-Sunstein likens his synthesis, liberal republicanism, to Rawls's theory.'
Moreover, he claims that his theory of deliberative democracy is entirely compatible with the theories of constitutional
democracy defended by Mill and Rawls.'
Sunstein's principal theme
of securing the preconditions for deliberative democracy is indeed largely
compatible with constructivism's first theme.'
But his theory lacks a

principal theme of securing the preconditions for deliberative autonomy
corresponding to constructivism's second theme. Indeed, he is remarkably

silent concerning certain substantive liberties such as liberty of conscience,
privacy, autonomy, and freedom of association.

To the extent that he

addresses them, he tries conclusorily (and unconvincingly) to recast them
as preconditions for deliberative democracy. Constitutional constructivism
better fits and justifies these substantive liberties, which are manifested on
the face of our constitutional document and implicit in our underlying
constitutional order, than does Sunstein's theory.
For example, in his presentation of the four core commitments of deliberative democracy, Sunstein makes no reference whatever to liberty of

conscience or religious liberty.'

To be sure, in Beyond the Republican

Revival, he states that "liberty of expression and conscience and the right
to vote... are the basic preconditions for republican deliberation," citing
Rawls.'
But he does not justify this conclusory statement, nor does he
elaborate the relationship between liberty of conscience and republican
deliberation.
Sunstein explains that the exclusion of religion from politics is a

precondition for republican deliberation in an "ironic sense": "[R]emoval
of religion from the political agenda protects republican politics by
ensuring against stalemate and factionalism."'

Here Sunstein analyzes

221. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 141, 373 n.18; Sunstein, supra note 34, at 1566-71.
222. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 141, 175, 186; see also Sunstein, supra note 34, at 1567
(noting affinities between his synthesis, liberal republicanism, and Rawls's integration of the liberal
tradition and republican thought).
223. See Rawls, supra note 35, § 43 (discussing deliberative democracy as an aspect of
constitutional democracy and referring favorably to Sunstein's treatment of deliberative political
discussion in Sunstein, supra note 34).
224. See SUNSTEIN, supranote 22, at 133-41. Sunstein acknowledges that his failure to say more
about the "constitutionally central issue of religion" is a "significant gap" in The PartialConstitution.
Cass R. Sunstein, Liberal Constitutionalism and Liberal Justice, 72 TEX. L. REV. 305, 311 n.29
(1993).
225. Sunstein, supra note 34, at 1551 (citing RAWLs, supra note 32, at 205-21). Pages 1547-58
of that artice are the basis for the statement of the four core commitments at pages 133-41 of The
PartialConstitution, but in the book Sunstein omits the passage from the article that is quoted in the
text.
226. Id. at 1555 n.8 5 . He further states that this exclusion of religion from politics has also been
based "on the notion that religious conviction is a matter of private right." Id.
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religious liberty in terms of a "gag rule" to remove divisive, factional
issues from the political agenda so that republican deliberation can go
on.'
He does not treat religious liberty and liberty of conscience as
shields to protect citizens against oppressive republican deliberators
wielding coercive political power in enforcing the republic's collective
judgments concerning the good. Hence, he recognizes the potential divi-

siveness of protecting religious liberty, which results in citizens holding
divergent conceptions of the good, but he ignores the potential oppressiveness of not protecting it.'
Sunstein's liberal republican theory also gives remarkably little atten-

tion to principles of liberty, privacy, or autonomy that have been vindicated through substantive due process cases from Meyer v. Nebraska and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters to the present. 9 These landmark cases,

however controversial, reflect fundamental principles of our underlying
constitutional order.

Any constitutional theory, to be persuasive, must

account for them and for the principles that they embody. Yet Sunstein
does not consider whether these cases from the Lochner era, not to mention
their progeny-including Griswold,' Loving, 1 Roe, 2 Moore, 3
227. Id. (citing Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 19).

228. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943) (recognizing
the potential for oppression through any coercion ofbelief). Rawls recognizes both aspects of religious
lierty. See RAWLs, supra note 31, at 36-38, 134-40, 151-54; RAWLs, supra note 32, at 205-21.
229. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) ("Mhe ideas touching the relation between
individual and state [in ancient Sparta and Plato's ideal commonwealth, which 'submerge the individual
and develop ideal citizens'] were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest."); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The fundamental theory upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state.").
Sunstein's only reference to autonomy in his presentation of the four core commitments of
deliberative democracy is a reference to "a sphere of autonomy into which the state may not enter" that
is created by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. SUNSTEIN,
supra note 22, at 136. Clearly, he is referring to "spatial privacy" as distinguished from "decisional
privacy" or decisional autonomy. Furthermore, as stated above, Sunstein is critical of both of the
doctrinal strands upon which the joint opinion in Casey relied in reaffirming the right of a woman to
decide whether to have an abortion, that is, decisional autonomy and bodily integrity. Instead, he
would base that right on equal protection grounds. See supra text accompanying notes 184-88.
230. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut statute that
criminalized the use of contraceptives by married persons violated the right of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees).
23 1. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a Virginia statute preventing interracial
marriage violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses). The casebook of which
Sunstein is a co-author reprints, in the section on equal protection, the portion of Chief Justice
Warren's opinion that holds that the miscegenation statute deniedthe Lovings equal protection but omits
the portion that holds that the statute also deprived them of liberty without due process of law. Id. at
12; see GEOFFREY R. STONE El AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 605-06 (2d ed. 1991).
232. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a Texas statute criminalizing abortions
except those performed "for the purpose of saving the life of the mother" violated the right of privacy
protected by the Due Process Clause).
233. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that a city ordinancelimiting
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and Casey -evince status quo neutrality or, to the contrary, stem from
an alternative baseline in liberty.235 Jed Rubenfeld has argued persuasively that such cases reflect the latter, an antitotalitarian principle of
privacy: they are concerned with the danger of "creeping totalitarianism,

an unarmed occupation of individuals' lives."

6

In constitutional

constructivism, a similar antitotalitarian principle of liberty, privacy, or
autonomy parallels Sunstein's anticaste principle of equality. Moreover,
all of these cases are justifiable on the basis of a constructivist principle of
deliberative autonomy, or a conception of liberty and personhood, that

constrains the republic's enforcement of its collectivejudgments concerning
the good. Instead of developing an antitotalitarian principle of liberty as
a precondition for deliberative autonomy, Sunstein neglects cases like

Meyer, Pierce, Griswold, Loving, and Moore, while justifying cases like
Roe and Casey on the basis of an anticaste principle of equality as a precondition for deliberative democracy 37

Despite his neglect of liberty of conscience, privacy, and autonomy,
Sunstein does state that "no democracy should impose on citizens a
particular or unitary conception of what their lives ought to be like." 8
His theory, however, does not provide or entail any limits on deliberative

occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family, and narrowly defining "family" to exclude
certain extended family arrangements, violated the Due Process Clause).
234. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (reaffirming the "central holding" of
Roe, that the Due Process Clause protects the right of a woman to decide whether to terminate a
pregnancy, but upholding certain aspects of Pennsylvania's abortion law while invalidating the spousal
notification provision).
235. But see Sunstein, supra note 29, at 1172, 1173 (acknowledging that "tradition is sometimes
treated as aspirational" and discussing the "references to tradition" in Griswold).
236. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 784 (1989) (emphasis in
original). For example, Rubenfeld emphasizes the profound sense in which laws restricting abortion
reduce women to "mere instrumentalities of the state," and "take diverse women with every variety
of career, life-plan, and so on, and make mothers of them all." Id. at 790, 788; see also TRIBE, supra
note 47, at 104 (approvingly quoting Rubenfeld's analysis); id. at 92, 93 (characterizing Meyer and
Pierce as "bulwarks in our legal system" and as ancestors of the right of women "not to be made
mothers against their will"); TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1302-21, 1337-62 (discussing the parameters of
the rights of privacy and personhood and the court decisions that have developed them).
I refer to the right of privacy or autonomy as an "antitotalitarian principle of liberty" to suggest
a parallel with Sunstein's anticaste principle of equality. (I use the term "totalitarian" in Rubenfeld's
sense, not the stronger sense applied to Nazi Germany or the Communist Soviet Union.) Such an
antitotalitarian principle of liberty is intertwined with an anticaste principle of gender equality. For
example, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Casey observes that "[b]y restricting the right to terminate
pregnancies, the State conscripts women's bodies in its service" and proceeds to cite both the article
on privacy by Rubenfeld, id., and an article on equality by Sunstein, Neutrality in ConstitutionalLaw
(with Special Reference to Pornography,Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 31-44
(1992), as among the commentaries recognizing the gender equality issues present in the context of
abortion. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2846, 2847 n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 184-88.
238. SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 185-86.
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democracy that would protect citizens against the republic's doing so and
thus encroaching on deliberative autonomy. He claims that the rights that
are preconditions for deliberative democracy impose constraints on collective judgments, adding that "other rights fundamental to individual
autonomy or welfare-such as consensual intimate sexual activity-ought
generally to be off-limits to government."" 9 Yet he offers this statement
almost as a throwaway line. He does not articulate any reason why such
activity should be off limits to government, for example, because this sort
of individual autonomy or welfare is a precondition for deliberative
autonomy or even for deliberative democracy.
At this point in his argument, Sunstein conclusorily states that "the
notions of autonomy and welfare would be defined by reference to the ideal
of free and equal persons acting as citizens in setting up the terms of
democratic life," echoing Rawls's idea that basic liberties are grounded on
a conception of citizens as free and equal persons.' ° Prior to this point,
though, Sunstein has not grounded his theory of deliberative democracy on
such a conception of the person. Furthermore, he does not proceed to
develop this sort of a conception. But Sunstein's reference to Rawls's
theory suggests what is needed in his own theory: namely, a theme of
securing deliberative autonomy that, together with his theme of securing
deliberative democracy, is grounded on a conception of citizens as free and
equal persons. The former theme would protect citizens' pursuit of their
divergent conceptions of the good from coercive political power, even that
of a well-functioning deliberative democracy. The constitutional constructivism that I outline in Part IV includes these two themes and is based on
a conception of citizens as free and equal persons."
Ironically, my Rawlsian critique of Sunstein in this respect amounts
to a charge that Sunstein's republican theory presupposes too thin a conception of the person. This critique is ironic because some political theorists
who are celebrated by republicans, such as Michael J. Sandel, have argued
that Rawls's theory reflects an impoverished conception of the person as
an "unencumbered self." 2 Such criticisms of Rawls's theory are not

239. Id. at 184.
240. Id. at 186. For a discussion of Rawls's conception of citizens as free and equal persons, see
inffra text accompanying notes 382-90.
241. Sunstein's relative inattention to deliberative autonomy suggests that he underestimates the
extent to which many real, intractable battles in our constitutional democracy at the present time involve
not only the problem of partisanship versus neutrality, but also the clash between divergent conceptions
of the good (involving competing claims concerning who we as a people are and what our values
are-claims that are couched in terms of a cultural war of us versus them). One need only mention the
1992 Republican National Convention to illustrate this clash. See Chris Black, Buchanan Beckons
Conservatives to Come "Home," BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 1992, at 12 (reporting Pat Buchanan's
declaration of "cultural war" at the Republican National Convention).
242. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 21 (1982); Michael J.
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In sum, Sunstein's elaboration of the preconditions for deliberative
democracy includes several references to substantive liberties of the
moderns such as, religious liberty, liberty of conscience, freedom of inti-

mate association, and autonomy. But he does not elaborate the role or
significance of these liberties in relation to securing the preconditions for
deliberative democracy, much less develop a principal theme of securing
the preconditions for deliberative autonomy. Nor does he adequately
ground either deliberative democracy or deliberative autonomy on a
conception of citizens as free and equal persons.
Moreover, the architecture of Sunstein's theory forces or leads him to

recast, as preconditions for deliberative democracy, certain substantive
liberties that are better understood as preconditions for deliberative

autonomy. Worse yet, his theory ignores such liberties. In this sense,
Sunstein's liberal republicanism, somewhat like Ely's qualified utilitarianism, represents a flight from giving effect to substantive liberties to

perfecting processes.
C.

Sunstein's Flightfrom Substantive Due Process to Equal Protection

1. Bowers: The New West Coast Hotel or the New Lochner?-To
illustrate what is at stake in Sunstein's emphasis on deliberative democracy
to the neglect of deliberative autonomy, I shall explore his conception of
the relationship between due process and equal protection in general, and
how that understanding shapes his analysis of Bowers v. Hardwick 4 in

particular. (I put to one side the question of whether the Privileges or
Immunities Clause provides a firmer ground for protecting substantive

Sandel, The ProceduralRepublic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81, 85-87 (1984).
Sandel's critique of Rawls has been invoked by scholars who are sympathetic with republicanism and
critical of liberalism. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE 317 (1988); Suzanna
Sherry, Civic Virtue andthe Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 545
(1986); cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIsCOURSE 191
n.4 (1991) (drawing upon Sandel's claim that liberalism neglects the "situated" or "encumbered" self
in advancing a communitaian critique of the alleged liberal conception of the person as a "lone rightsbearer").
243. Many scholars have defended Rawls's liberal theory against Sandel's communitarian critique.
See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 47-73 (1989); CHAPRES E.
LARmORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 118-30 (1987); Amy Gutmann, CommunitarianCritics
of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308 (1985); see also RAWLS, supra note 31, at 10, 27 n.29, 97;
John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:Politicalnot Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985) (both
explaining that his conception of the person is political, not metaphysical). For defenses of Rawls's
theory in the context of feminist criticisms of liberalism that have invoked Sandel's critique, see Linda
C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and FeministJurisprudence,65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1204-06 (1992); Susan M. Okin, Reason and Feeling in ThinkingAbout Justice,
99 ETHics 229, 246-49 (1989).
244. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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liberties than the Due Process Clause.") My critique of Sunstein's
theory in this respect shows that a theme of securing deliberative autonomy, along with a theme of securing deliberative democracy, is necessary
to secure the basic liberties essential to free and equal citizenship for
everyone in our constitutional democracy. I suggest that Sunstein, like
Ely, flees substantive due process for equal protection.
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect a fundamental right
to engage in homosexual sodomy.'
Writing for the Court, Justice
White acknowledged that many cases have interpreted that clause to protect
not only procedural rights but also substantive rights that "have little or no
textual support in the constitutional language," including substantive rights
to heterosexual intimate association. 7 But Justice White expressed
wariness, fearing that the ghost of Lochner was incarnate in those decisions.' s The opinion stated that heightened judicial protection under the
Due Process Clause has been limited to those fundamental rights that are

245. See, e.g., RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 21, at 199-232 (arguing that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, not the Due Process Clause, expressed the nationalization of human rights);
TRIBE, supra note 4, § 7-4 (acknowledging that the Privileges or Immunities Clause has been
historically eclipsed by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, but suggesting that it is
potentially robust as a basis for vindicating personal rights); see also Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalismin the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
863, 925-28 (1986) (arguing that the privileges and immunities of citizenship comprehended by the
Fourteenth Amendment provide a principled basis for protecting rights that are essential to the
enjoyment of life, liberty, and property).
246. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186. Accordingly, the Court upheld Georgia's statute that prohibited
sodomy, as applied to consensual homosexual sodomy. The decision was by a narrow 5-4 majority.
As is well known, Justice Powell, who voted with the majority, subsequently stated publicly that he
"probably made a mistake" by doing so. See Linda Greenhouse, When Second Thoughts in Case Come
Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at A14. Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion, has
retired from the Court and has been replaced by Justice Ginsburg. See supranote 13. Ginsburg, while
a judge on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cireuit, voted with the en banc majority
to deny a rehearing in a 1984 case that rejected a discharged homosexual sailor's argument that the
military's ban on homosexuals violated his constitutional right to privacy and denied him equal
protection. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984), reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc). She wrote separately from Judge Robert Bork's more conservative
opinion, stating simply: "I am of the view that the Supreme Court's disposition in Doe [v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976),] controls our judgment in this case .....
Dronenburg,746 F.2d at 1582. (Doe, in a one-line decision without opinion, had summarily affirmed
the decision of a three-judge federal district court upholding a Virginia law that made it a crime, even
for consenting adults acting in private, to engage in homosexual relations. Doe, 425 U.S. at 901, aff'g
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).) Nonetheless, some observershavepredicted that Ginsburg might
vote to overrule Bowers. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, one of only three senators to vote
against her confirmation to the Supreme Court, justified his vote in part by saying that she "is likely
to uphold the homosexual agenda." Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 96-3, Easily Affirms Judge Ginsburg
as a Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1993, at B8.
247. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
248. See id. at 194-95.
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"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' 49 or "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."'
Although it said that these two formulations were different descriptions, it treated them as if they were the same.
Applying an understanding of substantive due process as basically

confined to protecting traditions conceived as historicalpractices,White's
opinion rudely concluded that the claim that the Due Process Clause protects a fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual

sodomy "is, at best, facetious. " " The opinion ignored the fact that the

claim instead was being made in all earnestness on the basis of an understanding of substantive due process as extending to protecting traditions and
a scheme of ordered liberty conceived as aspirationalprinciples. Below,
I explain this contrast between two basic understandings of what a tradition
is and of what due process requires.
Bowers is an emblematic, defining case. 2 Some decry it as marking a second death of substantive due process, at any rate as a principled
doctrine of constitutional law applicable to all citizens. 3 Others,
including Justice Scalia and Judge Bork, celebrate it as signaling a restora-

tion of legitimacy in constitutional law.'

Both reactions suggest an ana-

logy between Bowers and the watershed case of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,' which officially repudiated the era of Lochner. But Bowers, unlike West CoastHotel, did not overrule substantive due process precedents.
Rather, it refused to extend those precedents from protecting heterosexual

intimate association to protecting homosexual intimate association1

6

249. Id. at 191 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.)).
250. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion)).
251. Id. at 194.
252. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 873 (giving Lochner and Brown as examples of "defining
cases").
253. See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 10, at 242; cf. TRIBE& DoRF, supra note21, at 55-60, 74-79,
116-17 (reading Bowers as a retreat from the right to privacy); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality andthe
Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187 (arguing that laws that condemn homosexual
behavior, such as the law upheld in Bowers, violate constitutional norms of gender equality);
Michelman, Law's Republic, supranote 21, at 1532-37 (advancing a republican critique of Bowers that
emphasizes the link between privacy and citizenship); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle,
92 COLuM. L. R.v. 1431, 1475-76 (1992) (contending that statutes outlawing homosexual sodomy
violate the right to be free from state-legitimized homophobic violence and that such violence inflicts
cruel and unusual punishment upon the bodies of homosexuals).
254. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion);
BORK, supra note 5, at 116-26.
255. 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
256. Perhaps a more apt analogy is between Bowers and San Antonio IndependentSchool District
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The latter case curbed the expansion of both the fundamental rights
and the suspect classification branches of equal protection analysis, proclaiming that "[ult is not the
province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws." Id. at 33. Just as Rodriguez takes a "this far and no further" approach to
'substantive equal protection," so Bowers takes such an approach to substantive due process. To the
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Sunstein's analysis, however, suggests that Bowers, far from signaling
the end of Lochnering, is analogous to Lochner itself and indeed to Plessy
v. Ferguson.'57 For Bowers, like those egregious precedents, evinced

status quo neutrality. The Court simply pointed to historical practices,
common law, and statutes condemning sodomy (whether heterosexual or

homosexual) to justify refusing to recognize the asserted right of homosexual intimate association."

Sunstein argues that the Due Process

Clause is backward-looking: It is grounded in a principle of status quo
neutrality that operates largely as a baseline for protecting historical
practices against ill-considered or short-term departures. 9 From that
standpoint, he suggests that the decision in Bowers as a matter of due

process is not altogether surprising, even if it is unprincipled in relation to
precedents protecting heterosexual intimate association.'
Sunstein contends that the Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, is

forward-looking: It is grounded in a principle of equality that operates
largely as a baseline for criticizing historical practices that deny equality,
protecting against such practices, however long-standing and deeply rooted.

Equal protection is largely an anticaste principle, criticizing historical
practices that manifest second-class citizenship, whether founded on racism,
sexism, or heterosexism. 1 From that standpoint, laws of the sort upheld
in Bowers on due process grounds nevertheless should be struck down on
extent that Casey rests upon a commitment to stare decisis, rather than a commitment to substantive
liberty itself, that case, too, may prove to be somewhat analogous to Rodriguez. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808-16 (1992) (joint opinion).
257. For the analogy between Bowers and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), see Sunstein,
supra note 29, at 1162 (quoting Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting), withdrawn but aff'd, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 957 (1990)). The analogy between Bowers and Lochner is suggested by Sunstein's analysis
of Bowers in relation to status quo neutrality, epitomized in Lochner. See Sunstein, supra note 29, at
1168-74. Before Bowers was decided, Ely argued that sexual orientation should be recognized as a
suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause, and he anticipated the analogy to Plessy. See
ELY, supra note 16, at 163.
258. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986); cf. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550 (refusing
to invalidate a statute enacted "with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the
people"). As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent in Bowers, the historical "condemnation was
equally damning for heterosexual and homosexual sodomy." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 215 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). As Justice Blackmun retorted indissent, quoting Holmes's dissent in Lochner: "[Tihe fact
that [such] mora! judgments ... may be 'natural and familiar ...ought not to concludeour judgment
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States.'" Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Locbnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
259. See SUNSTEIN, supra note22, at 131-32, 402 n.17; Sunstein, supra note 29, at 1163, 117074, 1179. Sunstein concedes that due process and tradition are sometimes treated as "aspirational"
rather than being backward-looking and rooted in status quo neutrality. See Sunstein, supra note 29,
at 1173.
260. Sunstein, supra note 29, at 1173-74.
261. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 131-32, 136, 259-61, 402 n.17; Sunstein, supra note 29,
at 1163, 1174-75, 1179.
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Sunstein puts forward this conception of the

relationship between due process and equal protection, not simply as a
litigation strategy in the aftermath of Bowers or as a strategy of damage
control in trying to protect our basic liberties while Justice Scalia sits, but
as a general constitutional theory. It is, however, better as such strategies

than as such a theory.'
2. The Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection.-

Thus, Sunstein, like Ely, eschews substantive due process in favor of equal
protection as a ground for deriving basic liberties implicit in deliberative
democracy and representative democracy, respectively. Instead, Sunstein

emphasizes an anticaste principle of equality, Ely a conception of equal
concern and
stantive due
tions of the
liberty and
stein.2

respect.' In order to explicate Sunstein's flight from subprocess and deliberative autonomy, I examine three conceprelationship between due process and equal protection, or
equality: those illustrated by Dworkin, Scalia, and Sun-

a. Dworkin:freeand equal citizens.-First,one might argue that
due process and equal protection in large part overlap and are intertwined.
For example, Dworkin argues that the Constitution embodies an abstract
conception of justice, "a political ideal ... of a society of citizens both
equal and free."'
On his view, both equality and liberty are comprehensive principles: The Constitution requires both that government treat
everyone with equal concern and respect and that it not infringe their most
basic liberties, those liberties essential to a scheme of "ordered liberty," to
use Justice Cardozo's famous formulation in Palko v. Connecticut 67

262. See Sunstein, supra note 29, at 1162-70, 1175-79.
263. See TRIBE& DoRF, supra note 2 1, at 115-16 (criticizing Sunstein's argument concerning the
relationship hetween due process and equal protection "[a]s a matter of constitutional theory," but
conceding that it might be a good proposal "as a matter of advocacy and legal strategy"); see also infra
note 281 and text accompanying notes 325-27.
264. See ELY, supra note 16, at 14-21, 82-87, 135-79; Ely, suprd note 5, at 933-45.
265. For another exploration of the relationship between due process and equal protection, see Ira
C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the FourteenthAmendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981 (1979).
266. Dworkin, supra note 42, at 382.
267. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Dworkin himself, in his
earlier work elaborating equal concern and respect as a ground for rights, has been charged with trying
to derive too much from equality and too little from liberty. See HART, supra note 181, at 214, 217,
221 (arguing that Dworkinhas "soughtto derive too much from the idea of equal concern and respect";
that "[w]hat is fundamentally wrong is the suggested interpretation of denials of freedom as denials of
equal concern or respect"; and that as to certain denials of freedom, equality plays an "empty but
misleading role" better performed by liberty or respect). But see DWORKIN, A Right to Pornography,
supra note 76, at 365-72 (replying to Hart's critique). For Dworkin's more recent efforts to reconcile
equality (of resources) and liberty, see Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality?:The Place of Liberty, 73
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1987).
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And so, Dworkin continues, "[p]articular constitutional rights that
follow from the best interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, for
example, will very likely also follow from the best interpretation of the
Due Process Clause."" 8 As Chief Justice Warren put it in Boiling v.
Sharpe,' "Mhe concepts of equal protection and due process, both

stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. "'
Thus, Dworkin, like Justice Stevens, justifies Roe and Casey on
grounds of equal concern and respect as well as liberty of conscience and

decisional autonomy."

Furthermore, he criticizes Bowers not only on

the ground that it fails to accord equal concern and respect to homosexuals
but also on the ground that it denies them liberty of conscience and decisional autonomy.'
Hence, for Dworkin, both due process and equal protection stem from
principles of justice that provide alternative baselines to status quo

neutrality.

They provide intertwined bases for criticizing historical

practices that fail to realize our ideals of liberty and equality.
b. Justice Scalia:destruction and salvation.-Second,one might
argue that due process and equal protection, instead of overlapping, in
large part perform separate functions. Both Justice Scalia and Sunstein,

from different perspectives, advance versions of this conception. Scalia
argues that the Due Process Clause assures procedural due process and, to
the extent that it includes substantive restrictions, prohibits only depriva-

tions of "substantive" rights "historically and traditionally protected against
State interference."273

If the Court uses the Due Process Clause to try

268. Dworkin, supra note 42, at 382-83.
269. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Boiling was the District of Columbia companion case to Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
270. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499 (emphasis added). The Court continued, "[W]e do not imply that
the two are always interchangeable phrases." Id. Hence, the Supreme Court held that although the
Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the federal government, racially segregated public schools
in the District of Columbia are unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
which does apply.
271. See Dworkin, supranote 42, at 418-27; supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text; Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2840-42 (1992) (Stevens, I., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); cf. DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 171 (arguing that the Caseyjoint opinion's rationale for "the
right of procreative autonomy.., matched, in several important respects," the argument that Dworkin
makes in terms of liberty of conscience). For a different point, Justice Stevens cited Dworkin's article
in his opinion. Id. at 2839 n.2.
272. See Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in 11 THE TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 1, 113-15 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1990); Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77
CAL. L. REv. 479, 480-84 (1989); Dworkin, supra note 17, at 340-42; supra note 212 and
accompanying text.
273. Cruzanv. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,294 (1990) (Scalia, I., concurring);
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to protect the citizenry from "irrationality and oppression," he warns, "it
will destroy itself."274 After all, the ghost of Lochner lurks. By contrast, Scalia declaims, "Our salvation is the Equal Protection Clause, which
requires the democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved
ones what they impose on you and me."275
For example, Scalia argues that Roe and Casey are the Lochner or,
worse yet, the Dred Scott of our timeY 6 He contends, on the other
hand, that Bowers signals a restoration of legitimacy in constitutional

law.'
Therefore, for Scalia, neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal
Protection Clause offers a baseline beyond status quo neutrality for criticizing historical practices. Due process requires status quo neutrality and
grows out of a Burkean deposit of historical practices."
Equal

protection requires neutrality in the sense of generality, and reflects a
Thayerian' or Frankfurterian ° faith in salvation through democratic
processes rather than easy resort to judicial review." 1 Hence, for Scalia,

see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-27 & n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect a relationship between a biological father and
a child whose mother was married to and cohabiting with another man at the time of the child's
conception and birth because such relationships have not been historically protected).
274. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 301. For a skeptical view of such fears about the "destruction" of
courts, see ELY, supra note 16, at 47-48.
275. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 300.
276. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2883-85 (1992) (Scalia, I., concurring in the
judgment inpart and dissenting in part). For a critique of conservative or originalist invocation of the
ghost of Dred Scott in criticizing Roe and Casey, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again:
Originalism'sForgottenPast, 10 CONST. COMMETARY 37, 46-50 (1993) (arguing that Chief Justice
Taney's opinion of the Court in Dred Scott embraced a version of originalism).
277. See MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294.
278. See SUNSTEIN, supranote 22, at 130 (interpreting Scalia as a Burkean defender of status quo
neutrality as a baseline and referring to EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN
FRANc E (1790)); see also Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-16 (1990) (Scalia, 3.)
(concluding that state court jurisdiction over physically present nonresidents cannot violate the Due
Process Clause because of the established place of transient jurisdiction in American tradition).
279. See Thayer, supra note 128, at 156 ("[U]nder no system can the power of courts go far to
save a people from ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere."); Thayer, supra note 162, at 86 ("The
tendency of a common and easy resort to [judicial review] ... is to dwarf the politieal capacity of the
people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.").
280. See Sanford Levinson, The DemocraticFaith of Felix Frankfurter,25 STAN. L. REV. 430,
439 (1973) (interpreting Frankfurter's theory of "judicial restraint" as rooted in a "democratic faith"
and a conviction that "the Court had abused beyond salvation" its limited mandate through its
interpretation of the Due Process Clauses during the era of Lochner); see also SANFORD LEVINSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 3-4 (1988) [hereinafter LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH] (discussing

Frankfurter's constitutional faith).
281. Two caveats regarding Scalia's theory are in order. First, it is very likely that Scalia, for
his own part, would limit due process to procedural due process and overrule the whole line of
substantive due process cases. He does not, however, have the votes on the Court to bring about that
result. His Michael H. gloss on substantive due process as tradition understood as historical practices
and argument concerning the appropriatelevel of generality, which narrow the analysis of Bowers even
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due process is not an antitotalitarian principle of liberty or a principle of
deliberative autonomy, nor is equal protection an anticaste principle. Even
in the context of discrimination on the basis of race, equal protection is
merely a principle of racial neutrality. m
c. Sunstein: Janus.-Like Scalia, Sunstein argues that due
process and equal protection in large part operate along different tracks and
serve different purposes. But according to his analysis, the Fourteenth
Amendment, like Janus, has two faces looking in opposite directions. The
Due Process Clause is backward-looking and largely evinces status quo
neutrality as a baseline. The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, is
forward-looking and centrally embodies an anticaste principle of equal
citizenship as a baseline. Thus, Sunstein's Due Process Clause looks
backward somewhat like Scalia's, and his Equal Protection Clause looks
forward somewhat like Dworkin's. For example, Sunstein justifies Roe
and Casey on the ground of an anticaste principle of equality, but not on
the ground of an antitotalitarian principle of liberty or a principle of
deliberative autonomy.'
Likewise, he criticizes Bowers primarily on
the former ground.'
Sunstein's account of the relationship between due process and equal
protection has two fundamental problems. First, it gives insufficient attention to the possibility that the Due Process Clause might reflect an antitotalitarian principle of liberty that would serve as a baseline for criticizing
historical practices that deny deliberative autonomy, much as the Equal
Protection Clause expresses an anticaste principle of equality that provides
a baseline for criticizing historical practices that deny equal citizenship.

further, are his effort to engage in damage control: to limit the reach of the substantive due process
cases as narrowly as he can and to deprive them of critical force or generative power. See infra note
311 and text accompanying notes 325-27.
Second, the salvation that Scalia contemplates through the Equal Protection Clause is not
heightened judicial protection for fundamental rights or from prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities, under either the fundamental rights or the suspect classifications strand of equal protection
analysis. It is merely the political safeguard of a requirement of neutrality in the sense of generality
and, in the context of classifications based on race, a requirement of racial neutrality. See infra note
282.
282. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(asserting that only "race-neutral remedial program[s] aimed at the disadvantaged as such," not
programs that operate on the basis of race, are constitutional (emphasis in original)); Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 609 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ.) (asserting that the Equal Protection Clause requires racial neutrality, for
the idea of a "'benign racial classification' is a contradiction in terms"); id. at 635 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.) (rejecting any distinction between invidious and "benign"
discrimination); see also Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147 (contending
that affirmative action programs foster racism).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 185-88.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 259-62.
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Second, Sunstein ignores or downplays that equal protection alone,
without a substantive conception of citizens as free and equal persons from
which to derive fundamental rights or fundamental interests, may not be a

sufficient ground for securing even equal citizenship, let alone free citizenship. Without such a conception, Sunstein cannot satisfactorily answer the
question, "Equality with respect to what?"' Ely's theory of equal protection needs to be complemented by a principle like deliberative autonomy
to accomplish all that he claims for it with respect to discrimination on the
basis of race and sexual orientation."6 Similarly, Sunstein's anticaste
principle of equality needs to be supplemented with an explicit principle
like deliberative autonomy to support all that he attempts to derive from it,

for it inevitably smuggles in such a principle.'

Sunstein's theory in this

sense takes a flight from substantive due process and deliberative autonomy
to equal protection and deliberative democracy. Constitutional constructivism more comfortably grounds such basic liberties on both liberty and

equality, or on a conception of citizens as free and equal persons.
Here I focus on the first problem. Sunstein's account of due process
accepts too readily Bowers's obliteration of the difference between the
Palko and the Moore formulations of the due process inquiry and its adop-

tion of a narrow understanding of that inquiry. His account accedes too
readily to the Court's flight between Palko and Bowers from aspirational

principles to historical practices in the due process inquiry.
3. Due Processfrom Palko to Bowers: From AspirationalPrinciples
to HistoricalPractices.-BetweenPalko, Griswold, and Roe, on the one
hand, and Moore and Bowers, on the other, an initially subtle but ultimately significant change seems to have occurred in the Court's conception
of the due process inquiry: from Cardozo's formulation in Palko, "implicit

in the concept of ordered liberty,"" to Powell's formulation for the plurality in Moore, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 9

285. But see SUNStMEN, supra note 22, at 138 (discussing certain "universal human needs, to be
met in any just society").
286. See Tribe, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 12, at 1072-77 (arguing that Ely's theory should
be complemented with rights derived from a conception of the person, intimate association, and what
is needed to realize one's humanity); Dworkin, Forum, supra note 12, at 510-16 (contending that Ely's
theory presupposes a conception of moral independence).
287. See SUNsTMIN, supra note 22, at 270-85. Sunstein's analysis of a woman's right to abortion,
although it emphasizes equality rather than liberty, and indeed unnecessarily puts in doubt the due
process justification for such a right, see id. at 285, appears to resort to notions like autonomy and
independence, not just an anticaste principle of equality. In this respect, it is telling that Sunstein
acknowledges his debt to two classic articles-involving samaritanism and antisubordination-that
intertwine privacy and equality, although he criticizes them for not sufficiently emphasizing issues of
equality. See id. at 396 n.21 (citing Judith J. Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
47 (1971), and Donald Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. Rv. 1569 (1979)).
288. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
289. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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To fix ideas, Palko seems to call for an inquiry into aspirational principles,
while Moore may appear to suggest an inquiry into historical practices.

The shift reflects a flight from aspirational principles to historical practices
as the baseline for due process. (My claim is not that the Due Process
Clause incorporates all of justice, or that due process is purely aspirational
principles as opposed to historical practices, or indeed that the Court ever
actually has fulfilled the promise of the Palko formulation. Rather, my
claim is about the way the Court has conceived the due process inquiry.)
First, consider Justice Cardozo's formulation in Palko, which was
decided the same year as West Coast Hotel2 ' and one year before Carolene Products."' Cardozo asked whether an asserted right is "of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," and whether refusing to recognize it would "violate those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.'" 2' Such
expressions seem to contemplate elaboration of the basic liberties implicit

in a scheme of justice embodied in our Constitution.l They do not appear to call simply for an inquiry into historical practices, the common
law, or statute books (collectively, "historical practices").
Granted, in Palko, Cardozo also frames the due process inquiry as

whether abolishing a given right would "violate a 'principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.'" 2' But he does not conceive traditions merely as historical practices. Instead, the coupling of "traditions" with "conscience"

bespeaks an understanding of traditions as aspirationalprinciples-the
fundamental principles of justice to which we as a people aspire and for

which we as a people stand, whether or not we actually have realized them
in our historical practices.295 Our aspirational principles may be critical
of our historical practices; our traditions are not merely the Burkean
deposit of those practices, notwithstanding Scalia.

290. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
291. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
292. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325, 328 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)); see
supra text accompanying note 118.
293. Cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.) (invoking "certain vital
principles in our free republican government"); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1823) (No. 3230) (Washington, J., riding circuit) (referring to "those privileges and immunities which
are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments" in
construing the Privileges or Immunities Clause); Dworkin, supra note 42, at 382 (arguing that the
"natural reading" of the Bill of Rights, including the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, is that
it embodies an abstract scheme of justice).
294. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
295. For a similar distinction between history and tradition, see BARBER, CONSTITUTION, supra
note 21, at 84-85. For analyses of constitutional aspirations, see id. at 33-37, 54-62; GARY J.
JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME COURTAND THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUrrONALASPIRATION 107-11 (1986).
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Furthermore, Cardozo's phrases in Palko envision enlargement of due
process and liberty through moral progress, illustrated by what Chief
Justice Warren refers to in Trop v. Dulles as the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 2' In sum, nothing in Palko suggests that Cardozo identifies due process, much less our
traditions, with our historical practices. Cases such as Boiling, Griswold,
Loving, and Roe broke from traditions, in the sense of historical practices,
in pursuit of due process and traditions, in the sense of aspirational
principles. 2'
Second, consider Justice Powell's formulation of the due process inquiry for the plurality in Moore. Powell asks whether an asserted right is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."29 If Palko's coupling of "traditions" with "conscience" evinces an understanding of traditions as aspirational principles, Moore's coupling of "tradition" with
"history" may seem to suggest a conception of traditions as historical
practices. But Powell draws upon Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,
which speaks of a tradition as a "living thing," and refers to "what history
teaches are the traditions from which [this country] developed as well as
the traditions from which it broke."2' Hence, even if Powell's formulation appears to have less critical bite with respect to historical practices
than does Cardozo's, it does retain a notion of aspirational principles.
Moreover, the plurality in Moore expands constitutional protection under
the Due Process Clause from nuclear families to extended families."
In Bowers, however, the Court practically reduces the due process
inquiry to a backward-looking question concerning historical practices,
stripped of virtually any critical bite with respect to the status quo. The
Court simply observes what our nation's historical practices, common law,
and statutes have been regarding homosexual sodomy."1 Furthermore,

296. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (interpreting the Eighth Amendment);see Hudson
v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992) (defining the Eighth Amendment with the same language
as that used in Trop). Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented in Hudson, protesting against
the Court's cutting the Eighth Amendment "loose from its historical moorings." Id. at 1007 (Thomas,
J., dissenting); see infra note 310.
297. To be sure, Boiling and Loving involved equal protection as well as due process, see supra
notes 231,270, but that supports my thesis that the two clauses overlap and are intertwined, rather than
Sunstein's thesis that the two clauses perform largely different functions and look in opposite directions.
Cf. TRIBE& DORF, supra note 21, at 116 (criticizing Sunstein's thesis on the basis of Boiling).
298. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
299. Id. at 501 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). The
joint opinion in Casey drew heavily on the approach of Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805-06 (1992) (joint opinion).
300. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505-06.
301. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986). White's opinion of the Court observes
that whereas in 1961 all 50 states outlawed sodomy, by 1986 only 24 states continued to provide
criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults. Id. at 193-94. That
legal transformation from 1961 to 1986 suggests a tradition from which we are breaking, to paraphrase
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as Justice Stevens stressed in dissent, the Court engages in a flagrantly
selective reading of such practices, ignoring that the common law and
statutes historically have condemned all sodomy, both homosexual and

heterosexual.'

Applying such an approach, the Court rudely dismissed

Hardwick's claim that the Due Process Clause protects a fundamental right
of homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy as, "at best, facetious.'
Contrast Boiling, which illustrates traditions as aspirational principles.

There Chief Justice Warren wrote, "Classifications based solely upon race
must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our
traditions and hence constitutionally suspect."'

From the standpoint of

White's understanding in Bowers of traditions as historical practices,
Warren's argument in Boiling concerning our traditions "is, at best, facetious," given our shameful history of slavery and historical practices of
enacting laws that drew classifications based solely upon race, even after

the ratification of the Civil War Amendments and Reconstruction.0 5

Along similar lines, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, criticizing Bowers as

a "misdirected application of the theory of original intent" in light of
precedents such as Loving, interpreted its state constitution's privacy and
equal protection guarantees to prohibit a criminal statute outlawing

consensual homosexual sodomy.'
Finally, Scalia's Michael H. jurisprudence is an attempt to narrow the
Moore-Bowers due process inquiry even further, to reduce substantive due

process entirely from aspirational principles to historical practices.'
That is, Scalia seeks to limit substantive due process to include only those

rights that have been protected through historical practices, the common
Harlan's dissent in Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (H-arlan, J., dissenting). Admittedly, Harlan himself in Poe
contemplated that substantive due process would not protect homosexual intimate association, id. at
546, but he wrote in 1961, before the tradition that by his account is a "living thing" began to evolve.
For Harlan-like arguments that Bowers was wrongly decided, see CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW
81-85 (1991); TRIBE& DORF, supra note 21, at 76-79, 116-17. It is interesting to note that Fried was
Harlan's law clerk during the term that Poe was before the Court. For a critique of Bowers's
conceptionofthe dueprocess inquiry as "authoritarian" as distinguished from "self-revisionary" (which
parallels my distinction between "historical practices" and "aspirational principles"), see Michelman,
Law's Republic, supra note 21, at 1496, 1514.
302. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 214-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
303. Id. at 194.
304. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
305. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed.
1974); C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913 (Wendell H. Stephenson &
E. Merton Coulter eds., 1951).
306. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 497 (Ky. 1992). The court also drew upon
John Stuart Mill's liberal political philosophy. Id. at 496-98 (citing JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 68-69,
71 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1984) (1859)).
307. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-27& n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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law, and statute books."°' So far only Chief Justice Rehnquist has joined
Scalia in that effort,' although it is likely that Justice Thomas will do
so when the occasion arises."' Many criticisms of Justice Scalia's conception of due process have focused on problems of identifying what our
traditions are and at what level of generality to describe them.311 More
fundamentally, the problem with Scalia's conception lies in his answer to

the basic question of what constitutes a tradition. Unlike Cardozo in
Palko, Scalia in Michael H. confuses or conflates due process and our traditions with our historical practices, to the neglect of our aspirational

principles.312

In Casey, the joint opinion rejected Scalia's MichaelH. jurisprudence,

pointedly resisting the "temptation" to take such a flight from substantive

308. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[N]o 'substantive due process' claim canbe maintained unless the claimant demonstrates
that the State has deprived him of a right historically and traditionally protected against state
interference.").
309. See MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 113.
310. See Hudsonv. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1007 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (protesting against the majority's cutting the Eighth Amendment "loose from its historical
moorings"); see also Jeff Rosen, ReassessingJustice Thomas: Never Mind, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 21,
1992, at 19, 20, 22 (interpreting Thomas as a "malignant hybrid: a conservative activist
sanctimoniously posing as a strict constructionist" and observing that Thomas's opinions "read like
parodies of the opinions of Scalia").
311. See, e.g., TRIBE & DoRF, supra note 21, at 73-74, 97-117; Laurence H. Tribe & Michael
C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition ofRights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058-59 (1990);
Robin West, The Ideal ofLiberty: A Comment on Michael H. v. Gerald D., 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1373,
1374-75(1991). For defenses of Scalia's due process methodology, see Timothy L.R. Shattuck, Justice
Scalia'sDue ProcessMethodology: Examining Specific Traditions, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2743 (1992);
Gregory C. Cook, Note, Footnote6: Justice Scalia'sAttempt to Impose a Rule ofLaw on Substantive
Due Process, 14 HAkV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 853 (1991).
In Michael H. itself, Justice O'Connor, in concurrence, expressed doubts about Scalia's "mode
of historical analysis" and observed that "[o]n occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions
protecting asserted rigbts at levels of generality that might not be 'the most specific level' available."
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing, e.g., Grisvold and Loving, and also
mentioning Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe). Justice Brennan wrote a powerful dissent, criticizing
Scalia's interpretive method as "misguided" and "novel," stating:
The document that the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to me. It is not the
living charter that I have taken to be our Constitution; it is instead a stagnant, archaic,
hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long past. This
Constitution does not recognize that times change, does not see that sometimes a practice
or rule outlives its foundations. I cannot accept an interpretive method that does such
violence to the charter that I am bound by oath to uphold.
MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
312. Sealia's project of identifying our historical practices, in the context of due process and
elsewhere, raises a whole host of controversial questions and prompts sharp disputes, notwithstanding
his pretense to neutrality. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2917 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing Scalia for treating history "as a grab-bag of principles, to be
adopted where they support the Court's theory, and ignored where they do not"); see also id. at 2921
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (protesting that Scalia's approach "effectively freezes the State's common law,
denying the legislature much of its traditional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of
property" in light of moral progress).
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liberties to original understanding, narrowly conceived, or from aspirational principles to historical practices'13 It instead accepted Harlan's
approach to
due process in his dissent in Poe and his concurrence in
31 4
Griswold.

4. Sunstein's Janus-FacedFourteenth Amendment.-Sunstein's backward-looking conception of due process concedes too much to the Bowers
formulation of the due process inquiry or, worse still, to Scalia's formula-

tion in Michael H. Sunstein basically goes along with Scalia in his flight
from aspirational principles to historical practices. But substantive due
process and liberty are better understood as furthering aspirational prin-

ciples, not merely as safeguarding backward-looking historical practices.
The Rehnquist Court may well be Burkean, but our Constitution and our
constitutional democracy are not.
Ironically, Sunstein's analysis of due process as backward-looking and

evincing status quo neutrality carries forward the legacy of Lochner. Yet
our due process precedents such as Meyer, Pierce, Boiling, Griswold,
Loving, Roe, and Casey have repudiated status quo neutrality in favor of
a normative baseline rooted in a conception of liberty and personhood.
These cases have vindicated an antitotalitarian principle of liberty or a

principle of deliberative autonomy. Such landmark precedents pose serious
problems for Sunstein's general conception of due process as backwardlooking. Thus, he concedes that there is "some" aspirational element to
due process and that there is nothing about the Due Process Clause itself
35
that compels a reading of it as backward-looking.
To recapitulate, Sunstein's Janus-faced conception of the relationship

between due process and equal protection allows substantive due process
and liberty to do too little work in grounding basic liberties, and it tries to
make equal protection and equality do too much. But equal protection and

313. See supra note 14 for the debate in Casey between the joint opinion and Justice Scalia
concerning the opposing "temptations" to abdicate responsibility and to seize power.
314. Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2805-06 (1992) (joint opinion). Thus, Casey
to some extent replays the great debate concerning constitutional interpretation from Griswold, with the
joint opinionplaying Harlan to Scalia's Black. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting). For an analysis along these lines, see David
B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice
O'Connor and Justice Scalia over UnenumeratedFundamental Rights, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 895
(1993).
315. See Sunstein, supra note 29, at 1170, 1173. Sunstein does not there discuss Meyer and
Pierce. Those cases conceivably fit Sunstein's claim that due process largely protects against temporary
aberrations from historical practices, but Griswold, Loving, and Roe do not, for each of the latter cases
struck down a long-standing statutory provision. Boling is more complicated: although it, too, struck
down a long-standingpractice on the basis of due process, the Court basically held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment incorporates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
thereby making the latter applicable to the federal government. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954); see supra notes 270, 297 and accompanying text.
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equality alone, to the exclusion of substantive due process and liberty, need
not, cannot, and should not do all of the work in grounding basic liberties
essential to free and equal citizenship for everyone in our constitutional
democracy.
My more general contention is that the architecture of Sunstein's
theory of deliberative democracy forces or leads him to recast issues of
liberty and equality as issues of equality alone, and to recast preconditions
for deliberative autonomy as preconditions for deliberative democracy or,
worse yet, to leave them out entirely. Sunstein's Janus-faced conception
of the relationship between due process and equal protection is mirrored in
the architecture of his general theory: It unwittingly reflects the false
antithesis between the liberties of the moderns and the liberties of the
ancients, despite all his attempts at synthesis.
Constitutional constructivism instead combines due process and equal
protection, liberty and equality, the liberties of the moderns and the
liberties of the ancients, and liberalism and republicanism into a coherent
scheme of equal basic liberties with two themes: securing the preconditions
for deliberative autonomy as well as those of deliberative democracy.
Together, these two themes secure aspects of the justice that is due free and
equal citizens within our constitutional democracy. As Chief Justice
Warren put it in Boiling: "Mhe concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually
exclusive.""' Constitutional constructivism combines both in a conception of justice as fairness.
Constitutional constructivism grounds basic liberties in a conception
of citizens as free and equal persons or, in Dworkin's terms, "a political
ideal ... of a society of citizens both equal and free. 31 7 From that
standpoint, Bowers was wrongly decided not only because it ignored an
anticaste principle of equality and thus failed to secure the preconditions for
deliberative democracy, as Sunstein argues. It also was wrongly decided
because it applied a stunted conception of liberty of conscience and
freedom of intimate association-which Justices Stevens and Blackmun also
have articulated in terms of decisional autonomy, decisional and spatial
privacy, and freedom of intimate association 3 1 -and thus failed to secure
the preconditions for deliberative autonomy that are essential to our scheme
of ordered liberty.
Put another way, within constitutional constructivism, if the Fourteenth Amendment is indeed Janus-faced, perhaps the Equal Protection
Clause is an entrance, a gate that opens the polity to everyone with respect
to deliberative democracy, whereas the Due Process Clause is an exit, a

316. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499 (emphasis added).
317. Dworkin, supra note 42, at 382.
318. See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
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gate that allows persons "to be let alone" from the polity with respect to

deliberative autonomy." 9 Constitutional constructivism, unlike Sunstein's theory, does not take a flight from substantive due process to equal
protection, or from deliberative autonomy to deliberative democracy.

5. The Puzzle of Sunstein's Flightfrom Substantive Due Process to
Equal Protection.-We are left with a puzzle: Why would Sunstein go to
all the trouble to establish that what was wrong with Lochner was not sub-

stantive due process, and then himself flee from substantive due process in
developing his principal theme of securing the preconditions for delibera-

tive democracy? Given that he characterizes his theory as a synthesis,
liberal republicanism, and likens it to Rawls's theory, why does he not put
forward a theory that would combine a theme of securing deliberative

autonomy with a theme of securing deliberative democracy?
It is perfectly understandable why Ely, conceiving the specter of

Lochner as he does, would avoid a substantive due process approach to
such questions as those raised in Bowers in favor of an equal protection

approach. After all, for Ely, the lesson of Lochner is to repudiate substantive due process and protection of unenumerated substantive fundamental
rights, whether economic or personal.'
It is far less clear why Sunstein, conceiving the legacy of Lochner as
evincing status quo neutrality rather than unenumerated substantive fundamental rights,32 would flee substantive due process for equal protection.
To try to account for this puzzle, I offer five speculations, two obvious and
three more complex. The first obvious answer is that Sunstein simply is
more republican than liberal and accordingly has sought to avoid con-

straining our deliberative democracy with "liberal" liberties that are not
preconditions for deliberative democracy itself.32 The second is that he
is a New Dealer through and through3" and therefore has adopted a New

319. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In his
dissent in Bowers, Justice Blackmun quotes Brandeis's famous formulation of "the right to be let
alone." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf. ELY, supra
note 16, at 178-79 (analogizing the tradition of the frontier, and the right of "dissenting or 'different'
individuals" to relocate, to the "exit" option as distinguished from the "voice" option). I do not take
up the issue of whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause provides a firmer ground for such a right
to "exit" than the Due Process Clause. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. I also
acknowledge that this metaphor of the "Janus" expresses too schematically the relationship between
equal protection and due process, or between deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy. See
supra note 211.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 91, 182.
321. See supra section nI(A)(3).
322. Along these lines, Sunstein contends that it is less intrusive on the political process to rely
on equal protection principles (as an aspect of deliberative democracy) than on privacy or autonomy
principles (as an aspect of deliberative autonomy) in defending Roe and Casey or in attacking Bowers.
See Sunstein, supra note 224, at 310-11.
323. Sunstein practically celebrates the New Deal. See, e.g., SUNSTIN, supra note 22, at 6-7,
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Deal solution to combat the legacy of Lochner: a new version of a Carolene Productsframework as a sophisticated flight from substantive liberties
to process analogous to Ely's.
The first more complex speculation is that Sunstein, somewhat like Ely
in Another Such Victory, is making a principled plea to be the Thayer for
the next generation, a progressive voice crying in the wilderness during the
conservative era of the Rehnquist Court.3" To protect our basic liberties, we no doubt need a revitalized citizenry, and easy resort to judicial
review may well have deadened the citizenry's sense of political responsibility during the progressive era of the Warren Court and its immediate
aftermath.
In some respects, Sunstein's theory may be more appealing as a strategy of damage control in trying, to protect our basic liberties while Justice
Scalia sits than it is as a general constitutional theory."z Scalia, from the
right, is trying to control the damage caused by expansive substantive due
process holdings, such as those in Griswold and Roe, 3 by narrowly confining the due process inquiry. Perhaps Sunstein, from the left, is trying
to control the damage brought about by narrow substantive due process
opinions, such as that in Bowers, by resorting to equal protection arguments. But the upshot of Sunstein's analysis is that he all but cedes the
Due Process Clause and liberty, as a ground for basic liberties, to Scalia.
Furthermore, such efforts at damage control may not work, because just
as the Rehnquist Court tries to read status quo neutrality-rather than an
antitotalitarian principle of liberty or a principle of deliberative autonomyinto the Due Process Clause, it attempts to read racial neutrality-rather
than an anticaste principle of equality-into the Equal Protection
Clause.3"
The second speculation is that perhaps Sunstein has made the judgment
that in combining liberty and equality into one coherent scheme, it is safer
to derive specific basic liberties from a conception of equality than to
ground them in a conception of liberty. He rejects the idea of a general
right to liberty, or to liberty as such. 28 He may be wary that if we start
down the road of talking about protecting liberty, autonomy, or privacy in
any strong sense, we may have greater difficulty fending off conservative
status quo neutrality arguments like Epstein's than if we stay on the road
of talking about securing equality and deliberative democracy. As stated
above, Epstein wishes to demarcate a prepolitical zone of entrenched in-

40-42, 51-62, 134-35, 197-231; SUNSTEIN, supra note 143, at 17-52.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 128-34, 158-62.
325. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 281.
327. See supra note 282 and accompanying text (discussing Croson and Metro Broadcasting).
328. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 162-94, 261.
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dividual rights, including economic liberties reminiscent of the era of
Lochner, that would constrain deliberative democracy.32 9
My final speculation is that perhaps Sunstein has made the judgment
that in securing certain basic liberties, such as women's reproductive
freedom and homosexuals' freedom of intimate association, it is safer to
cast our lot with equal protection than with substantive due process or
privacy. He may be persuaded by arguments of feminists like Catharine
A. MacKinnon that rights of privacy, autonomy, and liberty may readily
prove, for women, to be "an injury got up as a gift."3 ' On this view,
such constitutional rights not only have been illusory for women, but
indeed have been a hindrance to-rather than a precondition for-securing
equal citizenship for them.331 Moreover, Sunstein may be mindful of
feminist arguments about the social costs of general rights of liberty
(prominently, free speech in addition to privacy) to women's equality and
liberty, not to mention their physical security. 32
These concerns do not, however, warrant neglecting the preconditions
for deliberative autonomy or overlooking the vital importance of such
autonomy to women's as well as men's free and equal citizenship. a
Constitutional constructivism instead attempts to hold Epstein at bay regarding liberty and to address MacKinnon's reservations regarding privacy
by cabining liberty and privacy. Like Sunstein's theory, it rejects the idea
of a fundamental right to liberty as such, or liberty as license.'
It
accords the much-vaunted priority of the basic liberties not to liberty as
such, but rather to the whole family of basic liberties, as they are articulated through the two fundamental themes of securing deliberative
democracy and securing deliberative autonomy.335
Notwithstanding
Epstein, the opportunity for consenting adults to perform capitalistic acts

329. See supra text accompanying notes 201-07.
330. CATHAWINE A. MACKJNNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 93, 100 (1987).
331. See id.; Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A
BicentennialPerspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453,454-55 (1992); Robin West, ReconstructingLiberty,
59 TENN. L. REV. 441, 454-61 (1992). For Sunstein's own work concerning feminist legal theory,
see SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 257-90; Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 826 (1988) (reviewing FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 330); Cass R. Sunstein,
Introduction:Notes on Feminist Political Thought, 99 ETHICS 219 (1989) (introducing a symposium
entitled "Feminism and Legal Theory").
332. See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991); West, supra note 331, at 454-61.
333. For works defending privacy from feminist viewpoints, see ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY
ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988); McClain, supra note 243, at 1176;

McClain,
334.
(rejecting
335.

supra note 185, at 124-50; Schneider, supra note 332, at 975.
See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 291-92; cf. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 266-71
the idea of "liberty as license" as distinguished from "liberty as independence").
See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 294-98; infra text accompanying notes 422-25.
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in private without reasonable governmental regulation is not among the
preconditions6 for deliberative autonomy, any more than for deliberative
3
democracy.
Nor does deliberative autonomy, contra MacKinnon, entail a right of
privacy as "a right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress women one at a
time."'" Within Rawls's political constructivism, the protection of basic
liberties includes protecting individuals not only from the government but
also from each other, including within families (for example, wives from
husbands and children from parents).3" That is, within constructivism,
to be a woman "is . . . the name of a way of being human.""'

Both

women and men are due the status of free and equal citizenship.'
Thus, liberal republicans such as Sunstein need not and should not flee
substantive due process for equal protection. Constitutional constructivism
better combines liberty and equality into one coherent scheme of equal
basic liberties for free and equal citizens.
D.

Sunstein's PartialConstitution

The title of Sunstein's book, The Partial Constitution, is richly
ambiguous in ways that he largely leaves implicit. 1 I focus on two
senses of his title. Sunstein's theory of judicial review as principally
securing preconditions for deliberative democracy proves, contrary to his
intention, to be a theory of securing the partial Constitution: first, as

336. See supra text accompanying notes 201-02. But see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,

STATE,

AND UTOPIA 163 (1974) (stating that (a hypothetical) socialist society would have to prohibit capitalistic

acts between consenting adults).
337. MACKINNON, supranote 330, at 102. Ronald Dworkin persuasively argues that MacKinnon
mistakenly conflates different senses of privacy, for example, "territorial privacy" with "sovereignty
over personal decisions" (or what I call deliberative autonomy). See DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 5256.
338. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 221. Sunstein himself cited Rawls in criticizing MacKinnon
on this point, stating that it is a "large mistake to suggest that liberal thinkers believed that threats lay
only in government intrusions and that there was no right to protection from private power." Sunstein,
supra note 34, at 1567 & nn.156-57 (criticizing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and
Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 330, at 32, and citing
RAWLS, supra note 32). This is not to suggest that our Constitution in general requires protection from
private power, but rather to observe that Rawls's political liberalism does.
339. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality UnderLaw, 100 YALE L.. 1281,
1299 (1991) (quoting Richard Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism, in 13 THE TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 1, 7 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1992)); see also SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER,
AND THE FAMILY 89-109 (1989); Okin, supra note 243, at 230 (both setting forth a feminist argument
that Rawls's liberal conceptions provide a basis for a critique of gender inequality); Sunstein, supra
note 34, at 1569 (citing Okin, supra note 243).
340. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at xxix.
341. But see SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at v-vi (distinguishing partial in the sense of biased and
partial in the sense of not whole); id. at 347-54 (outlining four conceptions of neutrality in a chapter
entitled "Conclusion: The Impartial Constitution").
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compared with the whole Constitution, and second, as compared with the
impartialConstitution.
First, one might speak of the partial Constitution as distinguished
from the whole Constitution-for example, the partial, judicially enforceable Constitution as contrasted with the whole Constitution that is binding
outside the courts upon legislatures, executive officials, and citizens
generally (unless and until they amend it). Sunstein intends his theory of
judicial review to be a theory of the partial Constitution in this sense.
Constitutional constructivism's theory of judicial review is likewise partial
in this respect.
But Sunstein's theory is partial rather than whole in another sense that
he does not intend. It does not fully account for important aspects of our
constitutional document and underlying constitutional order that are concerned with protecting substantive liberties such as liberty of conscience,
freedom of association, and decisional autonomy. From the standpoint of
constitutional constructivism, Sunstein's theory of securing deliberative
democracy to the neglect of securing deliberative autonomy is partial rather
than whole in this sense.
Second, one might distinguish between the partialConstitution and the
impartial Constitution-for example, between the partial, self-interested
marketplace of preferences and the impartial, public-regarding republic of
reasons. Sunstein intends his theory to be a theory of the impartial Constitution in this sense. Constitutional constructivism is similarly impartial in
this respect.
But Sunstein's theory is partial rather than impartial in another,
unintended sense. It does not adequately secure preconditions for deliberative autonomy that constrain the government's enforcement of collective
judgments concerning the good. Constitutional constructivism's theme of
securing deliberative autonomy requires the government to be impartial
with respect to citizens' pursuit of their divergent conceptions of the good
in a certain sense. That is, it more fully prevents the government from
imposing comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral conceptions of
the good, which are outside the limits of public reason, and thus it more
fully secures toleration of citizens' pursuit of their divergent conceptions
of the good. From the standpoint of constitutional constructivism, Sunstein's theory of securing deliberative democracy to the neglect of securing
deliberative autonomy is not sufficiently impartial in this respect.
I now turn to my argument that constitutional constructivism is a fuller
theory of perfecting the whole, impartial Constitution than is Sunstein's
theory. Its theme of securing deliberative democracy requires that political
decisions be justifiable on the basis of public-regardingreasons. And its
theme of securing deliberative autonomy requires that such decisions be
justifiable on grounds of public reason.
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An Outline for a

In Part III, I argued that Sunstein's theory of securing deliberative
democracy, though it moves somewhat beyond Ely's theory of reinforcing
representative democracy, proves largely to be a process-perfecting theory.
To move beyond such theories to a Constitution-perfecting theory, 2 I
shall outline a constitutional constructivism by analogy to John Rawls's
political constructivism, a theory developed in Political Liberalism.'
I mean constitutional constructivism in both a methodological sense-as a
method of interpreting our Constitution-and a substantive sense-as the
substantive political theory that best fits and justifies our constitutional
document and underlying constitutional order. Constitutional constructivism is, however, a theory of perfecting the Constitution and securing the
preconditions for constitutional democracy' 4 through constructing our
substantive Constitution. It is distinguished from a theory of constructing
a perfectly just constitution (unmoored by the constraints of our constitutional text, history, and structure, to say nothing of tradition, practice, and

culture).
Constitutional constructivism entails a theory of judicial review with
two fundamental themes: first, securing the preconditions for deliberative
democracy, and second, securing the preconditions for deliberative autonomy, in order to afford everyone the common and guaranteed status of free
and equal citizenship in our constitutional democracy. Such a theory flees
neither substantive political theory nor substantive constitutional provisions.
The first theme, deliberative democracy, closely resembles Sunstein's principal theme of securing deliberative democracy (which itself draws upon
Rawls's theory). The second theme, deliberative autonomy, secures
substantive liberties such as liberty of conscience, freedom of association,
privacy, and autonomy, which Ely's and Sunstein's theories flee or recast
as preconditions for representative or deliberative democracy. Constitutional constructivism does for substance and process what Ely's and
Sunstein's theories have done for process.'
In this Part, I put forward an outline for a constitutional constructivism. Then, I argue that such a theory resists the temptations to take

342. For my meaning of "perfecting," see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
343. RAWLs, supra note 31. Much work in constitutional theory has been influenced by Rawls's
earlier work in political philosophy. See supra note 32.
344. For my usage of the term "constitutional democracy" as distinguished from Ely's term
"representative democracy" and Sunstein's term "deliberative democracy," see supra note 35.
345. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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flights from substantive liberties like those taken by Ely's and Sunstein's
theories. Indeed, I suggest that constitutional constructivism better satisfies
Ely's criteria for an acceptable theory than does his own theory, and that
it offers a better synthesis of the traditions of liberalism and republicanism
than does Sunstein's liberal republicanism. Finally, I defend constitutional

constructivism against charges that it represents a boundless flight to substance beyond the Constitution, or that it is the very incarnation of the
specter of Lochner.

A. An Outlinefor a ConstitutionalConstructivism
1. Political Constructivism and Constitutional Constructivism.-In
PoliticalLiberalism, Rawls reformulates his well-known theory-justice as

fairness-as a political constructivism.3"
What is a political
constructivism? How might it provide a framework for a constitutional
constructivism?
Rawls's political constructivism seeks to construct a shared basis of

reasonable political agreement in a morally pluralistic constitutional
democracy such as our own, or to construct principles of justice that
provide fair terms of social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and
trust among free and equal citizens. 7 He distinguishes the purpose of

his project from that of theories of moral realism or natural law, which is
to discover principles of justice that are true to a prior and independent
order of moral values binding for all times and all places.' Rawls seeks

to construct the principles of justice that are "most reasonable for us,"
given our conceptions of the person and society and our principles of
practical reason. 9 He asks: "[W]hat is the most appropriate conception

346. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at xiv-xxi, xxvii-xxx, 89-129. See generally id. at 89-129
(developing the notion of political constructivism); Rawls, supra note 189 (elaborating the idea of
Kantian constructivism). Rawls initially put forward his theory, justice as fairness, in fully elaborated
form in A Theory ofJustice. RAWLS, supra note 32. For a brief account of the major changes between
A Theory of Justfce and PoliticalLiberalism, see supra note 32. To the degree that Rawls's new book
makes his political conception ofjustice appear less universal, and so perhaps less interesting to some
political philosophers, it may make his conception more immediately applicable to American
constitutional theory and hence more interesting to constitutional theorists. That is, the more limited
or parochial Rawls's aim is, as a matter of political philosophy, the more directly he speaks to
constitutional theorists and citizens in our constitutional democracy.
347. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 3-22.
348. See id. at 90-99. Rawls's political constructivism is a third theory between conventionalism
and natural law, just as Dworkin's legal constructivism is a third theory between positivism (or
conventionalism) and natural law. Compare RAWLS, supra note 32, at 263 (characterizing his theory
as attempting to find an "Archimedean point" outside existing circumstances that does not appeal to
a priori or perfectionist principles) with Ronald Dworkin, The Law of the Slave-Catchers, TIMES
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (London), Dec. 5, 1975, at 1437, 1437 (reviewing ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE
ACCUSED (1975)) (claiming that his theory is a "third theory" of law between legal positivism and
natural law).
349. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 28, 93-99, 107-10. Furthermore Rawls aims to resolve the
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of justice for specifying the fair terms of social cooperation between
citizens regarded as free and equal, and as fully cooperating members of
society over a complete life, from one generation to the next?" 3'

Rawls conceives justification in political philosophy not as a search for
truth and objectivity from the point of view of the universe, but as a quest
for reflective equilibrium between our consideredjudgments and underlying
principles of justice.35 1 This conception accords with and has influenced
contemporary
conceptions of justification as the exercise of practical
2
reason.

35

Now, what is a constitutional constructivism? First, I intend a general
methodological sense of constructivism, illustrated by Dworkin's conception of constitutional interpretation as constructing schemes of principles

that best fit and justify our constitutional document and underlying constitutional order as a whole.353 Dworkin originally put forth this conception

by analogy to Rawls's conception of justification in political philosophy as
Constitutional constructivism ema quest for reflective equilibrium.'
braces a methodological constructivism that is similar, though not identical,
to Dworkin's. 55
Second, I intend a specific substantive sense of constructivism, exemplified by Rawls's conception of the equal basic liberties in a constitutional
democracy such as our own as being grounded on a conception of citizens

as free and equal persons, together with a conception of society as a fair
system of social cooperation.

As shown below, constitutional construc-

tivism employs a substantive constructivism that is analogous, though not
identical, to Rawls's.

conflict between the traditions of the liberties of the ancients and of the liberties of the modems, and
to combine equality and liberty into one coherent scheme, by, answering the question in the text. See
supra text accompanying notes 208-09.
350. RAWLs, supra note 31, at 3.
351. See id.passim.
352. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 113-19, 370-71 nn.32-35 (discussing practical reason and
objectivity); id. at 351-53 (addressing impartiality and objectivity); see also Micbelman, Law's
Republic, supra note 21, at 1526-28 (describing public practical reason). But see Cass R. Sunstein,
Commentary: On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 781-87 (1993) (arguing that
analogical reasoning, as an approach to legal reasoning, has comparative advantages over Rawls's idea
of the search for reflective equilibrium and Dworkin's conception of law as integrity).
353. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 71 (explaining the analogy).
355. Dworkin has formulated the two dimensions of best interpretation, flt and justification, in
several ways. See supra note 69. In some formulations, he speaks of a dimension of fit and a
dimension of political morality. Rawls expresses reservations about "political morality" as a
formulation of the second dimension, for it may appear too broad. RAWLS, supra note 31, at 236 n.23.
He instead formulates "best interpretation" as "the one that best fits the relevant body of [constitutional]
materials, and justifies it in terms of the public conception of justice or a reasonable variant thereof."
Id. at 236. He concludes, however, by stating: "I doubt that this view differs in substance from
Dworkin's." Id. at 237 n.23.
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In Part II, I previewed constructivism in the methodological sense,
arguing that Ely's interpretive method, understood as a quest for the ultimate interpretivism, has affinities to Dworkin's constructivist conception
of constitutional interpretation and Rawls's notion of reflective equilibrium.
I contended that Ely's interpretive method shows the need for a Constitution-perfecting theory, such as a constructivism in the substantive sense, to
better fit and justify the constitutional document and underlying constitutional order as a whole than does his own process-perfecting theory, which
does not account for certain substantive liberties. Sunstein's interpretive
method also has affinities to Dworkin's constructivist method.356
In Part III, I previewed constructivism in the substantive sense,
pointing out that Sunstein's liberal republicanism has affinities to Rawls's
political constructivism. I suggested that constitutional constructivism,
which combines a theme of securing the preconditions for deliberative
democracy (much like that of Sunstein's theory) with a theme of securing
the preconditions for deliberative autonomy (which Sunstein's theory
lacks), better fits and justifies our constitutional document and underlying
constitutional order as a whole than does his theory.
In this Part, I present constitutional constructivism more fully. It is
important to state two things at the outset. First, this theory does not entail
that everything Rawls argues is required by justice is also, for that reason,
mandated by our Constitution. Second, one need not be persuaded to adopt
Rawls's political constructivism in order to embrace constitutional constructivism. Constitutional constructivism simply uses Rawls's guiding framework of equal basic liberties to help orient our deliberations, reflections,
and judgment about our Constitution and our constitutional democracy.3 57
To explain that framework, I must put forth several abstract conceptions
from Rawls's theory.
2. The Constitution of PoliticalLiberalism.-Aristotle remarks that
a common understanding of justice makes a polis. 38 Similarly, Rawls
says that a shared conception of justice as fairness makes a constitutional
democracy. 3 9 Aristotle, however, conceived such a common understanding as being based on a single conception of the good, that is, a single

356. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 368 n.1 (acknowledging his debt to Dworkin's work, but
stating that there are some differences in their approaches); id. at 369 n.17 (noting similarity between
his critique of Ely and Dworkin's). But see id. at 375 n.35 (stating that "Dworkin's powerful and lucid
account [of interpretive method] has influenced mine" but outlining "several difficulties" with it);
Sunstein, supra note 352, at 783-87 (criticizing Dworkin's ideal judge, Hercules).
357. See infra text accompanying notes 401-02.
358. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 1, ch. II, §§ 15-16, at 1253a (Ernest Barker
trans. & ed., 1948).
359. RAwLs, supra note 32, at 243.
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comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine concerning what
is valuable in human life.3" By contrast, Rawls argues that, at least
since the Wars of Religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and
the Protestant Reformation, a shared basis of reasonable political agreement
in a morally pluralistic constitutional democracy such as our own cannot
be grounded on a single conception of the good without intolerable state
oppression. Instead, such a shared basis can be grounded only on an
overlapping consensus concerning a political conception of justice.3 61
a. Politicalconception ofjustice.-Rawls offers justice as fairness as an example of a political liberalism or a political conception of
justice, as distinguished from a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or
moral conception of the good.362 First, political liberalism accepts "the
fact of reasonable pluralism"-the fact that a diversity of reasonable yet
conflicting and irreconcilable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and
moral doctrines may be affirmed by, citizens in the free exercise of their
capacity for a conception of the good-as a feature of the political culture
of a constitutional democracy not to be regretted and not soon to pass
away.3" Second, political, liberalism also emphasizes the related "fact
of oppression"-the fact that a single comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be established as a shared basis of reasonable
political agreement or public justification in a constitutional democracy
only through the intolerably oppressive use of coercive political power-as
an entailment of accepting the fact of reasonable pluralism.3 Political
liberalism, as it were, generalizes the principle of religious toleration to
apply to reasonable conceptions of the good."
Despite these two related facts, Rawls argues that citizens in a
constitutional democracy who hold opposing and irreconcilable conceptions
of the good, such as comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines, may be able to find a shared basis of reasonable political agreement
through an overlapping consensus concerning a political conception of
justice. This sort of consensus would obtain where different persons, from
the standpoint of their own divergent conceptions of the good, affirmed a
shared political conception of justice.3" Such a political conception of

360. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 358, at 1253a; see also RAWLS, supra note 31, at 134; RAWLS,
supra note 32, at 25, 325 (both interpreting Aristotle's theories).
361. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at xxiii-xxx, 3-11, 134-37, 303-04.
362. For a brief discussion of the relationship betweenjustice as fairness and political liberalism,
see id. at xv-xviii.
363. See id. at 37, 144.
364. Id. at 37.
365. See id. at 9-10, 154.
366. See id. passim.
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justice, to be illustrated below, would provide fair terms of social
cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and trust that citizens might
reasonably be expected to endorse. It would have priority over and would
constrain the polity's pursuit of conceptions of the public good and its
imposition of perfectionist values.367 This is what is meant by the
common notion that the right, or justice, is prior to and constrains the
368
good.
b. The two principles of justice.-Rawls presents justice as
fairness as an illustration of a political conception of justice that might
provide such a shared basis of reasonable political agreement in a constitutional democracy such as our own. It has two principles of justice:
[1] Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible
with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal
political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed
their fair value.
[2] Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second,
they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged
members of society [the "difference principle"]."
The equal basic rights and liberties of the first principle of justice are
specified by a list as follows: "freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; the political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the
freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and finally,
the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law." 3' This list is drawn
up from both historical and theoretical analysis. It includes the basic
liberties that the constitutions of successful constitutional democracies, such
as our Constitution, historically have protected. It also includes the basic
liberties that such systems analytically presuppose as necessary for the
development and exercise of the two moral powers of citizens, conceived
as free and equal persons, in the two fundamental cases to be explained
below.3 7'
Again, within Rawls's political constructivism, these equal basic
liberties are not conceived as being given by a prior and independent order

367. See id. at 6, 223, 295. But cf. SJNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 186 (describing his own theory
of deliberative democracy as "a mild form of liberal perfectionism").
368. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 174-76, 190-95, 203-09.
369. Id. at 5-6.
370. Id. at291.
371. Id. at 292-93, 325; see infra subsections IV(A)(2)(c), IV(A)(2)(d).
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of moral values, as in theories of natural law. Rather, they are conceived
as being those which are "most reasonable for us, " ' and are worked up
from the way citizens are regarded in the public political culture of a
constitutional democracy, in the basic political texts (e.g., the Constitution
and the Declaration of Independence), and in the tradition and practice of
the interpretation of those texts. 3
Rawls envisions an ideal four-stage sequence for incorporating the two
principles of justice into the basic institutions and social policies of a
constitutional democracy: the original position and the constitutional,
legislative, and judicial stages.374 At the constitutional stage, two kinds

of constitutional essentials are embodied in the constitution: first, the
general structure of government and the political process; and second, the
equal basic liberties of the first principle of justice.375 The latter
constitutional essentials include the equal basic liberties listed above; due
process of law and equal protection of the laws; and rights and liberties
protecting the security and independence of citizens, such as freedom of
movement and free choice of occupation, the right to hold and have exclusive use of personal property, and a guaranteed provision of a social
minimum of goods and services to meet the basic needs of all citizens 76
But the second principle of justice, including the principle of fair
equality of opportunity and the difference principle, is not among the
constitutional essentials in a constitutional democracy, and it is not
incorporated in the constitution.3
"Indeed," Rawls observes, "the
history of successful constitutions suggests that principles to regulate
economic and social inequalities, and other distributive principles, are
generally not suitable as constitutional restrictions. "378 The history to

372. Id. at 28; see id. at 66-71; Rawls, supra note 189, at 554-72; cf. SUNSTMN, supra note 22,
at 353, 403 n.7 (discussing a "suitable social point of view" or the "right baseline" as a conception of
impartiality).
373. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 13-14, 78. For an illuminating analysis of Rawls's political
liberalism as a case of an "interpretative theory" drawn from the ongoing political practice of
constitutional democracy, see Frank 1. Michelman, On Regulating Practiceswith TheoriesDrawnfrom
Them: A Case of Justice as Fairness, in NOMOS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Ian Shapiro & Judith
Wagner DeCew eds., forthcoming 1994).
374. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 336-40; RAWLS, supra note 32, at 194-201. For Rawls's
account of the original position, see RAWLS, supra note 31, at 22-28, 304-10.
375. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 227.
376. Id. at 228-29, 232, 298; see also id. at 164-68, 236 n.23 (explaining that the overlapping
consensus constituting the political conception of justice encompasses such rights and liberties);
Freeman, ConstitutionalDemocracy, supra note 32, at 347 (listing many of the same liberties as "a
part of the freedom of sovereign democratic citizens"); Freeman, DemocraticInterpretation,supranote
32, at 29-35 (arguing that such constitutional rights are a reflection of equal sovereignty among
citizens).
377. RAWLS, supra note 31, at 228-30, 337.
378. Id. at 337.
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which he refers includes the era of Lochner.3' Instead, it is only at the
legislative stage that the second principle of justice, to the extent that it is
accepted by the citizenry, is incorporated into legislation.
Constitutional democracy is in a general way "dualist": It distinguishes
the constituent power of We the People from the ordinary power of officers
of government and, accordingly, distinguishes the higher law of We the
People from the ordinary law of legislative bodies." s At the judicial
stage, courts may serve as one of the institutional devices to protect the
higher law of the constitution against encroachments by the ordinary law
of legislation.381
c. Conception of citizens as free and equal persons: the two
moral powers.-Rawls conceives the equal basic liberties as being
grounded on a conception of citizens as free and equal persons, together
with a conception of society as a fair system of social cooperation. 3" He
argues that free and equal persons engaged in social cooperation in a
constitutional democracy should be conceived as having two moralpowers.
The first moral power is the capacity for a sense of justice-the
capacity to understand, apply, and act from (and not merely in accordance
with) the political conception of justice that characterizes the fair terms of
social cooperation in a constitutional democracy. 3" Citizens apply this
capacity in judging and deliberating about the justice of basic institutions
and social policies.3 "
The second moral power is the capacityfor a conception of the goodthe capacity to form, revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the
good, individually and in association with others."s A conception of the
good is a conception of what is valuable in human life, and it typically
consists of ends and aims derived from certain religious, philosophical, or
moral doctrines, as well as attachments to other persons and loyalties to
various groups and associations.386 Citizens apply this capacity, their
power of deliberative reason, in deliberating about how to live their own
lives, individually and in association with others. 3 7
379. See id. at 233 n.18, 362-63.
380. Id. at 231-34 (referring to 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 21). But see infra note 405 (distinguishing between a commitment to dualism in a general sense and a commitment to dualism in
Ackerman's specific sense).
381.

See id. at 233, 240; infra text accompanying notes 408-12. I put to one side the question of

whetherjudicial review is a necessary requirement in a constitutional democracy; suffice it to say that
judicial review exists as an institutional device for preserving the higher law of the constitution in some
existing constitutional democracies, such as our own.
382. See id. at 15-20, 29-35, 299-304.
383. See id. at 19, 302.
384. See id. at 332.
385. See id. at 19, 302, 332, 335.
386. See id. at 19, 302.
387. See id. at 332.
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Rawls's basic idea is that by virtue of their two moral powers persons

are free and that their having these powers makes them equal. Possession
of these two moral powers constitutes the basis of free and equal citizenship.3"' The equal basic liberties are understood as preconditions for the
development and exercise of the two moral powers. 9 It is important to
understand that this conception of the person as free and equal, and as

having these two moral powers, is a normative, political conception of the
person as a citizen in a constitutional democracy; it is not a biological or
psychological conception of the human being as such.3 °
d. Deliberativedemocracy and deliberative autonomy: the two
fundamentalcases.-Rawls arranges the equal basic liberties so as to show

their relation to the two fundamental cases in which these two moral
powers are exercised. The first fundamental case is that of what I have
called deliberative democracy: The equal political liberties and freedom of

thought enable citizens to develop and exercise their first moral power
(their capacity for a conception of justice) in understanding, applying, and

acting from their conception of justice in judging and deliberating about the
justice of basic institutions and social policies.391 In the first instance, the

constitution is seen as establishing a just and workable political procedure,
without any explicit constitutional restrictions on legislative outcomes.
It incorporates the equal political liberties and seeks to guarantee their fair

value, so that the processes of political decision will be open to all on a
roughly equal basis. 3 3 It also protects freedom of thought (including
freedom of political speech and press, freedom of assembly, and the like),
so that the exercise of those liberties in those processes will be free and

informed.394

388. See id. at 19, 29-35, 79, 109; RAWLS, supra note 32, at 504-12.
389. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 332.
390. Id. at 18 n.20, 86-88. At the same time, Rawls does posit a "reasonable moral psychology"
whereby citizens "want to be, and to be recognized as, ... members" of society. Id. at 81, 86.
391. See id. at 332-35. For the sake of simplicity, I use Sunstein's term, "deliberative
democracy." See supra note 210 (concerning Rawls's use of that term).
392. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 337.
393. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 174-78 (discussing fair value of the equal political
liberties in relation to Sunstein's notion of political equality and in criticizing Buckley). Rawls treats
the equal political liberties in a special way: "by including in the first principle of justice the guarantee
that the political liberties, and only these liberties, are secured by [guaranteeing] their 'fair value.'"
RAWLS, supra note 31, at 327. Rawls explains that "this guarantee means that the worth of the
political liberties to all citizens, whatever their social or economic position, must be approximately
equal, or at least sufficiently equal, in the sense that everyone has a fair opportunity to hold public
office and to influencethe outcome ofpolitical decisions." Id. "Formal equality is not enough" where
the equal political liberties are concerned. Id. at 361.
394. RAWLS, supra note 31, at 335, 337.
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The second fundamental case is that of what I have called deliberative
autonomy: Liberty of conscience and freedom of association enable citizens
to develop and exercise their second moral power (their capacity for a conception of the good) in forming, revising, and rationally pursuing their conceptions of the good, individually and in association with others-that is,
to apply their power of deliberative reason to deliberating about how to live
their own lives. 9 In the second instance, the constitution is seen as
establishing constitutional restrictions upon the grounds for political decisions." 9 It protects liberty of conscience and freedom of association both
to secure citizens' free exercise of deliberative autonomy and to assure that
political decisions will not be justifiable solely on the basis of comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral conceptions of the good. 3"
Finally, Rawls connects the remaining (and supporting) basic liberties
to the two fundamental cases by noting that it is necessary to secure them
in order properly to guarantce the preceding basic liberties. These remaining and supporting liberties include "the liberty and integrity of the person
(violated, for example, by slavery and serfdom, and by the denial of freedom of movement and occupation) and the rights and liberties covered by
the rule of law.""' The constitutional essentials also include due process
of law, equal protection of the laws, the right to personal property, and a
guaranteed provision of a social minimum of goods and services to meet
citizens' basic needs. 3" In other words, guarantees of these basic liberties are preconditions for securing both deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy. Possession of this whole family of equal basic liberties
constitutes the common and guaranteed status of free and equal citizen-

ship."
3. ConstitutionalConstructivism:A GuidingFrameworkfor Securing
DeliberativeDemocracy and DeliberativeAutonomy.-Constitutional constructivism builds upon the architecture of Rawls's political constructivism.
Rawls states that although his political conception of justice "is not to be

395. See id. at 332-35. For an explanation of my usage of the term "deliberative automony," see
supra note 210. For a similar usage of that term in the context ofjustifying a woman's constitutional
right to decide whether to have an abortion, see Cohen, supra note 215, at 176-86.
396. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 337-38.
397. See id. at 335-38.
398. Id. at 335. The rights and liberties covered by the rule of law include, for example,
procedural due process, habeas corpus, freedom from unreasonablesearches and seizures, and freedom
from self-incrimination. See RAWLS, supra note 32, at 235-43; Freeman, Democratic Interpretation,
supra note 32, at 26, 31.
399. See supra text accompanying note 376.
400. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 335.
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regarded as a method of answering the jurist's questions," it may provide

"a guiding framework, which if jurists find it convincing, may orient their
reflections, complement their knowledge, and assist their judgment.""
He also states that it is "a guiding framework of deliberation and reflec-

tion" concerning constitutional essentials.'

In putting forth a constitu-

tional constructivism, I intend to deploy this guiding framework to help

orient our reflections, deliberations, and judgment in interpreting and
justifying our Constitution and our constitutional democracy. I do not,
however, mean to suggest that our Constitution is a perfectly just constitu-

tion, or to offer constitutional constructivism as a theory of constructing a
constitution for a perfect liberal utopia, unconstrained by our constitutional
text, history, and structure (not to mention tradition, practice, and culture).

a. What, how, and who?-In general, constitutional constructivism is a conception of what the Constitution is, how it ought to be interpreted, and who may authoritatively interpret it.'

First, as for what,

constitutional constructivism conceives our Constitution as embodying (or
aspiring to embody) a coherent scheme of equal basic liberties, or fair
terms of social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and trust, for our
constitutional democracy. The Constitution does not merely enact a
discrete list of particular rights narrowly conceived by the framers and
ratifiers.'
Furthermore, as indicated above, the theory understands our

constitutional democracy as dualist in a general way."

401. Id. at 368.
402. Id. at 156, 368. On the idea of a guiding framework for deliberation, reflection, and
judgment, see RAWLS, supra note 32, at 53; Rawls, supra note 189, at 560-64.
403. For a work organizing constitutional interpretation on the basis of these three fundamental
interrogatives, see MURPHY, FLEMING & HARRIs, supra note 35.
404. See DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 119, 126-29; Dworkin, supra note 42, at 382 (both
contrasting a constitution of principle with a constitution of detail); see also Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2833 (1992) (joint opinion) (conceiving the Constitution as a "covenant" or
"coherent succession" embodying "ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than one"); id.
at 2838-42 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2853 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (construing the Court's
personal-liberty cases as protecting the general right of privacy rather than a laundry list of particular
rights).
405. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 231-34 (referring to I ACKERMAN, supra note 21). A theory
of constitutional democracy can be dualist in a general sense, see supra text accompanying note 380,
without being dualist in Ackerman's specific sense-that is, without endorsing his complex apparatus
of higher lawmaking through structural amendments to the Constitution outside the formal Article V
amendment procedure, and without accepting his purported distinction between dualism and rights
foundationalism on the ground that the former theory but not the latter rejects the idea that a duly
ratified amendment might be unconstitutional. See I AcKEuMAN, supra note 21, at 13-16, 319-21.
For discussions of the idea that Ackerman's hypothetical amendment repealing the First Amendment
and establishing a state religion, id. at 14-16, instead of being a valid amendment, amounts to a
"constitutional breakdown" or "revolution," see RAWLS, supra note 31, at 239; Freeman, Democratic
Interpretation,supra note 32, at 41-42. Put another way, just as Ackerman elaborates a notion of
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Second, as regards how, constitutional constructivism conceives interpretation as the exercise of reasoned judgment' in quest of the interpretation that best fits and justifies the constitutional document and underlying
constitutional order.'
Responsible interpretation is not merely exegesis
of isolated clauses of the constitutional document or research into the
concrete intentions of the framers and ratifiers. In short, the theory is
committed to a methodological constructivism.
Finally, with respect to who, constitutional constructivism holds that
although the Supreme Court generally is the final (but not the exclusive)
institutional interpreter in any given case, We the People are the ultimate
interpreters of the Constitution. 8 Furthermore, it distinguishes between
the partial, judicially enforceable Constitution and the whole Constitution
that is binding outside the courts upon legislatures, executive officials, and
citizens generally in our constitutional democracy (unless and until they
amend it).'
As Rawls puts it, the Supreme Court is an "exemplar of

'structural amendments" to the Constitution outside the formal Article V amending procedure, see
Ackerman, supra note 65, at 1051-57; 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 266-94, so might one develop
a notion of "structural entrenchments" to the Constitution through constitutional practice and tradition.
See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 238-39 (suggesting that constitutional tradition and practice over two
centuries place restrictions on the formal amending procedure of Article V). On such a view, neither
amendment nor entrenchment is purely positivist and confined to the fbrmal procedures of Article V.
See HARRIs, supra note 21, at 164-208; MACEDO, supra note 21, at 182-83 (both describing limitations
beyond the text of Article V on amending power); Murphy, Ordering, supra note 21, at 754-57
(discussing basic values and the possibility of unconstitutional constitutional amendments). I pursue
these matters further in James E. Fleming, We the Exceptional American People, 11 CONST.
COMMENTARY (forthcoming 1994). For valuable discussions of the theory and practice of amending
the Constitution, see RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION (Sanford Levinson ed., forthcoming 1994); Akhil
R. Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article VP 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1043, 1044 (1988) (arguing that the "first, most undeniable, inalienable and important, if
unenumerated, right of the People is the right of a majority of voters to amend the Constitution-even
in ways not expressly provided for by Article V").
406. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (joint opinion); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (calling for "rational process" ofjudgment); cf. RAWLS, supra note 31,
at 222 (discussing "reasoned judgment").
407. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 236 & n.23. For the two dimensions of best interpretation,
fit and justification, see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
408. See RAWLS, supranote 31, at 232-33, 237. But see supra note 405 (discussing the possibility
that some provisions are entrenched outside the formal Article V amending procedure). Constitutional
constructivism entails a "protestant" conception of who may interpret the Constitution. See LEVINSON,
supra note 281, at 29, 9-53 ("As to the ultimate authority to interpret the source of doctrine, the
protestant position is based on the legitimacy of individualized (or at least nonhierarchical communal)
interpretation."); see also Michelman, supra note 373, at 11-18 (arguing that Rawls's political
liberalism rejects "judicial supremacy").
409. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 240. For example, the Constitution might impose affirmative
obligations upon the legislative and executive branches of government, such as a constitutional
obligation to provide a social minimum of goods and services to meet the basic needs of all citizens,
but it might not accord a judicially enforceable right to such subsistence in the absence of legislative
or executive measures. Others have expressed similar views concerning the gap between thejudicially
enforceable Constitution and the Constitution that is binding outside the courts. See, e.g., SUNSrEIN,
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public reason" in a forum of principle.41 ° But it is not the exclusive
voice of such reason, nor is it the sole forum of principle: "[W]hile the
Court is special in this respect, the other branches of government can
certainly, if they would but do so, be forums of principle along with it in
debating constitutional questions."" In other words, constitutional constructivism is a theory of the Constitution, not merely a theory of judicial
review. Moreover, judicial review is subject to certain institutional limits
in carrying out2 social reform, such as those sensitively and sensibly stated
41
by Sunstein.
b. The two fimdamental cases or themes of deliberativedemocracy and deliberative autonomy.-In particular, constitutional constructivism entails a theory of judicial review with an active role for courts with
respect to the two fundamental cases or themes: first, securing the preconditions for deliberative democracy, to enable citizens to apply their
capacity for a conception of justice to judging and deliberating about the
justice of basic institutions and social policies, and second, securing the
preconditions for deliberative autonomy, to enable citizens to apply their
capacity for a conception of the good (or their power of deliberative
reason) to deliberating about how to live their own lives, in order to afford
everyone the common and guaranteed status of free and equal citizenship
in our constitutional democracy. In other words, courts should exercise
more stringent review to strike down democratic choices when those
choices do not respect the preconditions for deliberative democracy and
deliberative autonomy. The remaining (and supporting) basic liberties, as
stated above, also must be guaranteed in order to secure these preconditions.
Constitutional constructivism's first theme, concerned with securing
deliberative democracy, is quite similar to Sunstein's principal theme of
securing deliberative democracy. It frames questions regarding the equal
political liberties and freedom of thought much as his theory does (though

supra note 22, at 9-10, 138-40, 145-61, 350; Sager, FairMeasure, supra note 158; Sager, Thinness,
supra note 158; supra note 126; supra note 158 and accompanying text.
410. RAWLs, supra note 31, at 231, 235-37, 240 (referring to Dworkin's notion of courts as a
"forum of principle," in Dworkin, Forum, supra note 12, at 516-18). For the idea of the Supreme
Court as an educative institution, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative
Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961 (1992). Again, I do not take up the question of whether judicial
review is a necessary requirement in a constitutional democracy. See supra note 381. Here 1 am
offering an account of the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional democracy.
411. RAWLs, supra note 31, at 240.
412. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 145-53; supra text accompanying note 160-161. It is not
the role of courts to say what arrangements are necessary to secure the preconditions for deliberative
democracy and deliberative autonomy, but merely to assure that the arrangements enacted by
legislatures do not flout these preconditions. See RAWLs, supra note 31, at 362.
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I do not endorse everything that Sunstein proposes in elaborating and
applying his principal theme). Indeed, as noted above, Sunstein repeatedly
claims that his theory of deliberative democracy is entirely compatible
with, not to mention indebted to, the theories of constitutional democracy
put forward by Mill and Rawls.4 13
Furthermore, the first fundamental theme of deliberative democracy
seeks to assure that political decisions will be impartial in the sense that
they are justifiable on the basis ofpublic-regardingreasons, not merely the
self-interested preferences of private groups or individuals.4 14 Constitutional constructivism conceives our political system to be a public facility
for deliberation concerning the common good, not a veritable political market for aggregation of self-interested preferences. Also, this theme forbids
political deeisions that violate the constraints of impartiality in the sense
that they deny equal citizenship to groups or individuals on the basis of
morally irrelevant characteristics, such as race, sex, or sexual orientation.41 5
I have previewed this first theme, along with its central notion of
securing political equality or the fair value of the equal political liberties,
in presenting Sunstein's cogent analysis of Buckley as an incarnation of
Lochner (which itself draws upon Rawls's discussion of those cases).416
The equal political liberties are primus interpares, first among the equal
basic liberties. Constitutional constructivism in this respect parallels the
doctrine of preferred freedoms outlined in footnote four of Carolene
Productsand elaborated in Ely's theory, not to mention Sunstein's. It also
incorporates their two Carolene Products categories of cases warranting
stricter judicial scrutiny. Finally, it largely accepts Sunstein's insightful
analysis of the legacy of Lochner and is wary of status quo neutralitywithout further justification-as a baseline for judging the justice of basic
institutions and social policies and as a constraint on deliberative democ417
racy.

413. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
414. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 219-20, 359-63; RAWLS, supra note 32, at 221-28, 356-62;
cf. SUNSrEIN, supra note 22, at 17-39, 133-41 (arguing that interest-group pluralism is antithetical to
deliberative democracy, which requires public-regarding reasons for political decisions); supra text
accompanying notes 144-48 (summarizing the requirement of public-regarding reasons in Sunstein's
theory).
415. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 79-81, 335; cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 136,259-61, 402
n. 17 (acknowledging that his notion that morally irrelevant differences should not be turned into social
disadvantages draws upon RAWLS, supra note 32).
416. As stated above, both Sunstein and Rawls argue that Buckley is analogous to Lochner because
the Court misconceives our political system as a veritable marketplace of preferences rather than a
republic of reasons. See supra text accompanying notes 170-78.
417. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07. Thus, within constitutional constructivism, there
is no justification for special judicial protection for economic liberties.
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Constitutional constructivism's second theme, concerned with securing
deliberative autonomy, is not articulated as a principal theme in Sunstein's
theory. It aspires centrally to protect liberty of conscience and freedom of
association, along with autonomy and privacy. Moreover, at least where
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at stake, it seeks to
assure that political decisions will be impartial in the sense that they are
justifiable on the basis ofpublic reason-ongrounds that citizens generally
can reasonably be expected to endorse, because they come within an over-

lapping consensus concerning a political conception of justice.41

These

constitutional restrictions must be honored if free and equal citizens are to
engage in social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and trust in a

constitutional democracy such as our own, which is characterized by the
fact of reasonable pluralism and which recognizes the related fact of

oppression."'

Constitutional constructivism conceives our polity as

being subject to the limits of public reason, at least where constitutional
essentials and matters of basic justice are at stake, rather than being free
to make collective judgments founded solely on comprehensive religious,
moral, or philosophical conceptions of the good.4'
I have previewed this second theme in criticizing Sunstein's theory for

emphasizing deliberative democracy to the neglect of deliberative autonomy. I also have shown, through critiquing his analysis of Bowers, that
constitutional constructivism, unlike Sunstein's theory, applies both substantive due process and equal protection as bases for securing the status
of free and equal citizenship for everyone. As shown above, it embraces

conceptions like decisional autonomy, decisional privacy, spatial privacy,
and freedom of intimate association as aspects of deliberative autonomy,

not merely an anticaste principle of equal citizenship as an aspect of deliberative democracy.42

The architecture of constitutional constructivism,

418. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 213-20, 223-30; Freeman, DemocraticInterpretation,supra
note 32, at 17, 20-29.
419. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 319, 337-38; supra text accompanying notes 362-65.
420. Rawls speaks of the limits of public reason as imposing "a moral, not a legal, duty-theduty
of civility." RAWLS, supra note 31, at 217. Others have produced valuable discussions and
applications of Rawls's idea of public reason to constitutional theory. See Lawrence B. Solum,
Constructingan Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. (forthcoming 1993); Lawrence B.
Solum, Faith andJustice, 39 DEPAUL L. Rsv. 1083 (1990); Edward B. Foley, PoliticalLiberalism
and EstablishmentClause Jurisprudence,43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 963 (1993). Elsewhere I plan to
elaborate upon the constraints of public reason in our constitutional democracy. Here I would note that
Rawls has suggested that the ideal of public reason does not forbid citizens to rely upon their religious
beliefs in public discussions of political matters, provided that they also in due course support their
political proposals in terms of the values of public reason. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason:
Further Considerations § 3 (Nov. 2, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (discussing
"wide public reason"); RAWLS, supra note 31, at 247-54 (adopting an "inclusive" view of public
reason).
421. Seeuring deliberative autonomy would not involve Lochnering in Sunstein's sense, for these
constraints on deliberative democracy are not reflections of status quo neutrality. See supra text
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unlike that of Sunstein's theory, would not force or lead it to recast such
basic liberties, better understood as preconditions for deliberative
autonomy, as preconditions for deliberative democracy or, worse yet, to
disregard them entirely.
Constitutional constructivism accords priority to the whole family of
equal basic liberties over pursuit of conceptions of the public good or the
imposition of perfectionist values. 4' This understanding of priority entails that it may be permissible to regulate certain basic liberties for the
sake of securing other basic liberties or the whole family of such liberties.
No single basic liberty by itself is absolute.4' For example, Buckley was
wrongly decided with respect to limitations on campaign expenditures,
among other reasons, because the Court failed to see the Constitution as a
whole. Therefore, it failed to see that freedom of political expression may
be regulated (though not restricted) through campaign finance laws in order
to try to assure political equality, or the fair value of the equal political
liberties, for equal citizens in a fair scheme of representation.'
The
Court's single-minded focus on the First Amendment without regard to
such preconditions for deliberative democracy blinded it to that compelling
governmental objective. 4'

accompanying notes 135-36, 235-37, 318. Instead, they are rooted in a conception of citizens as free
and equal and of what is necessary for the development and exercise of their two moral powers. See
supra subsection IV(A)(2)(c).
422. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 6, 223, 295.
423. Id. at 294-99.
424. See id. at 359-63. Rawls states that his discussion of Buckley is "in sympathy with" Justice
White's and Justice Marshall's dissents in Buckley, id. at 359 n.72 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 257-66 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) and id. at 287-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting)), as well as with
Justice White's dissent in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 803-04 (1978) (arguing that
the government's interest in prohibiting expenditures by banks and corporations to influence the
outcome of voting on certain referenda is derived from the First Amendment and the system of
expression itself). See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 359 n.72.
425. A similar blindness may be at work in Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), which struck down a "Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance."
Scalia and the Court resolutely refused to see the Constitution as a whole and therefore failed to see
that freedom of hateful racist expression quite possibly may be regulated (though not restricted) in order
to attempt to secure equal citizenship for members of groups who are subject to racial, religious, or
gender hostility. Cf. Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 106 HAPV. L. REV. 124, 151-60 (1992) (criticizing the Court for ignoring the Reconstruction
Amendments). But see Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A PenumbraToo Far, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1639, 1657 (1993) (arguing, in response to Amar, supra, that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are "missing" from R.A. V. because "penumbras and emanations are dangerous business," and
these provisions' "shadows" are "too tenuous" or "too far" from the First Amendment to be brought
to bear on the case). This suggestion regarding what is wrong with Scalia's opinion accords with that
of Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in R.A. V. Stevens argues that the First Amendment-in
isolation from the whole scheme-is not an absolute. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2564 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice White made a similar argument in R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2556, 2555-56 (White,
J., concurring) (mentioning the Equal Protection Clause and stating that "[in light of our Nation's long
and painful experience with discrimination," the ordinance was plainly reasonable and the interest
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Sunstein's theory of securing deliberative democracy bears a resemblance to Alexander Meildejohn's well-known view of the overriding value
of self-government and political freedom. 4' Constitutional constructivism also has a certain similarity to Meiklejohn's view, but it gives the kind
of primacy that Meiklejohn and Sunstein give to political liberties instead
to the family of political and personal liberties as a wholeF and thus
seeks to secure both deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy.
It aspires to be a theory of self-government in both a political sense and a
personal sense. 42
. c. Constitutionaldemocracyand trustworthiness.-Constitutional
constructivism is a theory of constitutional democracy and trustworthiness,
an alternative to Ely's theory of representative democracy and distrust and
to Sunstein's theory of deliberative democracy and impartiality. I mean
trustworthiness in the sense of Rawls's own remark: "By publicly affirming
the basic liberties citizens ...express their mutual respect for one another
as reasonable and trustworthy, as well as their recognition of the worth all
citizens attach to their way of life."429 Each of constitutional constructivism's two themes seeks to secure a type of precondition for the trustworthiness of political decisions in our constitutional democracy. To be
trustworthy, a constitutional democracy must secure and respect a scheme
of equal basic liberties that guarantees not only the preconditions for
deliberative democracy but also the preconditions for deliberative autonomy. Ely's and Sunstein's process-perfecting theories secure only the
former type of precondition for trust or impartiality.
Hence, constitutional constructivism is a fuller theory of perfecting the
trustworthy and impartial Constitution than is Sunstein's (or Ely's)
theory.'
Its first theme of securing deliberative democracy, like
Sunstein's theory, requires that political decisions satisfy his impartiality
principle-that they be justifiable on the basis ofpublic-regardingreasons,
not merely self-interested preferences. But its second theme of securing
deliberative autonomy, unlike Sunstein's theory, requires that such decisions satisfy another principle of impartiality-that they be justifiable on the

compelling). For Sunstein's analysis of R.A.V., see SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 245-53; SUNSTEIN,
supra note 143, at 180-93.
426. Sunstein, for example, writes that a renewal of the Madisonian view that "the First

Amendment is principally about political deliberation, [which was] asserted most vigorously in the work
of the philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn, would help to resolve many current controversies."
SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 232 (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)).

427. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 290 n.1.
428. These two senses of self-government, however, are interrelated. See supra note 211 and
accompanying text.
429. Id. at 319; see supra text accompanying note 36.
430. See supra text accompanying note 341.
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basis of public reason, or reasons that everyone in our constitutional
democracy can reasonably be expected to accept, whatever their particular
conceptions of the good. It would secure greater toleration for citizens'
pursuit of divergent conceptions of the good than does his theory. Like
Rawls's political constructivism, constitutional constructivism generalizes
the principle of religious toleration to apply to reasonable conceptions of
the good. 1 From the standpoint of constitutional constructivism, Sunstein's theory of securing deliberative democracy to the neglect of securing
deliberative autonomy is not sufficiently impartial. His partial Constitution
is not trustworthy enough.
Constitutional constructivism, with its two themes, gives a sense to the
common idea of the Constitution as the basis for a civil religion in our
constitutional democracy.432 The idea is that the Constitution, conceived
as an embodiment of fair terms of social cooperation on the basis of mutual
respect and trust among free and equal citizens, provides a shared public
basis for reasonable political agreement in our morally pluralistic constitutional democracy. In this sense, constitutional constructivism does not
gainsay Justice Holmes's observation in dissent in Lochner that "a constitution.., is made for people of fundamentally differing views."'
B.

ConstitutionalConstructivism Does Not Take a Pointless Flightfrom
Substance

I have claimed that constitutional constructivism resists the temptations
to take flights from substantive liberties like those taken by Ely's and Sunstein's theories. Now I shall pull together several earlier strands of the
analysis. Bear in mind that this Article merely sets forth an outline for a
constitutional constructivism, but it should suffice to suggest ways in which
such a theory avoids Ely's and Sunstein's flights.
1. Constitutional Constructivism Avoids Ely's Flight from Substance.-In Part II, I intimated that constitutional constructivism avoids
Ely's flight from giving effect to certain substantive provisions of the

431. See supra text accompanying note 365; supra note 420 and accompanying text.
432. For the idea of the Constitution in the American civil religion, see LEVINSON, supra note
281, at 9-53. Kathleen Sullivan has advanced a theory of "the culture of liberal democracy" as the
American "civil public order" entailed by the religion clauses of the First Amendment. See Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Religion andLiberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 199, 197 (1992); see also
Abner S. Greene, The PoliticalBalance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1613 (1993)
(arguing that "if the Establishment Clause should be read to place a special burden on the role of
religious values in politics, then those values should receive special treatment when they conflict with
the values adopted by the legislature"). For a view contrary to Sullivan's (and Greene's), see Michael
W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992).
433. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Constitution to merely perfecting processes. Here I suggest three arguments for the superiority of constitutional constructivism over Ely's theory
of reinforcing representative democracy. These arguments parallel Ely's
three arguments for his theory of judicial review, or his three criteria for
an acceptable theory.
Ely's first argument for his process-perfecting theory is that it better
fits and justifies the constitutional document and underlying constitutional
order than do substantive fundamental values theories.'
I contended,
though, that his own quest for the ultimate interpretivism showed the need
for a Constitution-perfecting theory, such as a constitutional constructivism.
In this Part, I have outlined the latter sort of theory, which provides a
guiding framework of equal basic liberties. Constitutional contructivism's
second theme of securing deliberative autonomy fits and justifies the substantive liberties manifested in our constitutional document and implicit in
our underlying constitutional order that elude the reach of the two processperfecting themes of Ely's Carolene Productsframework. Its first theme
of securing deliberative democracy better fits and justifies our constitutional
democracy's political processes than does Ely's qualified utilitarian and
pluralist theory of representative democracy. Accordingly, constitutional
constructivism better satisfies Ely's first criterion than does his own theory.
Ely's second argument is that his theory, unlike substantive fundamental values theories, "is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary is
entirely supportive of, the American system of representative democracy. " 435 This argument assumes that, or begs the question whether, the
political theory that best fits and justifies the American system is Ely's
theory of representative democracy as an applied utilitarianism.4 36 By
constructing such a conception of our system, which cannot account for
certain substantive liberties, Ely has built his flight from such liberties into
the very substance of his process-oriented political theory of representative
democracy. His theory, however, is not consistent with and supportive of
the substantive liberties that it cannot account for and that are better fit and
justified by constitutional constructivism.
Constitutional constructivism, by contrast, argues that our underlying
system is better interpreted as a constitutional democracy and a synthesis
of liberalism and republicanism. Unlike Ely's theory, it aspires to perfect

434. See ELY, supra note 16, at 88, 87-101 (arguing from "the nature of the United States
Constitution" for a "representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review" rather than a substantive
value-protecting approach).
435. Id. at 102; see id. at 88.
436. See Dworkin, supra note 42, at 384, 384-85 (characterizing Ely's theory as adopting an
"'external' revisionist strategy" that "plainly begs the question" what conception of democracy the
Constitution establishes and that "rewrites [the Constitution] to make it more congenial to what the
revisionists consider the best theory of democracy").
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both our constitutional democracy's substantive preconditions for deliberative democracy and its procedural preconditions for deliberative autonomy
and thus to reinforce that system on its own terms. Accordingly, constitutional constructivism is more consistent with and more effective at reinforcing our underlying system than is Ely's theory. Therefore, it is
superior to Ely's theory on his second criterion.
Ely's third argument is that his representation-reinforcing theory,
again unlike substantive fundamental values theories, "assigns judges a role
they are conspicuously well situated to fill" as compared with politically
elected officials: perfecting political processes rather than discovering
society's substantive fundamental valuens."' His argument is not so
much one of relative institutional competence as it is one of institutional
position or perspective.
Constitutional constructivism agrees with Ely that courts are different
from legislatures, but it draws the opposite conclusion: Precisely because
of their differences from legislatures, and because of their independence
from politics in the narrow sense of a battleground of power politics,
courts are well situated to protect basic liberties against encroachment by
the ordinary political processes. To use Dworkin's term, courts should be
(That is not
a "forum of principle," vindicating fundamental rights."3
executive
branches
should
not also be
however,
that
legislative
and
to say,
forums of principle, deliberating concerning matters of principle." 9 )
This argument, like Ely's, is less one of competence than of institutional position. It is an argument about the entailments of judges' responsibility to render their decisions according to law, understanding law on a
constructivist model of principles rather than a positivist model of

rules.'

As Justice Jackson put it in the second flag salute case,

437. ELY, supra note 16, at 102; see id. at 88, 103; Ely, supra note 78, at 833-36 & 833 n.4.
438. See Dworkin, Forum, supra note 12, at 516-18. But see Ely, supra note 78, at 833 n.4
(criticizing the fundamental values strand of the legal process tradition represented by, e.g., Henry M.
Hart, Jr., Foreword:The une Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959)).
439. See RAWLS, supra note 31, at 240. Similarly, Sunstein criticizes Dworkin's distinction
between legislatures as a battleground of power politics and courts as a forum of principle for being
overstated and for understating the extent to which "the major reflections of principled deliberation in
the American history have come from Congress and the President, not the courts." SUNSTEIN, supra
note 22, at 146.
440. See DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 14-45, 46-80, 87-88, 104-05, 126, 160-62
(contrasting the constructivist model of principles with the positivist model of rules as different
conceptions of the rule of law and emphasizing the responsibility ofjudges and the notion of"articulate
consistency" under the former model); DWORKIN, Political Judges andthe Rule of Law, in DWORKIN,
PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 9 (contrasting the model of principles (the "rights" conception) with the
model of rules (the "rule-book" conception)); DWORKIN, How Law Is Like Literature, in DWORKIN,
PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 146, 159-62 (stressing judges' responsibilities under the model of
principles); DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 114-50, 176-224 (contrasting "law as integrity" with
positivism (or "conventionalism")). Contrast Scalia's positivist understanding of the rule of law as a
law of rules. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
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responding to Justice Frankfurter in the first flag salute case: Rather than
deferring to the "vicissitudes" of the political process, courts vindicate
fundamental rights, "not by authority of [their] competence but by force of
[their] commissions. " "
Constitutional constructivism combines a conception of courts as an
exemplar of public reason in a forum of principle, vindicating fundamental
rights in our constitutional democracy, with a recognition of certain institutional limits of courts, such as those stated by Sunstein.1 2 Ely
basically uses the notion of "substance" versus "process" as a principle of
role differentiation between legislatures and courts, so again he builds his
flight from certain substantive liberties into his argument for a processperfecting theory of judicial review. 3 Constitutional constructivism is
also superior to Ely's theory on his third criterion.
And so, constitutional constructivism better satisfies Ely's three criteria for an acceptable theory of judicial review than does his own theory.
It also is at once more liberal and more republican than Ely's qualified
utilitarian and pluralist theory. Finally, it is a fuller Constitution-perfecting
theory.
2. Constitutional Constructivism Avoids Sunstein's Flightfrom Substance.-In Part III, I contended that constitutional constructivism avoids
Sunstein's flight from deliberative autonomy to deliberative democracy and,
in particular, from substantive due process to equal protection. Now that
I have outlined that theory more fully, I shall review those arguments.
First, constitutional constructivism does not flee deliberative autonomy
for deliberative democracy. It offers a better synthesis of the traditions of
liberalism and republicanism than does Sunstein's liberal republicanism, for
it combines a "republican" theme of securing the preconditions for deliberative democracy with a "liberal" theme of securing the preconditions for
deliberative autonomy. Sunstein's synthesis emphasizes the liberties of the
ancients to the neglect of the liberties of the modems. Furthermore, constitutional constructivism better fits and justifies certain substantive liberties

(1989). For a similar contrast, though between standards and rules instead of principles and rules, see
Sullivan, supra note 10. For a valuable analysis of the model of principles and the model of rules as
competing understandings of the ideal of the rule of law, see Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity to PreExisting Law and the Legitimacy of Legal Decision, 69 NOTRE DAmE L. REV. 1 (1993).
441. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638, 640 (1943), overruling
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). In Gobids, Justice Frankfurter's opinion of
the Court had emphasized that courts "possess no marked and certainly no controlling competence" as
compared with state legislatures and school boards in deciding whether compelling a salute to the flag
inculcates patriotism. Gobits, 310 U.S. at 597-98.
442. See supra notes 409-12 and accompanying text.
443. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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manifested on the face of our constitutional document and implicit in our
underlying constitutional order than does Sunstein's theory.
Second, constitutional constructivism does not flee substantive due
process for equal protection. It aspires to secure both free and equal
citizenship for everyone by providing both liberty- and equality-rooted
baselines for criticizing existing practices that fail to satisfy the preconditions for deliberative autonomy and deliberative democracy. It offers
a better combination of liberty and equality in one coherent scheme of
equal basic liberties than does Sunstein's theory. In sum, constitutional
constructivism is a fuller Constitution-perfecting theory.
C. Constitutional Constructivism Does Not Take a Boundless Flight to
Substance: The Specter of Lochner
Hence, constitutional constructivism does not take a flight from
substance to process like Ely's or Sunstein's theories. But does it take a
boundless flight from process to substance beyond the Constitution? That
is, does it put aside the legal materials of our constitutional order and
succumb to the temptation to remake our Constitution in the image of a
Indeed, is constructivism the very incarnation
perfect liberal utopia?'
of the specter of Lochner?
Constitutional constructivism must be prepared to confront the
inevitable paraphrase of Justice Holmes's dissenting opinion in Lochner:
If the Constitution does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,
neither does it enact Mr. John Rawls's A Theory of Justice or his Political
Liberalism.' What responses can it give to this paraphrase?
Most important, a first response is to recall that constitutional
constructivism simply deploys the constructivist framework as a guiding
framework to help orient our reflections, deliberations, and judgment about
our Constitution and our constitutional democracy as embodying (or
aspiring to embody) a coherent scheme of equal basic liberties, rather than
It does not make
merely enacting a "laundry list of particular rights."'
and ratifiers
framers
an absurd anachronistic claim that the constitutional
4
in 1791 enacted a book published by Rawls in 1971, much less 1993.'

444. See BORK, supra note 5, at 210-14, 351-55; Monaghan, supra note 15, at 356.
445. See Ely, supra note 70, at 401 (quoting paraphrase of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) with respect to Mill's On Liberty). But see Commonwealth v.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 496-98 (Ky. 1992) (implying that the Kentucky Constitution does enact John
Stuart Mill's On Liberty); supra text accompanying note 306 (discussing Wasson).
446. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2853 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); see supra text accompanying notes
357, 401-04.
447. But see BORK, supra note 5, at 211 (ridiculing efforts to apply Rawls's A Theory of Justice
to interpreting our Constitution).
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Nor does it make a far-fetched Panglossian claim that our Constitution
establishes a perfect liberal utopia.'

It simply conceives our equal basic

liberties as being centrally concerned with two fundamental cases or
themes, those of deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy.
A second response to the paraphrase is in terms of economic liberties
and particular economic theories: To grant that it would aptly dispose of
any attempt to read Rawls's difference principle, like liberty of contract,

into our Constitution. But we need to recall that Rawls himself argues that
the difference principle is not among the constitutional essentials that would
be incorporated into a constitution in the ideal four-stage sequence (let
alone into our Constitution).M 9 He observes that history, including the

era of Lochner, shows that principles to regulate economic and social inequalities and other distributive principles are not among the constitutional
essentials that are incorporated as constitutional restrictions. "Rather," he
suggests, "just legislation seems to be best achieved by assuring fairness

in representation and by other constitutional devices. " '

In this respect,

Rawls sounds more like Ely or Sunstein than like either Justice Brewer of
the Lochner era451 or Richard A. Epstein or Mark V. Tushnet of the age
of Roe and Buckley. 452

A third, more general response is in terms of the legacy of Lochner.
Constitutional constructivism largely accepts Sunstein's provocative
analysis of what was wrong with Lochner and largely rejects status quo

neutrality-without further justification-as a baseline that imposes constraints on deliberative democracy. It decidedly does not enact status quo
neutrality, whereas Lochner in effect did.
A final response is in terms of interpretive method: To argue that the
terms of Holmes's dissent in Lochner, such as whether the Constitution

448. But see Monaghan,supra note 15, at 356 (criticizing "due substance" theorists as espousing
the utopian view of a perfect Constitution).
449. See supra text aceompanying notes 377-79.
450. RAWLS, supra note 31, at 337.
451. It is hard to determine who is the most heinous villain of the era of Lochner. The
progressive historian Arnold M. Paul awards the prize to Brewer. See ARNOLD M. PAUL,
CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW 70, 83 n.3 (1960) (analyzing, e.g., David J. Brewer,
The Nation's Safeguard, 1893 Proceedings of the New York State Bar Association-Sixteenth Annual
Meeting). Later in 1893, perhaps in response to Brewer, Thayerpublished his classic essay calling for
judicial deference to the national representative process. For discussions of Thayer, see supra notes
128-33, 158-62 and accompanying text.
452. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4 (advocating stringent judicial protection of economic liberties,
though under the Takings Clause and the Contract Clause rather than the Due Process Clauses); Mark
V. Tushnet, The Dilemmas ofLiberal Constitutionalism,42 OHIO ST. U. 411,424 (1981) (explaining
that his answer to the question "how would you decide the X case" is "to make an explicitly political
judgment: which result is, in the circumstances now existing, likely to advancethe cause of socialism"
and then "write an opinion in some currently favored version of Grand Theory" (emphasis in original);
supra text accompanying notes 201-07.
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"enacts" the text of "a particular economic theory" or a particular political
theory, are the wrong terms. Instead, the right terms are what substantive
political theory best fits and justifies the constitutional document and
underlying constitutional order as a whole-taking the Constitution's text,
history, and structure as "fixed points" that a theory must acceptably fit
and justify. 53 These terms are those of a methodological constructivism

and are accepted with slight variations by Ely and Sunstein.
Constitutional constructivism holds that interpreting the Constitution
with fidelity and integrity to its text, history, and structure requires

elaborating the substantive political theory (or competing theories) that best
fits and justifies the constitutional document and underlying constitutional
order that were originally framed and have developed. 4 Thus, substantive political theory in constitutional interpretation is bounded by the
criteria of fit with and justification of the extant legal materials. Courts are

exemplars of public reason in a forum of principle, not seminars of boundless philosophical speculation. 55 The character of the Constitution, as

an embodiment of a coherent scheme of general principles rather than
merely an enactment of a discrete list of particular rights, "enacts" or

establishes the need for substantive political theory in interpreting it faithfully and with integrity. These terms are those not only of a methodologi-

cal constructivism but also of the joint opinion of Casey along with the
opinions of Justices Stevens and Blackmun. 56 On this view, to echo The

FederalistNo. 78, courts have neither force nor will but merely reasoned
judgment.5 7
In conclusion, it would be profoundly beside the point to protest, as

against constitutional constructivism, that the Constitution does not enact
Rawls's PoliticalLiberalism. One might practically as well complain that

453. See RAWLS, supranote 31, at 8, 124,342-43; RAWLS, supra note 32, at 19-20,579-81 (both
discussing certain "fixed points," or moral convictions about which people generally agree and to which
any theory ofjustice must conform); see also DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note21, at 159-68 (describing
Rawls's theory of equilibrium between the "fixed points" in which people adjust between theory and
conviction until a fit is reached).
454. For an illuminating account of fidelity in constitutional interpretation, see Lawrence Lessig,
Fidelity in Translation,71 TEx. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
455. For the idea of courts as exemplars of public reason in a forum of principle, see supra text
accompanying notes 399-403. By "seminar," I mean to echo BICKEL, supra note 47, at 26 (quoting
Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Characterof JudicialReview, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208
(1952)).
456. See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
457. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 48, at 465 ("Thejudiciary... may truly be said
to have neither force nor will but merely judgment."). For the phrase "reasoned judgment," see
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2806 (1992) (joint opinion). For Scalia's angry reply,
invoking The Federalist No. 78, see id. at 2882 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). For Rawls's (presumably coincidental) usage of the phrase "reasoned judgment,"
see RAWLS, supra note 31, at 222.
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it does not enact the CaroleneProductsframework, or Scalia's Michael H.
framework, or indeed Holmes's dissent in Lochner, to say nothing of
Bork's The Tempting of America. All of this should go without saying.
The inevitable paraphrase of Holmes's dissent in Lochner is hardly dispositive of the projects of Ely, Sunstein, or constitutional constructivism.
V.

Conclusion: Constitutional Democracy and Trustworthiness

We need to move beyond Ely's and Sunstein's process-perfecting
theories to a Constitution-perfecting theory, a theory that would reinforce
not only the procedural liberties but also the substantive liberties embodied
in our Constitution. In this Article, I have set forth an outline for a
constitutional constructivism, a theory that secures the preconditions for
trustworthiness of political decisions in our constitutional democracy by
reinforcing both the procedural preconditions for deliberative democracy
and the substantive preconditions for deliberative autonomy. Constitutional
constructivism is wary of the specter of Lochner and takes neither a
pointless flight from substance to process nor a boundless flight from
process to substance beyond the Constitution. It provides a guiding
framework to help orient our reflections, deliberations, and judgment in
interpreting and justifying our constitutional document and underlying
constitutional order. Unlike Ely's theory of representative democracy and
distrust and Sunstein's theory of deliberative democracy and impartiality,
constitutional constructivism is a theory of constitutional democracy and
trustworthiness.

